Arms Proliferation in West Asia by Alam, Mohammad Sayeed
ARMS PROLIFERATION IN WEST ASIA 




MOHAMMAD SAYEED ALAM 
Under the supervision of 
Dr. AKHTAR MAJEED 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 




H' a - ^ f l K i d ^ * * * ! ^ ^ 
DS1810 
Department of Political Science 
Aligarii Muslim UnncrsitN 
Aligarh 
P/>o«..;F'^bli== 26720 
(Uni. : 266 
1 1 , 1 0 . 1 9 9 0 
This i s t o c e r t i f y t h a t t h s d i s s e rt-a t ion ^  
e n t i t l e d "Arms " P r o l i f e r a t i o n in West Asis'^ i s 
t h e o r i q i n a l work of Hr, flohammad Sayeed 
Mlam, uho has worked u n d e r my s u p e r v i s i o n , and 
has comple t ed the a t t e n d a n c e / r e s i d e n c e r e q u i r e -
m e n t s , and has c l e a r e d M.Ph i l p a p e r s . In my 
o p i n i o n t h e d i s s e r t a t i o n i s f i t for s u b m i s s i o n 
'^or n . P h i l d e g r e e of t h e A l i g a r h l*luslim 
Un iv/ers i t y , 
Akh ta r Plajeed 
^ juperv isor 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * 
» * 
* DEDICATED J 
* * 
* * 
: TO J 
J MAMU * 
* * 




ttitmt**it * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
C O N T E N T S 
Page 
Acknowledgeme nt i - l i l 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 - 6 
Chapter - I » West Asia in superpowers* 
Strategic Scenario 7 - 4 3 
C h a p t e r - I I t W^st A s i a ' s P o l i c y of 
Arms Acqu i s i t i on 44 - 75 
Chapter - I I I » U ^ A ' S P o l i c y of Arms Supply 
in West Asia 
Chapter -IV : USSR's P o l i c y of Arms 
supply i n west Asia 
Chapter - V j Arms and Oil , 
Conclusion } An Assessment . . . 
B ib l iog raphy . . . 
Appendix - 1.1 . . . 
Appendix - 1 . 2 . . . . 
Appendix - 1 . 3 . . . 
Appendix - 1.4 . . . 
Appendix - 1.5 . . . 
Appendix - 1.6 , . . 
Appendix - 1.7 . . , 
Appendix - 1.8 . . . 
Appendix - 1.9 . . . 






















* * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * 
LIST OF TABLES 
T a b l e No. Page No. 
1.1 Trade Route to Asia via Cape and 
Suez from New York. .... 13 
1.2 world Arms Importsj Share and 
Growth .... 53 
1.3 Us Defence in t e l l i gence Agency 
es t imates of the share of exports 
in sov ie t arms production by item 
1972-83. . . . 104 
1.4 sovie t d e l i v e r i e s of major weapons 
to coun t r i e s with which a t r e a t y 
of f r iendship and co-operat ion has 
been signed. . < . . 106 
1.5 Leading Arms Recipients of sovie t 
arms t o the Third World, 1971-85 108 
1.6 Cyclical Pa t te rn of sovie t Arms 
expor ts t o West Asia. . . . . 118 
1.7 CIA es t ima tes of sov ie t areas 
d e l i v e r i e s and hard currency 
earnings . . . . 129 
l.B USSR hard-currency balance-df-
t rade account . . . . 130 
* * * * * * * 
LIST OF FIGURES 
F i g u r e No. Page No« 
1.1 Air Interdict ion, Basing in 
Israel . . . . i l 
1.2 Air Interdiction, Basing from 
Saudi Arabia .... 19 
1.3 world Arms Imports Market, 
1987 .... 45 
1.4 Imports of major weapons, 
1971-85, North and South Yemen ... 48 
1.5 Leading Anns Importers, 1987 .... 54 
* * * * * ) « * 
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T 
This work owes i t s completion to a host of teachers , 
fellow researchers , f r iends and family members. 
My supervisor . Dr. Akhtar Majeed, Reader, Department 
of P o l i t i c a l Science and Direc tor , Center for S t ra teg ic 
Studies, A.M.U. Aligarh, had s t a r t ed cooperating with 
me r igh t from the time I decided to work on West Asia. 
He advised me to choose the s t r a t e g i c aspects of west Asian 
p o l i t i c s as the f ie ld of my research . His scholarship on 
the subject-mat ter inspired n.e to adhere to h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
His regular valuable advises went along way in f a c i l i t a t i n g 
the smooth s a i l i n g of my research . His c r i t i c a l and appro-
p r i a t e remarks improvised the f ina l manuscript, 
I am thankful to Prof. A .P . Sharma, Chairman, 
Department of P o l i t i c a l Science, for h is help in the 
submission of the d i s s e r t a t i o n without any hinderanoe. 
Prof, S.A.H. Bilgrami, ex-chairman. Department of 
P o l i t i c a l Sc ience , readi ly acceded to my request , for providing 
me with the r e q u i s i t e m a t e r i a l s . His constant proddings 
encouraged me to pursue my research work. 
Prof, M.A. Saleem Khan, ex-Direc tor , Centre of West 
Asian Studies, AI-IU, Aligarh, has always been generous to 
me; from teaching the bas ics of west Asian p o l i t i c s to 
providing unhes i t a t ing ly , valuable ma te r i a l s and 
equal ly valuable suggest ions. Words f a i l me in expressing 
my deep sense of gra t i tude to both of these t eachers . 
Thanks are due to Prof, Mahmoodul Haque, Director 
Centre of West Asian Studies/ A.M.U. Aligarh and Dean* 
Faculty of soc ia l Sciences, for allowing me the use of 
the l i b r a r y of West Asian Studies , A.M.U» Aligarh. 
I am thankful to my teachers in the department. 
Dr. Ishti^que Ahmad, Dr. T.A, Nizami, Prof. A.F. Usmani, 
Prof, Shan Mohammed, Dr. B, Rahmatullah, Mr. Arif Hameed, 
Mr, M, subramanyam for t h e i r encouragement and cooperation, 
I have gained a l o t of confidence from the 
experience and advises of my fellow research scholars , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when the d i s rup t ions and delays discouraged 
me, I wish to thank Mr, Iqbalur Rahman Shahzad, Mr, Irshad 
Pervez and Mr. Mohd, Shahid in t h i s regard, 
I am extremely thankful to my friends Mr, Saulat 
Abbas, Mr. Abdul Vahab, Mr. Jawed S, Ahmad for revis ing 
the manuscript and sparing t h e i r valuable time despi te 
t he i r busy teaching schedule. 
I owe Mr. Naseem Ahmad, Mr, Mohd. Naseem and 
Mr. Alamtar Ali for sharing my burden while r e -wr i t ing 
the f inal manuscript . 
- i i -
S p e c i a l t h a n k s t o Mr. A s i f Azmi and Mr. S a n j a y 
B a t r a f o r p r o v i d i n g me w i t h c o m f o r t a b l e a c c o n o d a t i o n 
d u r i n g my s t a y a t D e l h i , 
I d u l y acknowledge t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t s and w e l l 
w i s h e s of my f r i e n d s and s y m p a t h i s e r s t Mr. Abid M a l i k , 
Mr. S.H. Khan, Mr. Gazi Abdul M a t e e n , Dr . Qausim R a z i , 
D r . Qaseem Raza Khan, Dr . M. Aslam, Mr. S.M. J awed , 
Mr. Shah Alam, Mr, I m t i y a z Khan, Mr. Z a h e e r Khan, Mr. Mohd. 
Owais , Mr. T a r i q Saeed , J a m a l i , K h u r s h e e d , S h o u k e t , s u n i t a , 
A n j a l i , A t h a r R a s o o l , R a s h i d S a e e d , I r s h a d , a A d S a l a h u d d i n , 
I a l s o w i s h t o t hank t h e s t a f f o f Maulana Azad 
L i b r a r y , A.M.U, A l i g a r h , c e n t r e of West As i an S t u d i e s 
L i b H a r y , A.M.U. A l i g a r h , IDSA L i b r a r y , New D e l h i , American 
C e n t e r L i b r a r y , New D e l h i , f o r e x t e n d i n g me e v e r y p o s s i b l e 
a s s i s t a n c e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e c o l l e c t i o n of r e l e v a n t 
r e s e a r c h m a t e r i a l . 
Many t h a n k s t o Mr, Hamendra Kumar Sharma f o r 
t y p i n g t h e m a n u s c r i p t s k i l f u l l y and l a b o u r i o u s l y . 
With u t m o s t g r a t i t u d e , I e x p r e s s my i n d e b t n e s s t o 
my g r a n d - f a t h e r , p a r e n t s , b r o t h e r s , Mr, M a s r o o r Alam, 
Mr. F a r e e d Alam, and s i s t e r , A r s h i a Masood, who wi shed 
me a l l s u c c e s s w h i l e e a g e r l y w a i t i n g t he c o m p l e t i o n o f 
t h e work . 
ALIGARH (M. SAYHED ALAM) 
9 . 1 0 . 1 9 9 0 
- i i i -
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Arms mirror the p o l i t i c s of west Asia. Osci l lating 
prol i feration of arms, r e f l e c t s the shuttl ing of Vtest Asia's 
p o l i t i c s from war to peace and vice versa « gradual and 
continuous politico-economic development a t intranstate 
and in ter - s ta te s levels* changing s trategic scenario of 
the region, shift ing Und also stat ic) foreign policy 
behaviour of the local countries, and international and 
cold war p o l i t i c s in the region. 
Not merely the significance of arms in the context 
of West Asia po l i t i c s ,but i t s u t i l i t y and relevance from 
research purpose i n ^ i r e s one to tindertake ,this topic 
for a detailed and systematic analysis . 
ParadOKically,thetcpic is s t i l l unexplored despite no 
daerth of published material. Arms prol i ferat ion has always 
been dealt with as the sub-part of broader topic , l ike 
superpowers* p o l i t i c s in the region e tc , by the scholars. 
Published works under the concerned topic are a few, 
although i t const i tutes as an important subject matter of 
the works dealing with international p o l i t i c s in West Asia. 
Moreover, seme specif ic works related to the topic lack 
research orientation. 'SIPRI ^ a r Beok*, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Tranfers*, and 'The Military Bala 
1. Weapons S t a t i s t i c s show that during peace arms export 
to the region has dropped, while i t has increased once 
the war broke out and escalated further. 
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are the sound s t a t i s t i c a l works and informative sources 
of research* but not the research work in true sense of 
the term. Therefore* s p e c i f i c and independent research on 
arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y inportant . And t h i s i s 
what guides t h i s study* from the s e l e c t i o n of t o p i c to 
i t s complet ion. 
Importance of armament in West Asia in coraparision 
to other reg ions of the world* wide scope of the t o p i c 
2 
and i t s two dimensional nature , have a l s o prompted the 
undertaking and pursui t of t h i s research work. 
Purpose of t h i s work i s two f o l d . F i r s t purpose of 
the study i s to put forth a comprehensive and systematic 
account of the subject matter . The second one i s t o g ive 
an a n a l y t i c a l assessment the impact of arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
on the s u p p l i e r ' s and the r e c i p i e n t ' s i n t e r e s t s . 
With regard to the hypothes i s , t h i s work has been 
b u i l t around two premises t 
a) That arms (and o i l ) are the bas ic instruments of super-
power - west Asian r e l a t i o n s . 
b) That arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n has served the g o a l s and object-
i v e s of r e c i p i e n t s t a t e s at l imi ted sca l e and tempo-
r a r i l y only and that of suppl ier s t a t e s l a r g e r l y (not 
e x c l u s i v e l y ) but in short-term p e r s p e c t i v e . 
2. Arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n in West Asia i s both an arms t r a n s f e r 
and a c q u i s i t i o n phenomena. 
- 3 -
An elaboration of the t i t l e •Arms Proliferation in 
west Asia* i s essential to be given here t The term 
*Arms proliferation'# as i t s nature suggests^ aims to 
focus in t h i s study upon the intens i ty of quantitative and 
qualitative armament in West Asia and discuss arms trade 
policy of both sides* the recipient and the supplier. 
'West Asia** as per i t s unanimous defination , for 
the purpose of th i s work* has been connoted to the region 
stretching from Iran in east to Egypt in west and from 
Syria in north to south Yamen in south, while c i t ing and/ 
or referring western sources, the researcher has preferred 
the western analogy of the term 'Middle East*. For i t i s 
improper and unappropriate to interchange west Asia for 
the Middle East which i s the larger part of West Asia and 
consists of many arms rec ipients of Aferica, notably Libya. 
Libya i f included in West Asia, changes the entire weapons 
s t a t i s t i c s of the region. 
North Yamen and south Yamen, united when the research 
was underway,, have been deal t with as separate countries. 
Kuwait, presently annexed, has also been referred as a 
sovereign state• 
Though time l imi t i s not specified in the t i t l e , 
the study mainly covers the period between 1970 t i l l date. 
The period prior to 1970 i s not s ignif icant from the view 
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point of a Po l i t i ca l Science/Defence studies research. 
IXaring that period, arms proliferation was de-llnJced with 
the regional and cold war p o l i t i c s of / in West Asia. 
Military a l l l ences and Ideology were the basic determinants 
of west Asia - superpowers relations* Arms were trans-
ferred at low level and of, re la t ive ly , low quality. The 
arms transfer was primarily domestic In nature,to dispose 
of old and f i r s t l ine of weapons to keep the arms industry 
in readiness. The post 1970 period has been chosen for t h i s 
study because througboiut' th i s period,West Asia remained 
the crown winner of world's and third world's total arms 
supplies, qiaantitative as well as qual i ta t ive . Arms turned 
out to be the important most foreign pol icy tool of the 
supplier and the rec ipient . And *arms and o i l • trade, 
the most important trade between the West and the third 
world, started and subsequently grew during the same period. 
Chapter I i s the introductory part of the study which 
gives a detai led dlscription of geo-strateglc s.lgnlficance, 
the basic factor of superpowers interests and their arms 
supply in the region, of each sub-region of west Asia in 
the fyes of each of the two superpowers. 
The II chapter i s devoted to the study of arms 
acquisition trend and p o l i c i e s in West Asia. I t delves 
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into the causes* characterist ics aixS e f fects of arms 
acquisition pol icy in West Asia, in descriptive and 
analytical manner. 
Chapter III and IV attempt to evolve the basic 
features of Us and soviet arms transfer po l icy in the 
region respectively, and assess i t s impact v i s - a - v i s 
their object ives . 
The f inal chapter i s an effort to clothe the arms 
and o i l relationship in a theoretical framework. The 
chapter, formulates the defination and nature of arms 
and o i l relat ionship, i l l u s t r a t e s the arms and o i l pol icy 
of concerned s tates and examines i t s consequences. 
As regards i t s methodology, th i s study i s both a 
descriptive as well as an invest igative ins ight into 
the topic. 
This research i s e s s e n t i a l l y an inter-disc ipl inary 
study* The subject matter i s the part of the two d i sc ip l ines 
i . e . International Pol i t ica l and Defence Studies. I t s 
presentation also re f lec t s the orientation of these two 
subjects. 
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The work i s ent ire ly based on llberary method. Books, 
Journals and original sources have been tried to be 
extensively and Judiciously used and referred* 
Mark Twain said, "there sre l i e s , damn l i e s and 
statistics**. In consonance to th is contention, s t a t i s t i c s , 
despite much scope, have been used with care« Graphs and 
Tables have been Inserted to explain a particular trend 
Instead of exaggerating or downplaying the phenomenon. 
In l a s t th i s work alms but not claims to be an 
objective and Investigative research. The researcher alone 
stands the responsibi l i ty for h i s view point and Inefflcacy 
or u t i l i t y of t h i s research. 
C H A P T E R - I 
WEST ASIA IN SUPERPOWERS* STRATEGIC SCENARIO 
No Other region of t h i s world has been as much s t r a t e g i -
c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e superpowers &s West As ia , Geo-
s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n of West Asia equates i t with Europe while 
o i l - s t r a t e g y adorns i t with an added edge over the l a t t e r . 
In add i t ion , p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and unexpected deve lop-
roents^Ainquestionably p lace t h e region on top p r i o r i t y of 
the world agenda. 
This chapter e f f o r t s t o present a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of 
the s t r a t e g i c v i a b i l i t y of the area . As regards the s tructure 
of the chapter i t i s devided i n t o two s u b - c h a p t e r s i . e . West 
Asia in US s tra tegy and West Asia in USSR's s t r a t e g y . Each 
sxib-chapter i s devided further i n t o two p a r t s . 1) The geo -
s tra tegy of West A^ia, and 2) The o i l s t ra tegy of West As ia . 
Further* t h e g e o - s t r a t e g i c importance of two s e c t o r s *-rr- t h e 
Eastern Mediterranean s e c t o r and the Pers ian Gulf/Arabian 
Peninsula s e c t o r — has been dea l t with separate ly , as the 
two s e c t o r s , though part of West Asia, are d i s t i n c t in many 
re spec t s as far as t h e i r s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e i s concerned. 
(1) WEST ASIA IN US CTRATEGY : 
West Asia , as remote as "va l l eys of moon**^ before world 
1 . Pere tz , Don : The Middle East Today, Dryden P r e s s , 
Hinsda l l e , I l l i n o i ' s , USA, 1971, p . 2 . 
- 8 -
war I« a t t r a c t e d most of US I n t e r e s t s abroad. Later on« 
pres ident Elsenhower descr ibed i t in 1951 as world 's most 
2 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y Important area ' so sa id pres ident Nixon a f t e r 
twenty y e a r s . Pres ident Carter in l a t e r years of h i s p r e s i -
dentship a f t e r the Soviet in tervent ion Ih Afghanistan, gave 
importance t o West Asia as no other pres ident d i d . And i n 
Reagan!5 Geo-strntegy the area was given " f i r s t priority**. 
a) The Geo-Strateov of West Asia and USA ; The Eastern 
Mediterranean Region : 
A niomber of i n t e r r e l a t e d fac tors a t t r a c t Us t o the 
geo - s t ra tegy of t h i s region t I t ' s piroximity with USSR and 
Europe, i t s importance as a plateform of m i l i t a r y ac t ion 
Against the i n d u s t r i a l USSR , and i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e as an 
4 
arena of superpower competit ion • 
Frc»n Truman's time t o Reagan's, the region has been of 
prime importance for t h e containment of Soviet Union. Since 
Eastern Mediterranean i s geographical ly c l o s e t o USSR 
and NATO m^nbers, USSR's s u c c e s s f u l l penetrat ion i s .bound 
2 . Hossein, Amir Sadeghi (ed.) t The Security of the Pers ian 
Gulf, Groom Helm L t d . , London, UK, 1981, p . 1 . 
3t, I b i d . , p . 1 , 
4. Reich, Bernard,"United States Middle East Policy : Carter 
and Reagan /administrations" Middle East Review, vol. 17, 
Winter 3 984-85, p. 20. 
5. Babu, B. Ramesh*"America and West Asia Today" in Haqqi, 
SAH : "WeatAsia since Camp David", Mittal Publications, 
New Delhi, India, 1988, p. 175. 
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t o disturb the balance of power, xinfavourable t o USA. Arab-
I s r a e l i war and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t character of the region 
makes USSR's p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y advancement easy of a c c e s s . 
Hence for th , the r i v a l superpower's des igns i n , and 
presence around the region makes i t most v i t a l t o be prevented 
from Soviet Union . 
Because of the danger of superpowers c o l l i s i o n in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, t h i s region continues t o renain the 
epicentre of East-West compet i t ion. Thus, in consequence, 
i t has become the barometer of g lobal balance of power. 
Therefore, m i l i t a r y super ior i ty and predominance are the 
main i n t e r e s t s of USA in the area which i t has achieved by 
deploying Sixth F lee t and pumping in arms. 
Shift from a i r and land warfare, huge US naval presence 
i n the Mediterranaen and the Indian Ocean, and US naval 
super ior i ty expanded the s t r a t e g i c importance of the Eastern 
Mediterranean for USA. US submarines, c a r r i e r and surfaceships 
from Red Sea have balanced both USSR and Eastern Europe. 
6 . Handrick, anith*"Reagan what kind of World Leader/^ 
New York Times Magzine, No. 16, pp. 174-175. 
7, Sokolarky, Joe l J . "The superpowers and t h e Middle East 
The Maritime I^imension** Aurel, Braun The Middle East in 
Global Strategy, Westview P r e s s , Manseel Publ ishing Ltd, 
London, England, 1987, p . 132. 
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P a r t i c u l a r l y , the deployment of SLBM. Polaris^ Poseidon^and 
the Trident system has made USSR vulnerable t o US a t t a c k . 
Some defence a n a l y s t s are of the view that US greater naval 
c a p a b i l i t y enables i t t o control Suez canal one of t h e 
m i l i t a r y choke p o i n t s of the Indian Ocean r e g i o n . Therefore, 
during t h e c r i s i s US Navy by blockading the Suez canal can 
detach Soviet Union*s#Indian Ocean naval force from i t ' s 
9 
Mediterranean and Black Sea f l e e t s and prolong the s a i l i n g 
of USSRfenaval s h i p s . In addi t ion t o enjoying an edge in 
naval s t r a t e g i e s , USA's naval forces are a l s o capable, by 
c o n t r o l l i n g the Mediterranean Sea,of re inforc ing arms p a r t i -
cu lar ly a i r c r a f t s t o land and a i r u n i t s , f i g h t i n g from the 
11 bases in Middle East . Even though a d i r e c t war between the 
superpowers i s u n l i k e l y , the Eastern Mediterranean i s equal ly 
s i g n i f i c a n t t o u s naval forces for deterrence and MAD s trategy 
12 
v i s - a - v i s the ^ v i e t Union. 
8 . Anand, J . P . ; "Indian Ocean, S tra teg i c Waterways, 
S tra teg ic Analys i s , v o l . XVI, No. 4 , ;^r i l - June 1984. 
9 . Singh, K.R. : P o l i t i c s of the Indian Ocean, Thomas Press 
Limited, D e l h i , Ind ia , 1974,p. Pre face . 
10. Hant, Kennett, "Western S tra teg i c Option in the Middl? East", 
Kauppi, Mark V. and Craig, Nation R (eds . ) :The Soviet 
Union and the Middle East in 1980S , Lexington Books, Toronto 
Canada, 1983, p . 138. 
11 . Sokolosky, J e l J . n . 7, pp . 114-115. 
12. Hunt, Keeneth, n . 10, p . 136. 
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Air interductioa Basing in Israel 
source I Mcnaugher, Thomas L, Arms and Oil Brooking Institution, 
Washington, D.C,, USA, 1985. 
Fig. - 1.1 
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13 Contrary to prevalent view , the Eastern Mediterranean 
has not yet lost its relevance for bases and likewise 
facilities. Even if the superpower war is not fought on 
or from West Asia, US long distanced aerial attack over USSR 
will have to over fly the Mediterranean where Egypt and 
Israel may be extrenely useful for transit arrangements* 
refuelling, staging, maintenance and command-control 
facilities.-'-^  
If such a war is fought in, or from West Asia, as likely, 
then, "Egypt will be the most plausible site for US military 
15 bases protecting the Gulf" • No less important is Israel in this 
connectionjlgure 1.1 show. US air interdiction capability from 
the base in Israel. Most of the aircra£ts deployed there 
providti security to the targets of Soviet attack in the^ 
Persian Gulf. 
After the loss of Iran, Egypt has emerged as USA's most 
important ally for protecting US security in the Mediterranean, 
next only to Israel. USA has so far obtained sufficient 
13. For detail see, Wlater Laquer, "Middle East, the US, the 
USSR and Europe", Udovitch, A.L. (ed) : The Middle East; 
Oil Conflict and Hope,Lexington Books, Toronto, Canada,1976, 
14. Aspaturian, Vernon, V., "Soviet Policy in the Middle East : 
In Search of Analytical Framework", Harry Alan S and Ivan, 
Volgyes : Israel, the Middle East and US Interests, 
Preager Publishers, New York, USA, 1983, p. 139. 
15. Perlmutter, Amos : "The Parameters of US Policy in the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East" Harry Alan S and Ivan, 
Volgyes : Israel, the Middle East and US Interests, Preager 
Publishers, New York, USA, 1983, p. 71. 
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T r a d e r o u t e t o A s i a v i a Cape and 3uez f r o n New York 
P o r t s By Cape By Suez Sav ing % 
New York -
Bombay 11 ,800 8 ,200 31 
S i n g a p o r e 12 ,500 10 .200 18 
Ras T a n u r a 11 ,900 8 ,300 30 
(Saud i A r a b i a ) 
Source I The New E n c y c l o p e d i a B r i t a n n i c a , IPSA J o u r n a l 
V o l . X ' / I , No . 7 , A p r i l - J u n e 1 9 8 4 . 
T a b l e - 1.1 
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f a c i l i t i e s in Egypt "on two a i r bases in Ras Banas and 
naval base in Read Sea". 
Eastern Mediterranean region i s extremely v i a b l e as a 
17 gateway t o t h e Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area . Suez canal 
i s the wor ld ' s most important economic and s t r a t e g i c artery• 
I t i s the p lace from where "or ig inates / US naval development, 
sending of t a s k f o r c e s , f lag-showing v i s i t s , and musc le -
18 f l ex ing demonstrations in the West Asian Waters . Both for 
economic and s t r a t e g i c purposes, the Suez i s the shortes t 
19 
maritime route t o A t l a n t i c , Indian Ocean and P a c i f i c Ocean. 
The a l t e r n a t i v e route from USA t o the Persian Gulf through 
Pearl Harbour i s 4,000 mi l e s long and t a k e s 25 extra days 
20 
of s a i l i n g . Table 1.1 g i v e s p i c ture of s t r a t e g i c impo^rtance 
of Suez canal-Red-Sea route .as far as economy of s a i l i n g 
days i s concerned. This short cut route i s of greater value 
during the time of c r i s i s when the delay can bring devastat ing 
blows t o the superior naval c a p a b i l i t y of USA. 
16. Anand, J . P . N. 8, p . 379. 
17. Primakov "International Conflict" cited in Kohler Foy D, 
Goure, Leon and Harvey Mose L. The Soviet Union and the 
October 1973 Middle East War : The Implication for Detente 
Monograph in International Affairs, Center For Advanced 
International Studies, University of Miami, 1974, p. 24. 
18. Anand, J.P., N. 8, p. 378. 
19. Anand, J.P., N. 8, p. 379. 
20. Peter, Mangold t Superpower Intervention in the Middle 
East, Groom Kelm, London, England, p. 17. 
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The Eastern Mediterranean where four Arab-Israeli 
wars have been fought with US and Soviec weapons, is also 
important as the testing ground of superpowers military 
strength : To quote Peter Mangold^"Middle Eat has proved 
21 
a useful barometer of the fortunes of superpowers rivalry. 
The Arab-Israeli wars have furnished information about the 
performance, efficiency and technological standard of 
superpowers' arms. Yom Kippur war, is, therefore, also 
22 termed as the war of weapons*. 
Strategic importance of Israel deserves special investi-
gation. For Israel culturally and politically does not belong 
to West Asia. And it is also essential to give a clear and 
objective analysis of the strategic utility of Israel which, 
24 
misunderstandbly, is either termed as "strategic liability", 
25 
or "strategic asset" , in sheer contrast. 
Undoubtedly, Israel is the only permanent, reliable and 
26 
the most strong friend of USA in West Asia. As the most 
21 . I b i d . , pp . 17-19. 
22. Spectator Dec, 13, 1975. 
23. Harr T. ^shaw, "St ra teg ic Dissensus" Foreign Pol icy , v o l . 61, 
Winter 1965-86, pp. 125-144. 
24. P h i l l i p James,"America's Security Stake ^n I s r a e l " 
Heritage Foundation, Washington., D.C., USA, 1986. 
25. Reich, Bernard : The United States and I s r a e l : Influence 
in the Special Relat ionship, Preager Pub l i shers , New York, 
1984, p . 89. 
26. Keddie, Nikki R. " I s r a e l ' s Contribution t o US I n t e r e s t s in 
the Middle East" Hary Alden S. and Ivan, Valgyes : 
I s r a e l t he Middle East and the US I n t e r e s t s , Preager 
Publ i shers , New York, USA, 1983, p . 8 1 . 
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s t r o n g m i l i t a r y power , I s r a e l p o s s e s s e s most s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
27 
a rms which i t c a n . h a n d l e a l s o , u n l i k e t h e Arab s t a t e s . UiJ-
I s r a e l i r e l a t i o n s i n c o m p a r i s o n t o US-Arab s h i f t i n g r e l a t i o n s 
C o n f e r upon I s r a e l t h e s t a t u s of US p e r m a n e n t a l l y i n t h e 
r e g i o n . And a f t e r t h e f a l l of t h e Shah of I r a n , I s r a e l h a s 
29 
r o n a i n e d t h e s i n g l e power on whom USA can r e l y i n t h e r e g i o n . 
I s r a e l h a s t h e b a s e s i m p o r t a n t f o r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t 
30 USSR o r an Arab c o u n t r y i n West As i a* i n c a s e of t h e b l o c k a d e 
31 
of o i l s u p p l y t o USA. As r e g a r d s t h e l o c a t i o n of I s r a e l , 
i t i s n e a r t o b o t h t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and t h e P e r s i a n Gulf 
32 
a r e a . I t a l s o p r o v i d e s e a s y a c c e s s t o , and from M e d i t t e r r a n e a n , 
and h a s f a c i l i t i e s on l a n d f o r c o n n e c t i o n t o Red Sea i n c a s e 
o f c l o s u r e o f Suez c a n a l . H e n c e , t o sum u p , " i t i s an i d e a l 
33 S t r a t e g i c b a s e f o r o p e r a t i o n " t o u t a z i m u t " ( i n any d i r e c t i o n ) " 
The b a s e s i n I s r a e l can b e u s e d f o r d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e , 
34 
e l e c t r o n i c s w a r - f a r e , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t 
2 7 . S p i e g e l , S t even L . : " I s r a e l and t h e S e c u r i t y o f t h e W e s t " , 
A u r e l , B r a u n : T h e M i d d l e E a s t i n G l o b a l S t r a t e g y , Westv iew 
P r e s s , M a n s e e l P u b l i s h i n g L t d . , London, E n g l a n d , 1 9 8 7 , p . 2 9 . 
2 8 . Reagan , R o n a l d , " R e c o g n i s i n g t h e I s r a e l i A s s e t " , Wash ing ton 
P o s t , August 15 , 1979 , p . 2 5 . 
2 9 . P e r l r t u t t e r , Amos, N. 1 5 , p . 7 1 . 
3 0 . K e d d i e , N i k k i R . , N. 26 , p . 8 4 . 
3 1 . L a c k o f f , San f o r d / " P o w e r and L i m i t ; US S t r a t e g i c D o c t r i n e 
i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t , A u r e l Barun : The M i d d l e E a s t i n 
G l o b a l S t r a t e g y , Westv iew P r e s s , M a n s e l l P i i b l i s h i n g L t d , 
London, E n g l a n d , 1987 , p . 8 1 . 
3 2 . K e d d i e , N i k k i , Rn. N. 26 , p . 8 0 . 
3 3 . I b i d . , p . 8 2 . 
3 4 . Adequacy of US M a r i n e Corps S e c u r i t y i n B e i r u t , I n v e s t i -
g a t i o n sub -Commi t t ee on Armed S e r v i c e , US House of 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . D e c . 19 , 1 9 8 3 . 
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35 
s e r v i c e s and medica l f a c i l i t i e s e t c . H n a d d i t i o n , t hey a r e 
t h e most modern and advanced b a s e s , s t a t i o n i n g weapons 
found only i n US o r NATO inventory • 
I s r a e l i s t h e count ry which may he lp USA by p r o v i d i n g 
in fo rmat ion about t h e ' d e s e r t war fa re and e l i m a t i c a s p e c t s 
of t h e Middle East war . I s r a e l a l s o p r o v i d e s in fo rmat ion 
about Soviet weapbns i t has cap tu red i n t h e war s , and about 
t h e e f f i c a c y of US weapons and t h e i r d e f e c t s . F i n a l l y , 
because l a s t f o r t y y e a r s make i t e v i d e n t l y c l e a r t h a t US 
I s r a e l i coope ra t i on has not a f f e c t e d US-Arab r e l a t i o n s , a s 
37 viewed by some s c h o l a r s . t h e n i n s t e a d of " m i l l - s t o n e annund 
t h e neck" o r t h e "net d r a i n , U S - I s r a e l i s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s 
a r e "net a s s e t " . 
Geo-St ra teov of West Asian and USA : The P e r s i a n Gulf 
Like t h e Eas t e rn Med i t e r r anean , P e r s i a n ^ u l f "a f a r 
away" and beck ward r eg ion" b e f o r e t h e world war I , has 
38 become t h e f o c a l p o i n t of US g l o b a l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y . 
3 5 . Keddie, N ikk i , R. N. 26, p . 8 3 . 
3 6 . Babu, B. Ramesh, N. 5 , p . 175. 
3 7 . H a r r T . Shaw, N. 23 , p p . 125-144. 
3 8 . Ramzani, Rohullah K : "The S t r a i t of Harmuz : The Glbbal 
Choke p o i n t s Browraan, Lar ry W. and Cla rk , Ian : The 
I n d i a n Ocean i n Global P o l i t i c s , Young Asia P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
New D e l h i , I n d i a , 1981, p . 108. 
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F i r s t l y and foremostly, t he Persian Gulf i s important 
t o USA due t o i t s prime loca t ion in the global s t r a t e g i c 
s e t t i n g . I t comprises of an area of 4716 .square kms approxi-
mately, i s surrounded by Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakis tan , 
t he Indian Ocean, the Arabian sea the PDPY, North Yamen, t he 
Red Sea, Jordan and Syr ia . Hence^because of i t s cen t ra l 
loca t ion , Pers ian Gulf works as a cockpit of US worldwide 
involvement. 
Loss of radar i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering s i t e s and other 
bases a f t e r t he down f a l l of the Shah and simultaneous 
39 deployment of RDF , which necess i t a ted the f a c i l i t y of bases 
40 for i t s operat ion , has made the region K as the hunting 
ground for acqu i s i t ion of new bases . Although p a r t l y successful 
in i t s attempt ~, the l imi ted f a c i l i t i e s US has got around 
Oman, UAE and Bahr&LQ ,ensure su f f i c i en t ly the capab i l i ty 
t o de te r the Soviet Union's s t ra tegy of occupying o i l 
f i e l d s . 
39. Savory, Roger, "The Geo-political Impact of Islamic 
Revolution in Iran on the Gulf Region" in Braun, , 
Aurel (ed.) : The Middle East in Global Strategy, Westview 
Press,/Mansell Publishing Limited, London, England,1987, 
p. 202. 
40. It is said that with the deploymanet of naval forces bases 
have X ceased to be important. The consequences of 
operating without bases have beea illustrated by the failure 
to free the hostages from Tehran in April 1980 operation. 
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Ai r I n t e r d u c t i o n , Basing from Saudi Arabia , Dhahran 
TURKEY 
• ' •M«m'^ SYRIA ' \ > 
S A U O I '>•'"" 
A R A B I A 
source } Macnaugher, Thomas L./Arms and Oil Brooking 
I n s t i t u t i o n , Washington, D.C,, USA, 1985. 
F i g . - 1 .2 
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The b a s e s US has a c q u i r e d i n t h e P e r s i a n Gulf a r e 
u se fu l fo r b o t h , t h e s t a g i n g , . main tenance , redeployment 
41 
and o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s , and a i r i n t e r d i c t i o n campaign, t h e r e -
f o r e , most of t h e a i r c r a f t s CENTCXDM p o s s e s s e s can on ly 
be o p e r a t e d from t h e b a s e s of t h e P e r s i a n Gulf t h e absence 
of which s h a l l reduce o p e r a t i b n a l c a p a b i l i t y on e i t h e r B-52 Hs 
42 
f i g h t e r from Deigo Garc ia b a s e o r c a r r i e r based a i r c r a f t s ^ 
Figure 1.2 shows t h a t from Dahran b a s e i n Saudi Arabia F-4 E 
a i r c r a f t can cover t h e mouth of t h e P e r s i a n Gulf i n case of 
Soviet advancement t h e r e , F - lO , F-16 A-7 D/E can cover t h e 
whole of n o r t h e r n I r a n and A-6E, F-fiFEand F - I H D/E cover 
Soviet Southern b o r d e r s . 
Over and above, t h e s e b a s e s a r e e q u a l l y v i t a l f o r ground, 
a e r l a l & n a v a l s t r a t e g y , u s n a v a l deployment does not l e s s e n 
t h e impor tance of b a s e s . For t h e b a s e s p rov ide s e c u r i t y 
43 t o moving s h i p s from t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean. 
The MEDEASTFOR s t a t i o n e d a t t h e b a s e s i n Bahrain "moni tors 
t r a f f i c t h r o u g h ou t t h e r e g i o n . The navy s h i p s " c r u i s e t h e 
P e r s i a n Gulf and a l s o v i s i t p o r t s £rom t h e Gulf of Aqba and 
44 
Red Sea t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean s i i b - c o n t i n e n t * . 
4 1 . Mcnaugher, Thomas L . : Arms and O i l : US M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y 
i n t h e P e r s i a n Gulf- t h e Brooking I n s t i t u t i o n , Washington, 
4 2 . I b i d . , ' p l ' 5 8 . ' ' ^^' 
43. Campbell John C. "The United States and the Middle East" 
in Legum Colin:Crisis and Conflict in the Middle East, 
Helmes and Meller Publishers, New York, USA, 1981, p.69. 
44. Gupta, Bhabni Sen : The USSR in Asia Young Asia Publications 
New Delhi, 1980, p. 152. 
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The West's and tnat of US l i f e blood o i l 
i s traded through sea lanes of Gulf waters , vulnerable t o 
i n t e r n a l , ex terna l and reg ional a t t a c k s , (although, many 
scholars r e j e c t the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of phys ica l blockade of 
46 the S tra i t of Harmuz and o ther choke-points) . 25% of 
world 's t o t a l supply of o i l , 20% of non cornmunist wor ld ' s 
supply 50% of OPEC esQjort, 60% of tpe o i l import of Japan 
and West Europe and 10% of USA's o i l import drains 
through t h i s reg ion . Hence, t h e s ecur i ty of the trade water 
and o i l producing countr i e s , i s t h e s i n g l e l arges t fac tor 
of US i n t e r e s t s i n the area . In the wake of I r a n ' s threa t t o 
blockade t h e o i l supply, USA sent i t s l a r g e s t multi-power 
armada, c o n s i s t i n g f i f t y war s h i p s , c l o s e t o the s t r a i t of 
48 Harmuz, in Oct . 1984 and a g a i n in Aug-Sept. 1990 against 
Iraq . US d i r e c t l y intervened i n the Gulf war in 1987 when 
Iran threatened i t s o i l supply by a t tacking o i l tankers 
of Gulf s t a t e s . US m i l i t a r y involvement in the l a t e s t Gulf 
49 c r i s i s , s ince the renewal of Iraq-Kuwait d i f ference , centers 
round the s e c u r i t y of o i l supply. 
4 5 . Ramzani Rohullah K. N, 37, pp . / - l l , 
4 6 . Rajan, M.S. and Ganguli Shivaj i : Great Power Re la t ions , 
World Order and the A'hird World, Vikas Pviblishing House, 
Ghaziabad, 1981, p p . 157-167 ,re ferr ing Geoffrey, Jukes: 
t h e Shoviet Union and t h e Indian Ocean". 
4 7 . Anand, J . P . , N.8 , p . 380 . 
4 8 . I b i d . , p . 381 . 
49. The Hindustan Times, 26 July, 1990. 
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Geograph i ca l l y , t h e a r e a be ing t h e b u f f e r zone i n 
US-USSR b a l a n c e of power, i s impor t an t t o USA f o r t h e 
50 
containment of USSR . T h e r e f o r e ^ P e r s i a n Gulf b e f i t s i n US 
51 
s t r a t e g y of d e t e r r e n c e o r MAD p o l i c y . I n a r eg ion from 
aS 52 
where USSR* s e c u r i t y i s sxabject t o v u l . n e r a b i l i t y , where 
i t s naval f o r c e s a r e equipped w i t h T r i d e n t system capab le 
53 
of cover ing Sovie t i n d u s t r i a l h e a r t l and , where US nava l 
fo rce o f f s e t s USSR's s u p e r i o r i t y i n l and w a r f a r e ' , and where 
USA has t h e c a p a b i l i t y of employing mass ive r e t a l i a t i o n 
54 (as CENTCOM i s c a p a b l e t o " l ay an American aczross t h e road) , 
t h e p o l i c y of d e t e r r e n c e can be most s u c c e s s f u l l y p r a c t i c e d . 
US arms in t h e r eg ion and i t s c o o r d i n a t i o n wi th US f o r c e s , 
s t a t i o n e d i n P e r s i a n Gulf, a l s o check USSR* s p o s s i b l e 
55 
e x p a n s i o n i s t t h i n k i n g 
The f u t u r e ' of s t r a t e g i c impor tance of t h e a r e a t o 
Uni ted S t a t e s seems t o expand. Since USSR i n next c e n t u r y 
s h a l l have t h e l i o n share i n t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of remote 
5 0 . Campbell, John C, N. 44 , p . 72 
5 1 . Synder, Glenn i "^'he Balance of Power and t h e Balance 
of T e r r o r i n Seabury, P a u l ( ed . ) x The Balance of Power, 
San F r a n c i s c o , USA, 1965. 
5 2 . Aure l , Barun : " ' ' onc lus ion : Global S t r a t e g y N a t i o n a l 
I n t e r e s t s and C o n f l i c t Management Aurel Barun ( e d . ) : T h e 
Middle East i n Global S t r a t e g y , Westview P r e s s , Manseel 
P u b l i s h i n g L td , London, England, 1987, p . 252. 
5 3 . Hurewi tz , J . C . : The P e r s i a n Gulf : Af t e r I r a n ' s Revolu-
t i o n , Headl ine S e r i e s , 242, p . 3 8 . 
5 4 . J e f f r r e y , Record/"The RDF and US M i l i t a r y I n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n t h e P e r s i a n Gulf Cambridge 1981, and "The RDF i s t h e 
Pentagon Kidding" , The Washington Q u a r t e r l y , No. 3,i>ummer 
1981, p p . 4 5 - 5 1 . 
5 5 . Hunt, Kenneth, N, 10, p . 139, 
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r e g i o n s t h e landmass of S i b e r i a ; USA* i n r e t u r n , 
would t i g h t e n i t s g r i p on and c o n t r o l t h e Sea, p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
economical ly and s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l P e r s i a n Gulf /Arabian 
P e n i n s u l a . 
The P e r s i a n Gulf a l s o f e a t u r e s p rominen t ly i n US space 
war fa re programme. I n d i a n Ocean/Pers ian Gulf i s t h e chosen 
a r e a of "us s t r a t e g y f o r employment of a i r launched AS^ ff 
miss i l e which from t h i s reg ion , s h a l l cover t h e e n t i r e 
landmass of Soviet ^ s s i a — 1/3rd of t h e e a r t h ' s s u r f a c e " . 
To sxim up, t h e P e r s i a n Ciulf has been v i t a l t o u s f o r 
i t s r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l involvement and a l s o ho ld s t h e 
key of US f u t u r e s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e s . And h e r e i n l i e s 
t h e immense s t r a t e g i c v a l u e of t h e r e g i o n which even t r a n s -
57 
cends i t s "obvious economic v a l u e " . 
O i l S t r a t egy of West Asia and US : 
Oi l has made t h e r e g i o n " v i t a l " from ".important and 
58 p rominen t " . I t had become a s t r a t e g i c commodity a s l a t e 
a s world war I I when i t f u e l l e d US war e f f o r t s . I t l o s t 
i t i n 1970 and onwards t h a t t o o a t an u n p r e c e d e n t e d - l e v e l . 
5 6 . Singh, J a s j i t , " Ind ian Oc^an i n t h e Global S t r a t e g i e s : 
Some P e r s p e c t i v e s , Research Monograph, P u b l i s h e d by 
I n d i a n I n s t i t u t e f o r Defence S t u d i e s and ^ a l y s e s 
30 Nov. 1984, p . 2 1 . 
5 7 . P e t e r , Mangold, N. 20, p . 147. 
5 8 . s t o f f , Micheal B . : Oi l War and American Secu r i t y : 
The Search f o r a N a t i o n a l P o l i c y on Fore ign O i l , Yale 
u n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980, p . 209 
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A number of i n t e r r e l a t e d f a c t o r s ; growing production of 
the West-Asian o i l , growing share of o i l in energy 
consiimption, economic growth, deplet ing reserves of 
West European s t a t e s , o i l embargo in 1973 and subsequent 
p r i c e r i s e , and USSR's t h r e a t , a l t o g e t h e r have placed 
59 West Asia prominently in USA's o i l s t rategyQ Importance 
Of o i l had r e l a t i v e l y decl ined in .1980' , but not t o much 
e f f e c t . I t s t i l l raanains a cen t ra l fea ture of US pol icy 
in West Asia*. 
Destination of oil supply,rather the commodity 
61 itself, has given strategic dimension to oil • USA has 
baen dependant upon other import items like nickle (from 
6 0 
Canada) , but t he former i s t he only commodity worth of 
s t r a t e g i c importance as i t s locat ion makes i t s supply 
uns table and u n r e l i a b l e . That i s why f luc tua t ions in danand-
supply p a t t e r n , for example, from 35% in 1975 t o 8% in 
l983^?did'Dt diminished t h e importance of West Agian o i l . 
I t i s prudent t o note t h a t during the per iod 1980-1963 
when US o i l import from West Asia began decl in ing , USA 
59. Mangold, Pe te r , N. 20, p . 147. 
60. Haglund, David G. "Dil as a Factor in US Policy Towards 
The Middle East" in Marantz Paul and Steinberg Balma 
(e§s . ) : Superpower involvement in t h e Middle East , 
Westview, P res s , ^oulder , USA, 1985, p p . 185-192. 
6 1 . I b i d . , p . 182. 
62. I b i d . , p . 178. 
63. Monthly Energy Review : Dec. 1983, pp . 32-36, 33-40. 
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became more and more concerned with t he supply of o i l . 
Huge reserve i s one aspect which helped in maintaining 
the s t a t u s quo of o i l s t r a t e g i c s igni f icance of West ^s ia 
desp i te many ups and downs in impoits-exports t r e n d . 
West Asia contains 60% of wor ld ' s t o t a l o i l r e se rve . 
Owing t o t h i s factor including t h e dwindling reserves of 
new sources of o i l supply in North Sea and Alaska and 
64 t h e i r diminishing l i f e - span . West As ia ' s s igni f icance 
i s bound t o speed up despi te reduced leve l of o i l import 
in comparison to 1970's and 1980 ' s . 
Besides, afdre-mentioned qjiantltative aspect the 
q u a l i t a t i v e aspect of West-Asian o i l puts the region on 
the top of t he other o i l producing s t a t e s . The low sulphur 
content in West Asian o i l i s t he l e a s t harmful t o the 
environment .This factor has led . the USA/the West ^ r o p e a n 
nat ions and Japan to prefer West Asian o i l over the o i l 
of t he o ther regions . 
A chain of events , i . e . Libyan experience (1969) 
Tehran and T r i p o l i agreement in 1970 and 1971, respec t ive ly 
64. Burcel , R.M. : The Pers ian ^ulf . The Washington Paper 
v o l . 1 Sage Pub l i ca t ions , London, 1972, p . 2 . 
65. McLaurin, R.D. : The Middle East in Soviet Po l icy , 
Lexington Books, London, England, 1975, p . 34. 
66. Ibid., p. 34, 
67. Ayoob Mohammad : "Oil Arabs and Islam : The Persian 
Gulf in World Politics" in Ayoob Mohammad ed.; The 
Middle East in World Politics, Groom Helm, London, 
England, 1981, pp. 119-120,121. 
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shift of oil control in the hands of local governments 
from oil companies, ^ overwhelmingly increased the importance 
of oil in US strategy. Oil after these developments became 
a political weapon, double edged and anti-US. It, 'getting 
interwoven with the Soviet threat and politics and security 
of the producing states, turned out to be an important 
instrument of supplier - client relations and added to 
68 it the aspects of denial, insecurity as well as embargo. 
Oil adorms West Asia with strategic significance*^ 
69 because oil supply is intermingly linked with the politics 
Oil embargo associated oil with Arab-Israeli or Palestinian 
issue. Moreover, West Asia is an area where oil import not 
only furnishes the supplier's requirement of energy, but 
also, on political level, facilitates political influence 
and presence. In other words,. West Asia is the "gray area" 
70 
endowed with abundanoe of oil and "political vacuumes • 
Vulnerability of the West to oil embargo or oil 
shock, Soviet threat.and regional war, keeps USA pre-
occupied with this region. Nixon doctrine was, to a 
68. Stokkey, Robert W, American and the Arab States : An 
Uneasy Encounter, John Willy and Sans Inc, New York, 
USA, 1975, p. 261. 
69. Ayoob Mohammad, N. 67, p. 123. 
70. Arad, Ruth W. and Arad Uzi B. "Scale Natural Resources 
and Potential Conflict" Arad Ruth W. (ed.) :faring 
Global Resources, MacGrew Hill, New York, USA, 1975, 
pp. ."74-75. 
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considerable extent , concerned with the safe ty of o i l . 
Oil was a l so t h e raison ' d ' e t r e of the Car ter doc t r ine 
which i m p l i c i t l y threatened USSR of m i l i t a r y a t t ack i f 
71 l a t t e r d i s rupted the o i l supply. Reagan followed the 
same po l i cy , USA deployed MEDESTFOR'^^ and l a t e r BDF'^^ , 
t o pol ice the Gulf and now a days, i s a l l set t o i n t e r -
vene m i l i t a r i l y in Viest Asia, pr imar i ly for o i l . 
US o i l requirements contriDute more t o the importance 
of West Asia than other f a c t o r s . To quote Robert J . Leiber 
"o i l i s e s s e n t i a l as food or water and unl ike food and 
74 
water US i s insu f f i c i en t in o i l " . Since 1970 United S ta tes 
has been i n t e r e s t e d in West Asia o i l for i t s e l f as much as 
75 for i t s a l l i e s . Oil embargo, when USA was importing only 
14% of i t s t o t a l imports , "represented t he margin between 
77 opulent l i f e and a u s t e r i t y " . The embargo "c losedfac tor ies 
increased unemployment, ch i l l ed homes, reduced c i t i z e n ' s 
t r a d i t i o n a l easy mobi l i ty , and lengthened l i n e s a t se rv ice 
7 1 . F i t z Gerald : ^he Kiddle East and T r i l a t e r a l Countries 
c i t ed in Marantz, Paul and Steinberg Blamer ( e d s . ) : 
Superpower involvement in t h e Middle East , Westview Presj 
Bouler, USA, 1985 , , . 182. 
72. Ramzani Rohullah, K. N. 38, p . 112. 
73. Per l Mutter Amos, N. 15, p . 70. 
74. Leiber , Robert, J . : cnoeisen and Disrupt ion in t he 
Western Alliance ' "Hillenbrand, Martin and Yargin 
Daniel , Penguine Books, Middlesex, England, 1983, p . 349, 
75. Stookey Robert W. N. 68, p . 57 . 
76. I b i d . , p . 57 . 
77. I b i d . , p . 57 . 
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stations".^® 
US import of oil from the Middle East increased from 
3% in 1972 to 15% in 1973 ana 33X in 1977.*^ ^ From 1972 to 
80 1973 US oil import from OPEC increased by 28%. Decline 
of the domestic reserve, inability and unwillingness of 
Q 1 
vanezuela and Canada t o supply US requirements and 
growth of o i l in energy consumptipn a t the r a t e of 7% 
82 per annum , ftiade USA more and more dependant upon t h e 
Middle East o i l as necessary for he r . Dropped share of t h e 
Middle East o i l from t o t a l import, however, did not 
minimize . t h e importance of West Asian o i l as i t continued 
paying off USA in form of p o l i t i c a l presence and improving 
the balance of payments. 
From 1990 onwards US dependency on VVest Asia i s 
bound t o increase due t o t h e fac tors , as : Depletion of 
domestic and outs ide resources , economic growth, imprac-
t i c a b i l i t y of s tockp i l ing , subs t i tu t ion and conservation 
methods, t o t a l f a i l u r e of US object ive t o meet the energy 
78. I b i d . , p . 57 . 
79. Monthly Energy Review, Dec. 1983, pp. 36-37. 
80. Haglund, David G. N. 60, p . 184. 
8 1 . I b i d . , p . 184. 
82. Bur re l , R.M., N. 64, p . 5 . 
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go 
demand through domestic resources by 1985 and growth 
of oil*'share in t h e t o t a l energy consumption. 
Oil has been economically advantageous t o USA , 
even the p r i ce hike did not affect the huge economic 
85 gains from o i l t r ade . Trade with o i l producing s t a t e s , 
has recycled t he pe t rodo l l a r and turned t h e balance of 
t r a d e favourable, US exported arms food, items technology 
p l a n t s , manufactured and consumer goods^vital items of 
the hea l th of US t r ade economy. In 1985 Arab Gulf market 
was the 15th l a rges t export market of USA. From 1973 
t o 1982 US export t o Saudi Arabia expanded from $ 3000 m 
88 t o $ 9 b . Arab s t a t e s deposited t h e i r su rp lus income 
in form of investments /swel l ing, t he re fo re , the American 
banks and enabling them lend cap i t a l straWed LDC's. i=y 
the end of 1975, Arab s t a t e s deposited $ 33b out $ 550 of 
89 t h e i r t o t a l investment in USA. During 1973T84 they 
83, sowayegh, Abdul Aziz Ali : Arab-Petro P o l i t i c s , 
Groom Helm, London, England, 1984, p . 1. 
84, Hans, Stuart T, "Economic Issues in t h e Middle East , 
^a^i<3» Ismael Y. :The Middle East in World P o l i t i c s . 
A study in contemporary in'-^emational r e l a t i o n s ; 
Syracuse Univers i ty P re s s , 1974. 
85, Imam, Zafar, "^oviet view of ^perpowers Rivalry in the 
Middle East , in Haqqi, S.A.H, (ed.) ;lJest Asia since 
Camp David, Mi t t a l Pub l i ca t ions , New Delh i , Ind ia ,1988 , 
p . 190. 
86, Hossein, Amir Sadeghi, N,2, Preface . 
87, Henderson, Bruce F."A Hi s to r i ca l Perspect ive of us GCC 
Economic and Financia l Interdependence" in Sandwick John, 
A,(ed,) :The Gulf Cooperation Council : Moderation and 
S t a b i l i t y in an Interedependent World, Westview P re s s , 
Boulder, Colorodo, USA, 1987, p . 49 . 
88, I b i d . Contd..89 
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90 invested $ 240 b in ^ e r i c a n banks . 
Dependency of NATO a l l i e s and Japan on the West Asian 
o i l and i t s ro le in US-West European r e l a t i on , a l so 
enhances oi l—strategic importance of West Asia to us* NATO 
and Japan have been dependent upon West Asian o i l much 
more than USA. The West 's and Japan ' s dependency en o i l 
has a l so dropped, but not t o the , level which makes USA 
free from the burden t o provide o i l t o t he a l l i e s . 
Flow of, and access t o . West Asian o i l determine us 
p r e s t i g e and pos i t ion in t h e world in general and v i s - a - v i s 
USSR, in p a r t i c u l a r . Oil g ives an opportunity t o USA t o 
acquire p o l i t i c a l influence in the Persian Gulf a t the 
expense of USSR; 1973 o i l embargo created chinks and 
f i s s u r e s in US-i^ iATC r e l a t i o n s . Similarly USSR's control 
over o i l can take away the hold of regional and world 
balance of power out of USA. Oil may a l so be a d e s t a b i l i -
zing fac to r in US r e l a t i o n with conservative s t a t e s of 
region . 
Hence, in shor t , US domestic economy^internal and 
ex te rna l s e c u r i t y , power and pres t tge«are subject t o a 
91 s ingle commodity, the West Asian o i l . 
89. I b i d . , p . 54 . 
90 . I b i d . , p . 54. 
9 1 . Levy Walter J . "Oil and the Decline of the West" 
Foreign Affai rs , Summer 1980, p . 1015. 
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WEST ASIA IN SOVIET STRATEGY : 
I f n o t p o l i t i c a l l y , " S o v i e t U n i o n " , g e o g r a p h i c a l l y 
and c u l t u r a l l y , " i s a Meddle E a s t e r n P o w e r " . ^ ^ So, t h i s 
p r o x i m i t y b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t Union and t h e M i d d l e E a s t 
(West A s i a ) , mos t i m p o r t a n t l y , and a c c u r a t e l y , e x p l a i n s 
t h e s t r a t e g i c v a l u e of t h e a r e a t o t h e USSR. I n a d d i t i o n , 
US p r e s e n c e and i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n add t o t h e a r e a ' s 
s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e USSR, r e m a r k a b l y . A d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s 
o f t h e e a c h s e c t o r o f West A s i a from S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e s 
i s d e a l t w i t h a s u n d e r i 
G e o - S t r a t e q y o f West A s i a and USSR ;The E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n 
r e g i o n : 
The c l o s e p r o x i m i t y b e t w e e n 
t h e E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n and USSR i s most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r 
93 
of S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n . S u f f i c i e n t , i s t o 
q u o t e f o l l o w i n g l i n e s t o e x p l a i n S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s , " C a i r o 
i s c l o s e r t o S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y t h a n i t i s t o t h e c a p i t a l s 
of Sweden, Saud i A r a b i a , e i t h e r Yamen, Oman, t h e i-AE, 
94 Q a t a r and B a h r a i n . B l a c k sea c o a s t of USSR, S o u t h e r n p a r t 
95 
of R u s s i a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s i n d u s t r i a l p o r t i o n , a r e 
v u l n e r a b l e t o n a v a l o p e r a t i o n from t h e E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a -
nean r e g i o n . 
9 2 . M a c l a u r i n , R . D . , N . 6 5 , p-» 1 5 . 
9 3 . R u b i n s t e i n , A l v i n , Z . " S o v i e t I n t e r e s t s i n t h e M i d d l e 
E a s t " , i n Ha r ry Alan S . and I v a n V o l g y e s ( e d s . ) : 
I s r a e l , The M i d d l e E a s t and t h e US I n t e r e s t s , P r e a g e r 
P u b l i s h e r s , New York , USA, 1983 , p . 9 0 . 
9 4 . P e t e r , Mangold , N . 2 0 , p . 2 2 . 
9 5 . H o r e l i c k , Arno ld L . S o v i e t M i d d l e E a s t P o l i c y , p . 8 9 , 
c i t e d i n M a c l a u r i n , R . D . N . 6 5 , p . 4 1 , 
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C u l t u r a l , e t h n i c and h i s t o r i c a l , oneness between 
t h e p e o p l e s of c e n t r a l and Southern Russia and t h e 
Eas te rn Med i t e r r anean subjects Sovie t U n i o n ' s s e c u r i t y t o 
t h e atmosphere a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r s i n VJest A s i a . An unfavour -
a b l e change o r anti-USSR t r e n d i n t h i s b o r d e r i n g a r ea i s 
bound t o t h r e a t e n Sovie t s e c u r i t y i n i t s Southern a r e a , 
t o o much c l o s e t o US m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n . 
For t h e sake of t h e s e c u r i t y of Southern, b o r d e r . 
Eas te rn Med i t e r r anean i s e q u a l l y impor t an t fo r USSR's 
96 p o l i c y of " s t r a t e g i c d e n i a l " t o t h e adve r sa ry power. I t 
i s t h e r eg ion where , moreover, " p r i z e s " "of d e n i a l a r e 
97 
v a l u a b l e and s t a k e s a r e s m a l l " . During t h e t i m e of c r i s i s 
USSR can i n t e r r u p t USA's naval and a i r fo rce movements 
heading towards Russian l a n d s , s t r a n g l e o i l supply e a s i l y 
98 dnd e f f e c t i v e l y and render US m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h 
i n e f f e c t i v e by m o n i t o r i n g , c o n t r o l l i n g o r d e s t r u c t i n g t h e 
99 US b a s e s i n t h e r e g i o n . 
9 6 . E l l e n , J o n e s "Manning t h e ^ v i e t M i l i t a r y " I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
S e c u r i t y , Summer 1982, p p . 105-131 . 
9 7 . R u b i n s t e i n , Alvin Z. N. 93 , p . 100. 
9 8 . Report Annual Sur le Movement Das Nav i re s a ' t r a v e r s 
l e s s De t ro i t s T r a c e s (Aknara) J a n , 1975, c i t e d i n 
Yaacov R o ' i ( ed . ) : L imi t s t o Power : Soviet P o l i c y in 
The Middle E a s t , Groom Helm, 
99. Haclaurin, R.D. N. 65, p. 16. 
iddl  m el , London, Great Britain,1978, 
P • 5 8. 
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Eastern Mediterranean i s an ideal place in USSR's 
pol i t ica l -mi l i ta ry approach towards USA. Presence of Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron balances US naval presence and 
enhances USSR's prestige in the region. Arms and econanic 
aid, p o l i t i c a l and mili tary support to national l iberat ion 
movements and radical s t a tes , have materialized Soviet 
objective of an anti-Western phalaji^ of Arab s ta tes which 
once comprised of ^yrta, Egypt and I raq . 
Eastern Mediterranean i s the outlet of Soviet ac t iv i t i es 
101 in the r e s t of the world US presence in and around 
Mediterranean Arab. -1 s r ae l i war forced - U SSR's Southward 
102 expansion t o fu l f i l l various s t ra tegic goals like^iyan 
improved projection adjacent to NATO's Southern flank 
2) security of the Southern borders, 3) in terdic t ive and 
re ta l ia tory capabil i ty, 4) an ab i l i ty t o neturalize or 
subvert or intimidate US. and i t s a l l i e s . By in t e r -
vening in Afghanistan and accjuiring sufficient naval capabilit 
USSR's had nearly succeeded in materializing i t s Southward 
expansionist policy. Blue water f l ee t , consisting of 
100. Hossein, ^ i r Sadeghi, N. 2, p. 10. 
101 Maclaurin, R.D. N. 65, p. 15. 
102. Litwak, Robert S : The Soviet Union and the Gulf Area 
in Aurel, Brown : The Middle East in Global Strategy 
Westview Press/Manseel Publishing Ltd, London, England, 
1987, p. 207. 
103. Maclaurin, R.D. N. 65, p. 15. 
104. Synder Jed C , : "Strategic Bases and Southern Flank 
Security" Washington Uuarterly, Summer, 1985, pp.123-125, 
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modem c r u i s e r s and he l icopte r , c a r r i e r s in la rge ntanbers / 
m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l presence in PDRY, Ethiopean and 
Afghanistan (1978) and influence in s t r a t e g i c a l l y located 
Syria and Libya, are some of t h e dividends of Soviet 
p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c over tures in t h e East Mediterranean. 
Suez canal i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y precious t o the Soviet 
Union. Exploi t ing the advantage of i t s c loseness t o t h e 
canal , t h e USSR can Effect ively . choke us maritime 
advancement as i s general ly h e l d . 
The East Mediterranean i s c ruc ia l for Soviet Union 
t o operate land oased a e r i a l and naval campaign. USSR's 
land based a t t a ck from here i s said t o be capable of 
destroying US's Sixth F l e e t . ^ ° ^ Egypt (1976) and ^ r i a 
in t h i s regard, have given USSR the f a c i l i t y t o employ an 
strong maritime fo rce . At one t ime, Soviet maritime forces 
consis ted of 10 SSBMs, 3 t o 4 c r u i s e r s and 9 t o 12 des t roye r s 
h e l i c o p t e r s , a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s and amphibious ships . 
In p r a c t i c e , USSR in Arab- I s rae l i wars did demonstrate many 
105. Disraakes, Bradford and McConnel James M.(eds) . Soviet 
Naval Diplomacy Pergamon P re s s , New York, USA, 1979. 
106. Nation, Craig R. "The Sources of Soviet Involvement 
in t h e Middle East ; Threat or Opportunity in Kuppi; 
Mark V, and Nation Craig R. ( e d s . ) : The Soviet Union 
and t h e Middle East in 1980's , Lexington Books, D.c . 
Health and Company L td . , Toronto, Canada, 1983,p.60. 
107. S0]c6l0s)):y, J o e l , J . N. 7, p . 124. 
108. Ibid«« p* 123, 
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t imes I t s wartime c a p a b i l i t y by supplying arms and prov id ing 
109 
other f a c i l i t i e s t o i t s c l i e n t s . 
As noted above. Eastern Mediterranean i s the t e s t i n g 
ground of Us-UssR balance of power.^ And USSR in t h i s 
r e spec t has been able t o maintain the same by achieving a 
p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y p a r i t y with USA in the reg ion . USSR 
enjoys base f a c i l i t i e s * has deployed i t s own f o r c e s , demon-
s t r a t e s s tab le presence and have a safe and strong group 
of a l l i e s in the Eastern Mediterranean reg ion . 
Black Sea - Mediterranean' - Red Sea - Indian Ocean 
P a c i f i c Ocean route i s the s h o r t e s t , s a f e s t and most econo-
mical transportat ion route between European and Far Eastern 
USSR and between Far Eastern USSR and the Indian Ocean 
sub-cont inent . Suez canal shortens the route of Sov ie t 
112 
v e s s e l t o the p a r t s of Indian Ocean and Far East . I t 
f a c i l i t a t e s USSR naval movement between Red Sea and the 
Mediterranean^- and i s the most preferred route for the 
109, USSR i n 1973 Oct. war e s t a b l i s h e d a de fens ive blockade 
between Cyprus and Northern part of Lebnon. 
110, zakheim, Dov, z . » Maritime Presence P r o j e c t i o n and the 
c o n s t r a i n t s of Par i ty Equivalence, s u f f i c i e n c y and the 
In ternat iona l Balance* Nat ional Defense U n i v e r s i t y , 
Washington D . C , USA» PP. 109-111. 
111» S e l l a , Amon, "Changes in Soviet P o l i t i c a l M i l i t a r y 
P o l i c y in t h e Middle East , After 1973" in Yacov Ro'l 
( ed . ) : Limits t o Power Soviet Po l i cy in t h e Middle 
East , Croom Helm, London, Great B r i t a i n , 1978, p . 3 2 . 
112. Burrel, R.M. and C o t t r e l l , Alvin, J. (eds . ) » "^he Indian 
Ocean*, A conference Report, The Central I n s t i t u t e of 
S t r a t e g i c Internat iona l S t u d i e s , p . 172. 
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reinforcement of s o v i e t P a c i f i c fleet.^^"^ 
Eastern Mediterranean region i s important f o r bases 
and l i k e - w i s e f a c i l i t i e s . As a matter of f a c t , the l i n k 
between USSR's armed f o r c e s and i t s bases i n the Eastern 
Mediterranean i s the obvious geographical bonus t o USSR. 
Base f a c i l i t i e s i n Syria and Egypt (197"6) gave USSR 
an e a s y acces s t o the f a c i l i t i e s i n Hodeida and Barberra 
114 
and the Red Sea* , A i r f i e l d s of Egypt provided i l ^ r e based 
a i r cover for Sov ie t f l e e t and jxanping off board for 
115 
reconnaissance f l i g h t s over NATO sh ips in the Mediterranean. 
These f a c i l i t i e s have helped UsSR to perform i t s regional 
commitments. M i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s i n Egypt were used during 
s o v i e t a i r l i f t to Syria in 1968.^^^ Sudan in 1971^^^ and 
118 India during the IndcPak war. 
To conclude . Eastern Mediterranean area , b e f i t s 
p e r f e c t l y t o s o v i e t Union's de fens ive and o f f e n s i v e s tra tegy 
and has , t h e r e f o r e , assumed "centre-s tage in s o v i e t foreign 
119 p o l i c y c a l c u l a t i o n " , * 
113. Maclaurin, R.D. N. 61, p . 42. 
114. Tahtinen, Dale R. i Arms in the Indian Ocean, AEI S tud ie s , 
No. 145, American Enterprize I n s t i t u t e f o r Publ ic 
P o l i c y Research, 1977, p . 15. 
115. S e l l a , Amon, N. I l l , p . 33. 
116. Mangold, P e t e r , N. 20 P. 16. 
117. Er icks ton , John, : s o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power, P. 80, c i t e d 
in Peter Mangold , N. 
118. Hott inger , Arnold, "The Great Power and the Middle East* 
in Gr i f f th , William (eds . ) * The world and the Great 
Power T r a i n g l e s , p . 138. 
119. Rubis te in , Alv in , z . , N. 93, p . 87, 
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GeO-Strateqy of West Asia and USSR i The Pers ian Gulf.Arabian 
Penitnsula t 
To begin with* "the d i r e c t i o n of s o v i e t i n t e r e s t in 
the Persian Gulf f o l l o w s the same route as t h a t t r a v e l l e d 
120 by the B r i t i s h e r s , the Frenchsand the Americans. I f the 
o i l factor i s excluded, USSR's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t in the 
Persian Gulf i s . p r o b a b l y , g r e a t e r than that of the USA and 
the West. 
The area, f i r s t and formost, being adjacent t o UsSR^. 
i s most v i t a l t o her^as the land and the waters of the region 
are the h o s t i l e m i l i t a r y plateforms for a e r i a l and naval 
121 
attack against the Sovie t .Union. The p r o v i s i o n s of 1921 
t r e a t y between USSR and Iran describe most a c c u r a t e l y the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of area t o USSR-Qlause 1 of the a r t i c l e 5 of 
the t r e a t y p r o h i b i t s anti-UssR a c t i v i t i e s in I ran . Clause 
2 of the same a r t i c l e cons iders the presence of h o s t i l e 
m i l i t a r y force i n the region as threat t o USSR's borders 
and secur i ty , and, thus , g i v e s , r i g h t of d i r e c t m i l i t a r y 
act ion to USSR. 
120. Lackoff, Sanford, K. 31 , p . 87 . 
121. Khalidzad, Zalmay, "Us S t r a t e g i c Conems > Deterrence Dielmaas i n the Gulf Region" in Braun Aurel t The Middle 
East in Global s t r a t e g y , Westview Pres s , 1 Mansell 
Publ ishing Ltd, London, England, 1987, p . 227. 
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B e s i d e s * g e o g r a p h i c a l p r o x i m i t y * t h e e t h n i c * c u l t u r a l 
and l lngvia l t i e s between t h e p e o p l e s of Northern P e r s i a n 
Gulf and s i x a d j a c e n t Muslim R e p u b l i c s of USSR* a f f e c t ' 
USSR's s e c u r i t y . P o l i t i c a l * c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l t r e n d s make 
a g r e a t i m p a c t on USSR's d o m e s t i c and e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y . 
I s l a m i c r e s u r g e n c y a l s o * which has grown i n USSR a t a f a s t 
122 1 ?•? 
r a t e , has i t s r o o t s i n t h e I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n o f I r a n , * "^  
No l e s s d e s t a b i l i z i n g have been c i v i l wars* g u e r i l l a a c t i v i t y 
124 
and beleaguered s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l sys tem of the a r e a t o USSR. 
P e r s i a n Gulf i s t h e avenue o f USSR's p o l i c y o f s t r a t e g i c 
125 
n e g a t i v i s m . In the words of Admiral S e r g i o C.Goreskov 
* . , . . t h e p r e s e n c e of four s h i p s . , . , t i e s t h e i m p e r i a l i s t 
hands and d e p r i v e s them of o p p o r t u n i t y f r e e l y t o i n t e r f e r e 
i n t h e p e o p l e s ' i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s " . In c a s e o f war or 
c r i s i s USSR can choke and t h r o t t l e t h e o i l s u p p l y t o t h e 
West* by l and based o p e r a t i o n from North and n a v a l b lockade 
1 2 2 , Nat ion C r a i g , R. N, 106* p . 5 1 , 
123v Ahmad Zubair* M. * " I s l a m i c Fundamentalism w i l l be the 
bugbear o f t h e w e s t . The Times o f I n d i a , A p r i l 1990 , 
1 2 4 . Beningsen* Alexendre , " s o v i e t Muslims and t h e wor ld of 
Islam* Problem o f Communism* Apri l* March 1 9 8 0 , p . 5 1 . 
1 2 5 . K i l l i n g h o f f e r * Arthur J .* " P r e t e x t and Contex t ; 
E v a l u a t i n g t h e s o v i e t Ro le i n t h e Middle Eas t* Mizan* 
v o l . X, N o . 3* May-JUne 1978* p . 8 6 . 
1 2 6 . Admiral S e r g i c Goresko, c . "Red S t a r R i s i n g a t Sea* 
speech on Navy Day* P a t r i o t (New D e l h i ) 26"Feb, 1 9 7 5 . 
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from south of the region, UsSR*s access t o . Persian 
Gulf and the a b i l i t y t o contro l choke p o i n t s enable i t 
i n r e s u l t t o c o n t r o l o i l sea l a n e s and i n s t a l l a t i o n s j with 
e a s i n e s s and before UsA can r e s o r t t o massive r e t a l i a t i o n 
In the Pers ian Gulf^usSR p o s s e s s e s the base and other 
f a c i l i t i e s . Having access t o the Iraqi por t of Umme-i-Qasr, 
USSR can e n c i r c l e Iran and Turkey - l a t t e r being the 
127 
member of NATO, Due t o the presence of CENTCOM, southern 
part of the Pers ian Gulf has be cone as valuable for bases 
as i s i t s Korthera par t , UsS i^ has acquired bases and 
f a c i l i t i e s in south Yamen t o support i t s naval f o r c e s in 
Arabian Sea- lndian Ocean. 
Persian Gulf a l so helps USSR to achieve i t s o b j e c t i v e 
i n the Indian Ocean, crucial t o s o v i e t Union f o r both 
m i l i t a r y and commercial purposes, s o v i e t presence in the 
land and the waters of the area a l s o ensures s a f e t y to 
s o v i e t comipercial in ter -course with centra l As ia , Indian sub-
continent and the F a r - E a ^ , 
Persian Gulf, i s the s t a r t i n g poAnt of UsSR*s 
ejqpansion southwards. I t g i v e s USSR access t o warm waters 
127, Muttam, John. , Arms Insecur i ty in the Pers ian Gulf, 
Radiant P u b l i s h e r s , New De lh i , 1984, p . 55. 
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( p o r t s ) , and connects USSR and Gulf water through land 
128 
route , USSR's expansion in t h i s area keeps I t r e l i e v e d 
from s e c u r i t y t h r e a t , s o v i e t - I r a q t r e a t y extended USSR's 
129 in f luence at the head of the Gulf.-^' Shah's over-throw 
coincided with s o v i e t invas ion i n Afghanistan; these two 
t h e developments on/one hand weakened-Us p o s i t i o n - and enhanced 
t h a t of USSR on the other . Thus, s o v i e t Union being adjacen't 
t o the region as w e l l as expanding i t s e l f i n t o the region^ 
"Casts a long shadow over the Gulf and the Arabian 
Peninsula", 
Pers ian Gulf a l so f u l f i l s Sov ie t Union's d e s i r e t o 
130 
be equated as superpower with USA.po l i t i ca l and m i l i t a r y 
in f luence a t the both ends of the area counterbalance Us 
in f luences i n Saudi Arabia and smal ler Gulf s t a t e s , Deve-
131 
loping s e a l i f t and a i r l i f t c a p a b i l i t i e s in l a t e 60*S/ 
invading Afghanistan _ i n l a t e 7 0 ' s , the USSR at l e a s t i n 
t h i s region i s a real superpower the t i t l e which was merely 
an a s c r i p t i v e country" before . 
To sum up^Persian-Gulf-Arabian Peninsula , which has 
been the c e n t r e - s t a g e of cold war p o l i t i c s and where USA 
due to i t dependency on o i l and I r a n ' s (and now Iraqfealso) 
h o s t i l i t y , -_ i s not as s trong as per i t s p r e s t i g e , i s an 
s t r a t e g i c a s s e t s t o USSR, 
128. Tahtinen, Dale R. N. 114, p . 20, 
129. Barrel , R.M,, N. 82, p . 11 . 
130. Kolokowiez, R,, The M i l i t a r y s o v i e t Foreign P o l i c y in 
Kannet R. (ed, ) t s o v i e t Foreign P o l i c y i n 1980 ' s , 
Preager P u b l i s h e r s , New York, UsA, p . 17, 
131. Winder, P h i l i p , The s o v i e t Union in I n t e r n a t i o n a l system 
of the 1980 's "Adelphl Papers Nr^ . ic;o TT«~ . 
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Oil Strategy of West Asia^ and USSR t 
West Asian o i l , th-ough does not c o n t r i b u t e , even 
nominally/ t o USSR's requirements, i s the important f a c t o r 
of s o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n the r e g i o n . For, as says Abraham 
Backer, "the s o v i e t Union could not be i n d i f f e r e n t t o Persian 
Gulf o i l a f f a i r s i f she was at a l l concerned w i t h the 
p o l i t i c s - of the region". 
Pers ian Gulf i s the avenue of USSR negat ive o i l - s t r a t e g y 
v i s - a - v i s USA i . e . t o deny, reduce, or contro l the o i l supply 
t o i t s p r i n c i p a l consumers and USSR's oppos i te powers. Complete 
or p a r t i a l shut o f f of o i l means s i g n i f i c a n t i n d u s t r i a l 
p a r a l y s i s and us and West's economic c o l l a p s e . Since NATO's 
economy and defence i s based upon o i l supply i t s denia l s h a l l 
132 le«id t o the d e s t r u c t i o n of the b l o c . Moreover, USSR's 
133 
contro l may d i s s o c i a t e npn^o from USA. The f a c t tha t o i l 
denia l s h a l l l ead t o t o t a l war does not reduce the importance 
of West Asia to USSR for s t r a t e g i c d e n i a l . USSR «ould not 
be naive enough t o resort to t h i s weapon; p r i o r t o a t o t a l 
war, as c a t a s t r o p h i c consequences.of a t o t a l war upon USSR 
w i l l be unbearable . While o i l denia l i s the most important 
134 instrument t o defend i t s e l f i f usA s t a r t s the t o t a l war. 
132 . Fohura* Wynfred, t Soviet Penetration i n t o Middle East 
(ed.) J National Strategoy Information Centre, New York, 
1971, p . 131. 
133. MOSS, Robert, i Reaching for O i l , The S o v i e t ' s Bold 
Middle East Strategy, Saturday Review, Apri l 4, 1990, 
pp . 1 4 - 3 2 . 
134 . Nation Craig* R. N . l 0 6 , p , 55 . 
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Oil y i e l d s p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s t o USSR. USSR reaped 
b e n e f i t s out of supporting war between l o c a l powerSand 
mul t inat iona l companies* the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of o i l 
industry^^^. and o i l embargo of 1967^^^ and 1973. USA's 
i s 
o i l import policy/eifi i s s u e i n the hands of USSR which i t 
can e x p l o i t t o malign USA*s image and ehhance that of 
137 i t s Own. Further, u t i l i z i n g o i l i s s u e s , USSR can e x p l o i t 
chance t o in f luence pro-Us conservat ive o i l producing s t a t e s 
of the Persian Gulf, 
West A s i a ' s o i l i s a l s o USSR's future source of supply. 
Import of o i l from North Ramallah f i e l d of Iraq was a 
goodwill gesture more than a n e c e s s i t y , ^ o r USSR ever turned 
as t o t a l or p a r t i a l .importer of west Asian o i l . I t a l s o 
139 does fiot seem t o be so in near future , . Yet , at the present 
ra te of consumption and production of o i l , USSR has t o 
import Persian Gulf o i l at l e a s t "for advantage i f not f o r 
n e c e s s i t y " , i n future unknown but a l s o not faraway. 
Growing consx:uTtption and dep le t ing production and 
r e s e r v e s , grea ter demand of expor t by i n c r e a s i n g number of 
c o u n t r i e s , s h a l l c e r t a i n l y induce USSR t o buy west Asian 
o i l f or i t s Own need and to s e l l the e^^pen^ive domestic 
135. Andreasyan, R.N, and Yanov, Aya E l , Cited in Mclaurin 
R,D. J The Middle East i n Sov ie t P o l i c y , Lexington 
Bools , London, England, 1975, p . 37. 
136. Stephen, Rage, "The USSR and the Arabia^as c i t e d in 
Maclaurin, R.O,, Lexington Books, London, England, 
1975, p . 38. 
137. Nation Craig, R., N. 106, pp. 54-55 . 
138. Barrel , R,M. N. 82, p . 5. 
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o i l to East and West Europe". ^ ^^ ^ 
Both e x t r a c t i o n of o i l in West Asia and t ranspor -
t a t ion from there to the sov ie t Union are cheap enough 
to a t t r a c t USSR trade with the Persian Gulf,"To save 
s t r a t e g i c reserve for long term and to by pass t ranspo-
r t a t i o n bo t t l enecks of moving , , . , o i l from Siber ia 
and Eastern UsSR to Volga-don I n d u s t r i a l basin? TDSSR 
shal l have to go for o i l t rade with West Asia. 
To assess f inal ly* West Asia i s of d i s t i n c t s i g n i -
ficance in many respects. I t i s a region which i s sorrounded 
by Europe and Africa in the West, Asia in the Eas t , USSR in 
the nprth and Us naval forces in the south. I t f ea tu res 
prominently in superpowers warfare and cold war s t r a t e g i e s 
simultaneously. I t comprises of two s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l 
sub-regions# known for ther d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s as well as 
oneness. And i t i s the l a r g e s t rese rv ior of wor ld ' s most 
important s t r a t e g i c mineral — the o i l . 
These aspec ts of geo-s t ra tegy of west Asia can not 
f a i l one to term the region as the world 's most s i ng i f i c an t 
reg ion , in conclus ion. 
1 3 9 , Imam, Z a f a r , N. 8 5 , p . 1 9 0 . 
1 4 0 . B u r r e l , R .M. , N. 8 2 , p . 5 . 
C H A P T E R - I I 
WEST ASIA'S POLICY OF ARMS ACQUISITION 
R e g i o n a l armament I s a b y - p r o d u c t of superpowers* and 
r e c i p i e n t s t a t e s * d e s i r e t o s e l l and p u r c h a s e the arms# 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , w e s t A s i a i s the most f i t t i n g example i n t h i s 
c o n t e x t . As a m a t t e r of f a c t , needs* demand and c a p a b i l i t y 
have t o g e t h e r made armament i n West A s i a a s p r i n c i p a l l y an 
arms a c q u i s i t i o n phenomenon. 
T h i s c h a p t e r endeavours t o be an a n a l y t i c a l s t u d y o f 
arms a c q u i s i t i o n i n West Asia under the f o l l o w i n g s u b - h e a d i n g s 
1) Arms A c q u i s i t i o n t The f a c t o r s , 2) Arms A c q u i s i t i o n : The 
B a s i c A s p e c t s , 3) Consequences of Arms A c q u i s i t i o n . 
Arms A c q u i s i t i o n » The F a c t o r s x 
West As ia i s the w o r l d ' s l a r g e s t i m p o r t e r o;£. arms. I t 
i m p o r t s 32% of w o r l d ' s t o t a l arms s u p p l y . ^ (See £i^^ir« 1.^3) 
2 
and consumes 45.9% of the t h i r d world i m p o r t s . 
Arms a c q u i s i t i o n i n West As ia i s t h e r e s u l t of v a r i o u s 
i n t e r - r e l a t e d f a c t o r s which can be b r o a d l y c a t e g o r i z e d 
a s d o m e s t i c , r e g i o n a l and e x t r a - i r e g i o n a l . 
1 . Zvi L a n i r ( e d . ) : I s r a e l i S e c u r i t y P l a n n i n g i n the 
1980S J I t ' s p o l i t i c s and Economics , P r e a g e r P u b l i s h e r s , 
New York, USA, 1984, p . 9 2 . 
2 . Brazoska , Micheal and Ohlson Thomas i Arms Trade t o The 
Th ird World 1 9 7 1 - 7 5 , Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , New York, 
1 9 8 7 , p . 2 . 
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1 9 6 6 . W a s h i n t o n D . C . . USA 
- 9* -
- . 4 6 -
As for as the domestic factors are concerned, internal 
threats i s the important most factor which shapes West Asia's 
arms acquisit ion po l icy . Though in i t s e l f a source of growing 
internal discontent , arms acquired by the countries of the 
region are spreadly used to repress the rebe l l ions . Saudi 
Arabia and other smaller Gulf countries have been guided 
primarily by th i s internal threat facttSr in their arms 
4 
acquisit ion pol icy . 
Appeasement of the armed forces to maintain feudal and 
monarchal set-up of the government against the radical and 
democratic forces^ and to avoid the opposition from armed 
forces a strong p o l i t i c a l force in west Asia * impells 
the rulers of west Asian countries to go for most sophisticated 
weapons in order to equip the army with same to win over 
i t s l oya l ty . 
Oil boom i s another internal factor which material izes 
West Asia's urge for s e l f defence. Oil boom hightened the 
3 . western arms and personnels in some of the Persian Gulf 
countries are the d irect source of internal resurgencles, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran (during 1970's) are the 
notable examples in th i s regard. 
4. Peterson, J.E. t Defending Arabia,Bill ing sons Limited, 
Warcestor, Great Britain, 1986, ppo 208-213. 
5. polk, William R. t The Middle East t Analysing Social 
Change", Bulletin of Atomic Sc ient i s t , Jan, p. 17, 
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Saudi A r a b i a ' s / I r a n ' s and I r a q ' s modest armament programme 
to an unprecedented l e v e l . During the p r i ce -h ike per iod , I ran 
alone imported arms worth $ 10500 m, while the corresponding 
figuires of I raq was $ IO4OO m, and the f i r s t three major 
r e c i p i e n t s — Saudi Arabia Iran and I raq —— arms imports 
amounted as much a3$94865 m i l l i o n . Oil income, in case of 
smaller but o i l r i ch s ta tes# i n i t i a t e d t h e i r heavy bu i ld -up . 
Moreover, p e t r o d o l l a r ass i s tance to non-oi l s t a t e s of West 
Asia a lso pushed up l e t t e r s ' arms acquis i t ion^ 
Oil a lso gave b i r t h t o many new i n t e r n a l and ex t e rna l 
7 problems , the bas ic causes promoting arms bui ld up in West 
Asia through out the l a s t two decades. 
Regional d i spu te s , t h r e a t s border skermishes and wars 
have made i t imperative upon the West Asian s t a t e s to r e s o r t 
to the modern and e f f i c i e n t na t ional defence system. In 
o 
broader sense, border d i spu te s among the Gulf s t a t e s * "Shah's 
9 grandiose p lans for m i l i t a r y expansion , t h r e a t s by the 
Islamic regime of I ran and I ran- I raq war^in subsequent order, 
are the reasons of quantum jump in the arms import of each 
6, Singh, J a s j i t ;"Burden of Arms race in West Asia", 
S t ra teg ic Analysis , vo l . x l l . No. 2, Manuary 1989, 
p . 1104. 
7, Stephanie Neuman, G, and Harkavy, Robert (eds,) tArms 
Transfers in the Modern world, Preager Pi ibl ishers , New 
York, 1980, p , 267. 
8, Shreedhar » The Gulf: Scramble for Secur i ty 
9. Muttam, John i Arms and Insecur i ty in the Pers ian Gulf, 
Radiant Publ i shers , New Delhi; Ind ia , 1984, pp.82-83, 
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state« throughout the preceedlng two decades . 
The Two Yaniens* armainent programme reached i t s z e n i t h 
(as shown in f igure 2^4) during 1978-80, the period of 
t ens ion and border d i s p u t e s between them. During 1982-86, 
the most cruc ia l period of Iran-Iraq war, Iraq spending 
$ 31740 m on arms annually, became West A s i a ' s and probably, 
w o r l d ' s , l a r g e s t arms r e c i p i e n t . ^ 
Even the Gulf war stepped up arms a c q u i s i t i o n programme 
of the neutral s t a t e s of the region; s i m i l a r l y , the Immediate 
period p r i o r t o , and a f t er the Arab- I srae l i war of 1973 shows 
a dramatic increase in the arms import of major b e l l l g e r a n t s 
of the Oct, war.^^ 
Regional asp ira t ion has a l s o been a major contr ibutory 
fac tor of west Asian arms a c q u i s i t i o n . Arms have been 
regarded as the symbol o f nat ional s trength and s t a b i l i t y . 
They (arms) conferred the s t a t u s of reg ional policeman upon 
Iran and helped Saudi Arabia to ezijoy hagemoney over the 
m i l i t a r i l y weak powers of Arabian peninsula i n the name of 
c o l l e c t i v e defence or c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , 
10. Brazoska, Micheal and Dhlson Thomas, N, 2, p . 22, 
11 . The Middle East and North Aferica 1990 : Europe P u b l i c a t i o n 
Limited , 36th addition: ., London, England, 1989, p . 133 . 
12 . Brazoska, Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas. N. 2, p . 19 . 
- 50 -
P r e s t i g e fac tor has s i g n i f i c a n t l y prompted the arms 
a c q u i s i t i o n progranone^ as s trong nat ional m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h -
ment equipped with modern and s o p h i s t i c a t e d we^ons# has^ 
become the e s s e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e of sovereignty.Unreasonable 
and i r r e l e v a n t arms a c q u i s i t i o n p o l i c y of n o s t of the Pers ian 
Gulf s t a t e s * emanates out of t h i s f a c t o r . Competition wi th 
neighbour (s) has been a l s o a p r e s t i g e f a c t o r s t imulat ing 
the a ^ s Import programme • UAE's arms bu i ld up, for example, 
owes t o the arms race among i t s sheikhdoms which ,otherwise , 
for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes , are the p o l i t i c a l u n i t s of UAE. 
B r i t i s h wlthdrawl pushed up and mi l i t ia t sd arms import 
14 programme of many of the s t a t e s of the Pers ian Gulf. The 
wlthdrawl created new Internal and ex terna l dangers in each 
s t a t e s , exposed the need of s e l f defence and gave an oppor-
t u n i t y t o the stronger powers to emerge as the regional 
powers. Arms, here, proved as the most s i g n i f i c a n t means 
15 to achieve each of these t a r g e t s . 
Threat from e i t h e r of the two superpowers and co ld war 
p o l i t i c s are the ex terna l f a c t o r s which have determined the 
arms Import p o l i c y of West Asian s t a t e s . 
13 . u s Congress, House of Representat ive , Hearing before the 
sub-commi.ttee on the Near East and south Asia of the 
Commltee of Foreign A f f a i r s , "New P e r s p e c t i v e s on the 
Pers ian G u l f , Us Government Pr in t ing Of f i ce , Washington, 
D . C . , p . 39. 
14 . c o t t r e l l , Alvln J . M i l i t a r y Force in the Pers ian Gulf, 
Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , London, England, 1976, p . 10. 
15. Shreedhar, N. 8, p . 85 . 
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s o v i e t Russ ia ' s , c l o s e and long proximity with the 
reg ion , i t s tt^qpansionist po l i cy* i t s presence in the Horn 
of Afer ica and Afghanistan, and i t s threa t to the o i l f i e l d s 
and the o i l supply^ shaped the arms import of pro>US s t a t e s 
in the reg ion , USA's presence around and in West Asia, 
augmented arms a c q u i s i t i o n by pro-USSR s t a t e s , l i k e Egypt 
( t i l l 1976) Iraq, Syria and south Yamen, of the are^, US 
des ign and threat to contro l the o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s in wake of 
o i l embargo, would have c e r t a i n l y persuaded pro-us o i l r i c h 
s t a t e s towards the strengthening of t h e i r defence , 
co ld war p o l i t i c s has a l s o f u e l l e d arms a c q u i s i t i o n in 
West Asia; in the sense that West Asian s t a t e s have been the 
p r o x i e s of e i t h e r of the superpowexs in t h e i r world wide arms 
race . Saudi Arabia, I s r a e l , and Iran ( t i l l 1978) and Egypt 
( s ince 1976) have played that role for USA and Syria , Iraq 
and South Yamen for USSR in t h i s regard. 
West Asian Arms Acquis i t ion x The Basic Aspects .» 
West Asian Arms a c q u i s i t i o n phenomenon has , the fo l lowing 
t y p i c a l and d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
During the 70® Middle East replac ing NATO became the b i g g e s t 
buyer of world 's most soph i s t i ca ted arms . Most of the arms 
16, P i e r r e , A.J. s The Global p o l i t i c s of Arms S a l e s , 
Princeton Univers i ty Pres s , New Jersy, USA, 198 2, p . 12, 
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t rans ferred to west Asia happened to be the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
weapons , suppl ier^ arms i n d u s t r i e s produced. Even some of them 
"are s p e c i f i c a l l y developed and redesigned in accordance wi th 
17 the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the buyers , 
some of the most advanced Us weapons,Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and I s r a e l have bought, include F-14 Tomcat f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , 
Phdenix a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e , P-3F aetronautic submarine 
s e r v i l i e n c e - p l a n e s , F-15 and F 16 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t and 
AWACS. The most advanced weapons of s o v i e t inventory are a l s o 
found in Syria and'Iraq. Thesre are, MiG-23, 27,29 f i g h t e r 
18 
a i r c r a f t s , T-72 tanks and SA-5 a i r defence m i s s i l e . While 
Jer icho I I and CSS-2 m i s s i l e s possessed by I s r a e l and Saudi 
Arabia r e s p e c t i v e l y , are the newest s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons 
of the world.^^ 
Various reasons have contributed t o the a c q u i s i t i o n of 
most s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms in the reg ion . Buying power, in f luence 
on s u p p l i e r , freedom of choice and f inanc ing of the production 
20 of new advanced weapons , are a few of t h o s e . 
Q u a n t i t a t i v e l y speaking. West Asia i s the l a r g e s t 
importer of the third wor ld ' s and the w o r l d ' s arms. According 
17 . Middle East and North Aferica 1990, N . l l , p p - 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 , 
see aiso^ s ingn, J a s j i t , "Burden ot Arms Race in Asia* 
S t r a t e g i c Analys i s , v o l . x l l . No, lO, January 1989 ,p ,1105 , 
18. I b i d . , p . 127. 
19. I b i d . , pp. 127-128. 
20. Brazosk, Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas, N.2 , p . 15 and Middle 
East and North Afer ica , N. 11, p . 128. 
- 53 -
Table - 1.2 
World Arm Importss 
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t o the WMEATjl988, Middle East Imports 37.7% of t o t a l arms 
supply t o the world (see table 1.2) and Iraq, and Satidi Arabia 
are the l a r g e s t importers of world arms#by country ( see 
f igure 1.5) while Syria and Egypt Occupy with and 7th 
p o s i t i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y in the l i s t of top 10 leading arms 
22 importers (see the f igure 1 . 5 ) . 
'" In comparison to other th ird world regions* Weat Asia 
r e c e i v e s most of the a i r c r a f t s * armours and a r t i l l e r y and 
23 
m i s s i l e s imported to these reg ions . 
West Asia p e r f e c t l y b e f i t s to the b e s t ever d e s c r i p t i o n 
of arms race of Colin Gray. Defining arms race^ he rays# "there 
should be two or more p a r t i e s . . . . who are increas ing or 
improving t h e i r armament at rapid rate and s tructur ing t h e i r 
m i l i t a r y pos tures with a general a t t e n t i o n to the p a s t 
current and ant ic ipated p o l i t i c a l behaviour of other 
countries**. 
w o r l d ' s major arms races have or ig ina ted and are going 
on in West Asia. In the Arab-Israe l i s ec tor there has been 
I s r a e l v s Syr ia , Jordan, Egypt arms race , p a r t i c u l a r l y , the 
21. US Arras Control and Disarmament Agency, World M i l i t a r y 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers , 1988, pp. 7 -8 , 
22. I b i d . , p . 8,Figure 8 , 
23 . Brazoska, Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas, N, 2, p p . 9 - 1 1 . 
24. Gray, Co l l in t **rhe Artns Race Phenomenon** world P o l i t i c s , 
Oct . 1971, p . 40. 
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arms r a c e between I s r a e l and S y r i a i s t h e mos t s y m b o l i c . 
In 1987 , I s r a e l had s«ne 679 combat a i r c r a f t s , 3 ,900 t a n X s , 
w h i l e S y r i a ' s armoury i n c l u d e d some 478 a i r c r a f t s and 4000 
25 t a n k s . The f i g u r e d e m o n s t r a t e s neck t o neck arms r a c e 
c o m p e t i t i o n between the two c o u n t r i e s * 
In t h e Gulf s e c t o r , I r a n - I r a q arms r a c e i s the w o r l d ' s 
most n o t a b l e . The two c o u n t r i e s have c a r r i e d on "mgin by 
27 
man, p l a n e by p l a n e and tank by tank arms r a c e " . During 1974-
1980 I r a n bought weapons worth o f $ 1 0 , 5 0 0 m and Iraq o f 
28 $ 1 0 , 4 0 0 m, Saudi Arabia had been a l s o i n d u l g e d i n arms 
race w i t h b o t h Iran and I r a q i n 1970®, While in 1980° i t h a s 
busy i n an arms race w i t h I s r a e l , Purchase o f F-15 and F-16 
f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t s by the b o t h c o u n t r i e s i n same q u a n t i t y -
r e f l e c t s t h e i n t e n s i t y of arm race between them. By l a t e s t , 
a m i s s i l e r a c e has s t a r t e d between Saudi Arabia and I s r a e l 
a s w e l l a s S y r i a and I s r a e l , Jordan and I r a q have r e - e n t e r e d 
29 i n t o t h e arms race w i t h I s r a e l , 
2 5 . M i d d l e E a s t and North A f e r i c a 1990, N, 1 1 , p , 127 , 
2 6 . I b i d , , p , 127 , 
2 7 . John, Wanger C , "Iraq" i n G a b r i e l , Richard A. ( e d . ) ; 
F i g h t i n g Armies, Greenwood P r e s s , London, E n g l a n d . 
2 8 . S i n g h , J a s j i t , "Burden o f Arms Race i n A s i a " S t r a t e g i c 
A n a l y s i s , v o l , x l l . No, 10 , aranuary 1989 , p , 1 1 0 5 , 
29 , J o h n s o n , G,H, i "War c l o u d s are l ooming a l a r g e o v e r 
West A s i a again" The Times of I n d i a , March 6, 1990 , 
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Oil i s the source which has financed West Asian arms 
acqu i s i t i on e f f o r t s as the incone generated by the o U 
esqport withdraw a l l f inancia l c o n s t r a i n t s on the r e c i p i e n t s 
to buy the weapons appropriate to t h e i r needs. I t i s sixid 
t h a t i f the Sheikh of Dubai wanted he could have j u s t bought 
up B r i t a i n ' s t o t a l arm production for few years . The p o l i c y 
of r egu la r o i l supply, increased product ion and reduced 
p r i c e has been the effect ive weapon in the hands of o i l 
producing s t a t e s to ma te r i a l i ze successful arms deals with 
the Western s u p p l i e r s . Saudi Arabia could get most of i t s 
purchases of weapons*like F 14, F 16 . a i r c r a f t and AWACS 
through t h i s method.^^ 
Arms are the ina l ienable p a r t of the p o l i t i c a l system 
and foreign po l i cy of the West Asian s t a t e s . Sada t ' s dev ia t ion 
from Nasser i te foreign pol icy a lso led to a complete s h i f t 
from one arm suppl ie r to the o the r . Is lamic Republic of I r a n ' s 
"ne i ther Eas t nor West pol icy" got r e f l e c t ed in i t s arms acqui-
s i t i o n s . I ran got arms from n e i t h e r of the superpowers during 
1981-85.^^ 
3fi. The Observer, 5 August, 1973. 
31 . Beedham, Brain "Look Beyond the Oi l " , The Economist, May 
1975, pp . 17-23. 
32. Middle East and North Aferica 1990, N. 11, pp.128-129. 
33. Brazoska, Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas, N. 2, pp.342-343. 
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Nature of the p o l i t i c a l system in West Asia has a lso 
determined i t s arms t r a n s f e r po l icy . Semi-mil i tary regimes 
of Syria and Iraq have adopted the po l i cy of self defence 
than m i l i t a r y a l l i ence p o l i c y of previous monarchal regimes, 
s o c i a l i s t government and the monarchal ones have opted for 
sovie t bloc and American bloc as t h e i r respect ive arms 
34 supp l i e r . Change in the p o l i t i c a l system and the foreign 
i-
pol icy has caused divergence in arms import p a t t e r n . On the 
other hand s tab le foreign po l i cy and s t a t u s quo p o l i t i c a l 
s e t up, as in Saudi Arabia* I s r a e l , and Jordan, have been 
followed by a s t ab le arms t rade pol icy by the r e c i p i e n t s . 
Since the West Asian s t a t e s lack the c a p a b i l i t y to handle 
and maintain the advanced weapons they buy^arms acqu i s i t i on 
in West Asia i s normally accompanied by the acqu is i t ion of 
35 m i l i t a r y personnels and ejc^eorts a lso , The personnels and 
advisers hired from abroad^manage the equipments and t r a i n 
the l o c a l forces . The r e c i p i e n t country bears the s a l a ry , 
housing and other f a c i l i t i e s for the foreign personne ls . 
In West Asia the arms trade i n t e r e s t s of the supp l i e r s 
and r e c i p i e n t s have genera l ly coincided. As back as . 
the beginning of 1970^, B r i t i s h withdrawl hightened the 
need of both aims t r ans f e r and arms acqu i s i t ion 
34. Ibid., pp. 344-345, 349. 
35. Stephanie Nueman G, and Harkavy, Robert, N, 7, p, 267, 
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in west As ia . Similarly* SaUdi Arabia's and I r a n ' s urge to 
p lay the ro le of reg ional power a f t e r the B r i t i s h withdrawl^ 
twined wi th the "Nixon Doctrine" which aimed at "mil i tary 
s a l e s in the creat ion of independent powers centers that 
could maintain l o c a l s t a b i l i t y " . Hence, USA's "two p i l l e r s " 
theory could be r e a l i z e d only due to the concerned powers 
w i l l i n g n e s s to assxime the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of "regional 
pol icemen". 
Growing Sovie t presence in and around the Indian Ocean 
has been the common f a c t o r in USA's arms t r a n s f e r and West 
37 A s i a ' s arms purchase p o l i c i e s , 'Foreign M i l i t a r y S a l e s ' 
p o l i c y of United s t a t e s , in s imi lar way^can be l inked with West 
Asian s t a t e s ' capac i ty t o buy us weapons. West As ia ' s d e c i -
s ion to buy s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons goes hand in hand to 
36 
s u p p l i e r s ' p o l i c y to s e l l the same for economic b e n e f i t s 
39 
and p o l i t i c a l l e v e r a g e . Emergence of I s lamic Iran was the 
common t h r e a t t o USA# i t s a l l i e s and West Asian s t a t e s which 
r e f u e l l e d arms in West Asia. in the beginning of the 80^. 
36, C o t t r e l l , Alvin j , N, 14, p . 12. 
37, I b i d , , p , 13. 
38, z v i , Lanir, N, 1, p , 16, 
39, P i erre , A . J . , N. 16, p , 182, 
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And i n the same decade c e r t a i n l y n o t w i t h o u t any common 
i n t e r e s t s t h e r e would have taken p l a c e the I r a n - c o n t r a arms 
d e a l i n v o l v i n g USA and I r a n , the s t a t e s d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d 
t o e a c h o t h e r . 
C l a d e s t i n e a c q u i s i t i o n o f n u c l e a r arms and a s s i s t a n c e 
i n 1980^ has been the w a t e r s h e d i n West A s i a ' s arms a c q u i s i t i o n 
p o l i c y , I s r a e l i s a n u c l e a r power, though t h i s h a s n o t b e e n 
40 
o f f i c i a l l y announced. 
purchase o f CSS-2 m i s s i l e s w i t h a range of 2200 km 
by Saudi Arabia and the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f l o n g range s u r f a c e -
t o - s u r f a c e m i s s l e i n o t h e r Arab c o u n t r i e s , namely I raq and 
S y r i a , ha^e in troduced i n the r e g i o n n u c l s a r c a p a b l e d e l i v e r y 
41 
s y s t e m , Saudi Arabia i s b e i n g ^ p r o b a b l y , or l i k e l y t o be 
42 
a s s i s t e d by China and P a k i s t a n i n i t s n u c l e a r e f f o r t s , 
B r a z i l , China, I n d i a , France and S o v i e t Union h e l p e d Iraq*^s 
n u c l e a r a t t e m p t s . And Egypt has r e c e i v e d n u c l e a r a s s i s t a n c e 
from U n i t e d s t a t e s and F r a n c e . 
A c q u i s i t i o n of n u c l e a r arms and a s s i s t a n c e i s an i m p o r t a n t 
6f 
g o a l / W e s t Asian s t a t e s ' d e f e n c e programme, a l t h o u g h m o s t o f 
4 0 . Branaby, Franh. The I n v i s i b l e Bomb, The Nuc lear Arms 
Race i n the Middle E a s t , I . B , T a u r i s and Co. L i m i t e d , 
Great B r i t a i n , 1989 , p . 6 , 9 0 , 8 1 . 
ftl. I b i d . , p . v i i . 
4 2 . I b i d . 
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them are the s i g n a t o r i e s t o NPT. Iraq i s again a l l s e t to 
r e s t a r t i t s nuclear programme, damaged by I s r a e l i at tack 
in 1980 and hal ted by the Gulf war since then onwards. 
Since i t joined NPT group, Egypt has persued in 
c l a d e s t i n e manner i t s p o l i c y of n u c l e r i z a t i o n with the 
help of two American f irms, a French f±nn,„the Framatome, 
the I t a l i a n firm, Nira and the west German firm, Krafwark 
union. U t t e r disregard of NPT by the s i g n a t o r i e s and 
44 s u p p l i e r s of nuclear a s s i s tance t o w e s t Asia , I s r a e l ' s 
n u c l e a r i z a t i o n and weakness of the NPT i n . i t s e l f ^ are 
the b a s i c causes underlying West A s i a ' s race for n u c l e r i -
zat ion a.n v i o l a t i o n of NPT by the s t a t e s who have signed i t . 
West Asian s t a t e s have a l so sought foreign help to 
produce and acquire chemical weapons. China i s the newest 
and the most p o t e n t i a l source of acquir ing chemical technology. 
However,due to Iraq*s indiscr iminate use of these weapons 
a g a i n s t the Iranian enemy and Khurdush peoples and i t s 
threat to Us forces s ta t ioned in West Asia now a days, i t 
i s very l i k e l y t h a t the Western s u p p l i e r s w i l l make s incere 
e f f o r t s t o stop trans ferr ing chemical weapons ox- a s s i s t a n c e 
43 . I b i d . , p . 85 . 
44 . I b i d . , pp. 147-149, 
45 . I b i d . , p . 54. 
46. I b i d . , p , 94 . 
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t o the th ird world in general and West Asian s t a t e s in 
p a r t i c u l a r , though preparing, openly, f o r t h e i r use them-
s e l v e s . 
contrary to the general trend, arms a c q u i s i t i o n in 
West Asia has not been marred by the arms production in 
the r e g i o n . For the s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms West Asia i s 
accoustomed t o , and needs/" can not be produced in the reg ion 
due t o the lack of necessary indus tr ia l i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e . 
Though I s r a e l and Egypt are the producers to reckon w i t h , 
both have f a i l e d to reduce t h e i r arm import burden,simply 
because o f the ir dependence upon the weapons more advanced 
than produced by them. 
The notable s u c c e s s in m i s s i l e technology achieved 
49 by Iraq , Syria and other countr i e s r e c e n t l y , sha l l on ly 
enhance the import of m i s s i l e s so to extend t h e i r range 
through indigenous e f f o r t s . To be c o n c i s e , indigenous 
arms production i s the p a r t of arms a c q u i s i t i o n programme, 
mainly concerned with overhauling,maintenance and 
redevelopment of arms procured from abroad. 
47. Muttan, John, h. 9, p . 198. 
48. Stephanie, Neuman G,jThe Arms Markets who's on Top, 
Orbis , v o l . 33, N,4, F a l l 1989. 
49. B l i t z (Urdu), Apri l , 1990. 
50. S t r a t e g i c Survey 1988-89 ,IISS, London, pp. 16, 20-25 , 
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As regards the nature of c l ient-suppl ier relat ionship, 
the divers i f icat ion of sources of arms supply has become 
an important foreign policy pr incip le . Notably, Iraq 
and Kuwait have not only lessened the i r dependence upon 
the major supplier, but also t r ied to purchase arms from 
each of the buyers of arms, Saudi Arabia and other Persian 
Gulf s t a t e s have also incorporated t h i s principle as the 
par t of thei r foreign pol icyand gradually succeeded a lso . 
However, i t i s worth-mentioning that only a manority of 
West Asian states has adopted the policy of divers i f icat ion, 
some of 'West Asian s ta tes are s t i l l over-dependent upon 
a single supplier for the i r to ta l imports. Syria and South 
Yamen import nearly 100% of their arms from USSR. Those who 
have t r i ed to diversify the i r sources have been par t ly 
successful only. Data show that these countries have been 
only able to reduce the i r supply at modest extent and 
s t i l l receive almost half of the i r needs from their major 
suppliers . 
In ter bloc import i s s t i l l not in practice barring 
a few exceptions. Tied closely with e i ther of the cold war 
camps in a l l spheres, the recipient has generally received 
arms from the superpower camp i t belongs to . Egypt i s the 
most prcxninent example in west Asia'and probably the 
- 65 -
whole world* which has completely switched over from one 
superpower to the o ther In I t s arms impor ts . Importing 
near about 100% of I t s arms from USSR during 1971-76, 
and before; y Egypt*after abandoning i t s diplomatic 
r e l a t i o n s with the former /s ta r ted g e t t i n g i t t o t a l imports 
from USA af te r 1976 and onwards. 
I r an (before 1980) Kuwait and Jordan are the exceptions 
which have acquired arms from the both superpowers. However* 
to be more speci f ic these count r ies have remained important 
c l i e n t s of USA throughout and also Imported arms from UdSR 
a f t e r the regular i n t e r v a l s . The share of Soviet weapons 
in comparison to tha t of American* in the t o t a l arms imports 
of these s t a t e s i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
C l ien t - suppl ie r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s very often favourable 
to the r e c i p i e n t . The r e c i p i e n t s t a t e s got the arms they 
wished and the suppl ier bowed to the "offers t h a t could not 
51 be refused" . There a l so genera l ly e x i s t s unanimity in 
c l i e n t - s u p p l i e r i n t e r e s t s than divergence. 
Open arms market, growing number of arms supplier* 
r e c i p i e n t ' s pol icy to reduce the r e l i a n c e on s ingle 
52 suppl ie r * arms embargo by the supp l i e r , spectism about 
5 1 . Brzoska* Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas. N. 2, p . 37. 
52 . Muttam, John, N.9 , p . 9 3 . 
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53 the reduct ion of arms supply-* and the a s s u r i t y of the 
54 
supply from the a l t e r n a t i v e sOurce(s)» I f asked , have 
togfBther l ed to the e x i s t i n g pat tern of s u p p l i e r - c l i e n t 
r e l a t i o n s and mul t i - sources supply trend In West As ia . 
Arms acqu i s i t i on has contributed to and a l s o proved 
hurdie in the p r a c t i c a l operat ion of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y 
system. Similar weapons sy s tan , would have c e r t a i n l y been 
one of the b a s i c reasons persuading the s o v i e t supplied 
Arab s t a t e s to go j o i n t l y aga ins t I s r a e l , GCC member 
s t a t e s / h a v i n g American weapons^ common to them, have evolved 
55 a c o l l e c t i v e defence system . GCC c o n s i s t s of 900 main 
b a t t l e tanks , more than 3500 armoured v e h i c l e s , over 42 5 
in terceptors and ground attack a i r c r a f t s .between 500 and 
800 h e l i c o p t e r s and 36 f a s t attack naval v e s s e l s , and, of 
course , h i g h l y soph i s t i ca ted a i r defence and communication 
56 system. 
But, arms have cr ippled the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y a l s o . 
Arms of d i f f e r e n t nature "prevent the transfer of spare 
p a r t s and ammunition and hamper e f f e c t i v e use of C-3 
57 system", as says J.E, Peterson , Fai lure of GCC c o u n t r i e s 
53, Despi te regular arms supply from UsA, the Shah of Iran 
always suspected American C r e d i b i l i t y as arms s u p p l i e r . 
New York Times, 5 S e p t . , 1976, 
54, I b i d , Shah said'"we have ten other markets t o provide 
us wi th what we need". 
55, Peterson J ,E, N, 4 . , p , 223, 
56, The Economist, 21 Jan, 1984 and Middle East Economic 
D i g e s t , Oct; 1983, p . 24, 
57, Pe terson , J .E , ; N.4, p , 223. 
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to de ter Iranian attack, and that of j o i n t Arab armies 
aga ins t I s r a e l in each Arab-Israe l i warfare the examplaries# 
to mention a few. 
Arms r e s t r a i n t has been i n e f f e c t i v e to contain arms 
a c q u i s i t i o n p o l i c y of west As ia . Lack of c o l l e c t i v e arms 
r e s t r a i n t has never l e f t the r e c i p i e n t short of a l t e r n a t i v e 
sources when the arms suppl i e s were l i m i t e d or stopped by 
one or a few s u p p l i e r s . For in s tance , Iraq remained unaffected 
by the arms embargo imposed by USSR, as the former met i t s 
requirements by importing arms from as many a« ^ r i t y 
58 
c o u n t r i e s . Moreover, arms r e s t r a i n t s in west Asia have 
been ••temporary'* and a few in between. During the second hal f 
of 1970^ Carter's arms r e s t r a i n t p o l i c y was unpract ib le and 
so were the conventional Arms Talks (CATX between the super-
S9 powers in 1977-79. USSR's embargo on Iraq iias short l i v e d , 
and USA f a i l e d to s t i c k upon i t s arms sanct ion a g a i n s t Iran and 
suppl ied arms to Iran under Iran-contra deal c l a d e s t i n e l y . 
The recent e f f o r t s of USA and other Western s t a t e s to 
stop the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s , capable of 
58. z v i , Lanir, N. 1, p . 67. 
59 , Stephanie, Neuman G. N. 48, 
60, Middle East and North Aferica 1990, N, 11, p . 137, 
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ca r ry ing nuclear weapons, through evolving MTCR (Missile 
Technology Control Regime) may prove a f u t i l e e x e r c i s e . 
Because#MTCR does not comprise of the coun t r i e s l i ke China, 
USSR, Braz i l and Argentine, the important arms supp l i e r s 
to West Asia. In addi t ion , France, I t a l y and West 
Germany,have followed t h i s po l i cy h a l f - h e a r t e d l y by t r a n s -
f e r r ing l e t h a l weapons in hng& q u a n t i t y almost r egu la r ly 
in West Aaia.^^ 
Consequences of Arms Acquisi t ion j 
consequences of arms import, in one sentence, have 
been more detr imental and l e s s advantageous to West Asia . 
A f u l l - l e n g t h discuss ion i s as fol lows. 
Buying capaci ty of the r e c i p i e n t s ha;, not ended t h e i r 
dependency upon, and the influence o f / the s u p p l i e r s . s e l f -
xreliance i s the most missing aspect of the arms acquis t ion 
p o l i c y . Lack of i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e , man power,and l o g i s t i c a l 
c a p a b i l i t y has pu t the arms s t i l l under the control of 
supp l i e r s through t h e i r personnels s t a t ioned in the r e c i p i e n t 
s ta tes»enjoying , thereby, influence on p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y p o l i -
c i e s of the r ec ip i en t c o u n t r i e s . Despite having h ighly 
61 . S t r a t e g i c Survey 1988-89, N. 50, p . 22. 
62. I b i d . , p . 21 . 
63. s i d d i q u i , Abdul Rahman, "Western o i l - s t a a t e g y , sov ie t 
Geo-Pol i t l cs and Gulf Security**, Defence Journa l , 
v o l . VII , No, 3, p . 5. 
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s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons,Saudi Arabia can h a r d l y t h ink t o 
go t o war a g a i n s t I s r a e l o r any o t h e r p ro -Us s t a t e s , i f 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o r c e , so l ong Us p e r s o n n e l s r e t a i n t h e 
c o n t r o l over the weapon s y s t a n of t h e fo rmer . 
Need of r e g u l a r s u p p l i e s * a d d i t i o n a l arms and spare 
p a r t s keeps the r e c i p i e n t v u l n e r a b l e t o the f e a r of c u t 
o f f s , slow downs and embargoes and » in re su l t »deepens the 
r e l i a n c e upon the s u p p l i e r . Attempt to throw the yoke of 
f o r e i g n power dominat ion th rough abandoning arms a c q u i s i -
t i o n can c o s t h e a v i l y . I r a n pa id fo r i t in terms of i t ' s 
d e f e a t a g a i n s t I r a q a s t h e former i n t h e absence of arms 
found i t s e l f hard to s u s t a i n the war . 
I nd igenous arms p r o d u c t i o n has a l s o no t reduced t h e 
dependency, because the need of l a t e s t weapons system/ 
produced on ly in the s u p p l i e r s t a t e , keeps the West Asian 
s t a t e s t i e d wi th t h e i r s u p p l i e r s . I s r a e l • s example i s no te 
wor thy as i t i s h i g h l y r e l i a n t upon the Uni ted s t a t e s f o r 
i t s n e x t g e n e r a t i o n of s o p h i s t i c a t e d a i r c r a f t s l i k e F-15 
and F-16 and AWACS, a l t hough i t i s p r o d u c i n g and s e l l i n g 
64 the arms known for t h e i r t e c h n i c a l q u a l i t y , e t c . 
Adress ing Uni ted Na t ions General Assembly, Rajatnam* 
f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r of Singapore , s a i d * " t h e massive flow of 
64 . S t e p h a n i e , Nueman, G. ftiod Harkavy, Robe r t . N. 7 , 
p . 270. 
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arms to the th i rd w o r l d . . . . c rea tes a new form of dependency 
on the g r ea t power who can e x p l o i t the t h i r d w o r l d . . . . to 
mant ipulate them to engineer con f l i c t s between them as to 
Use them as the proxies in t h e i r competition for inf luence 
and dominance". This i s the exact nature of the dependency. 
West Asia has been subject t o . Arms in the region have 
exacerbated the c o n f l i c t between Iran and I raq , giving the 
superpowers the p r e t e x t to pol ice the Mediterranean sea and 
the Pers ian Gulf, while the local powers, as I ran t i l l l a t e 
70°, Saudi Arabia since long and Syria,&Sov'th Yamen, ac t as 
the p rox ie s to help the superpowers and other major powers 
in t h e i r n e o - c o l o n i a l i s t - i m p e r i a l i s t a t tempts . 
Foreign arms in west Asia have paved the wa • to.., 
as c lauzwi t s says, the reso lu t ion of d i spu tes by vgar than 
the peaceful means. The fact is t ha t most of the wars of the 
pos t 2nd world war era have been fought in t h i s region and 
for an unant ic ipa tory pe r iod . Arms have ^ot only prolonged 
the wars, but turned these destruct ive, t2 the b e l l i g e r e n t s 
as wellasthe neutral s t a t e s . I r an - I raq war i s the f i t t i n g 
example to be c i t e d . Supply of arms kept on fue l l ing t h i s 
68 war no l e s s than nine years . The m i s s i l e s and other 
65. Statement of Minis ter for foreign Affairs of Singapore 
before the United Nations General Assembly, 31st 
sess ion Sept, 29* 1976. 
66. P i e r r e , N. 16, p . 5. 
67. The Hindustan Times, Ju ly 2, 1990, 
68. Kaul, Kapil : **rhe I r an - I r aq war; Linkages and Lessons" 
S t r a t e g i c Analysis, vo l . x i l . No. 2, March 1989, 
p . 1435. 
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weapons d i s t r u c t e d c i t i e s and took n e a r l y thousands o f . l i v e s . 
By a c q u i r i n g a n t i - s h i p s i l k war m i s s i l e / I r a n t h r e a t e n e d 
Gulf s t a t e s ' and o i l s h i p m e n t t o USA/ d r a g g i n g ' i n r e s u l t , 
bo th in the war . So, r i g h t l y and s u c c i n c t l y concludes Donald 
A. Wel ls t h a t , "Vars ( in West Asia) have i n c r e a s e d in scope , 
s e r i o u s n e s s and firequency i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
70 
of s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons!' 
Brandt commission r i g h t l y s t a t e d t h a t arms e x p e n d i t u r e 
has c o s t a s l u r o r the economic growth of Vfest Asian 
71 
s t a t e s . Rapid growth in arms p u r c h a s e s has slowed down 
the developmental p r o j e c t s . Arms pu rchase i n West Asia 
72 has r i s e n twice t o economic development . Even non o i l 
s t a t e s of West Asia have d i r e c t e d a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of 
t h t i r income and p e t r o d o l l a r a id on arms purchase i n s t e a d 
of economic development. 
Arms a c q u i s i t i o n has c o n t r i b u t e d to the c r e a t i o n 
of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e road and a i r f i e l d s . However, t h i s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i s uncomparable t o the c o s t the same has 
con fe r r ed upon the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , s o c i a l w e l f a r e , 
73 
e d u c a t i o n and e t c . 
69 . I b i d . , p . 1438. 
70. w e l l s Donald A. » The war Myth,Western P u b l i s h i n g 
Co. New York, USA, 1987^ p . 191 . 
7 1 . Programme fo r S u r v i v a l , Cambridge MIT P r e s s , 1980, 
p p . 120-122. 
72 . P i e r r e , N. 16, pp . 36 -38 . 
7 3. Benoit, Emile, Defence and Economic Growth in Developing 
countries, Lexington Book, Toronto, Canada,1974, p.86. 
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Oil and arms r e l a t i o n s h i p , the d i r e c t consequence 
of arms a c q u i s i t i o n , has a l s o no t p a i d o f f t o west As i a . 
I t h a s l e d t o the t r a n s f e r of o i l i n exchange of airms/ 
n e u t r a l i z i n g not only West?^ dependence upon West Asia* 
74 b u t t u r n i n g the l a t t e r under the f o r m e r ' s dominance. 
Arms and o i l r e l a t i o n s h i p has reduced t h e p r i c e of o i l and 
i n c r e a s e d i t s ou tpu t , bo th unfavourab le t o the o i l p r o d u c e r s . 
For example , dur ing the t ime of o i l s h o r t a g e s . West Asian 
s t a t e s , f o r arms/Kept t h e West awashed of o i l i n s t e a d of 
75 
e x p l o i t i n g the s i t u a t i o n i n t h e i r f a v o u r . 
Emergence and c o n t i n u a t i o n of arms r a c e i s t he 
d i r e c t consequence of arms a c q u i s i t i o n . In an atn^iOsphere 
of d i s p u t e s and t e n s i o n s / t h e arms a c q u i s i t i o n by one 
coun t ry i s suspected by the o t h e r a s t h r e a t t o i t s e c u r i t y ^ 
compe l l ing the l a t t e r t o go fo r arms. In r e s u l t , t h e r e 
s t a r t s the arms r a c e . For example, I s r a e l acqu i red as 
many F-15 f i g h t e r s as g i v e n t o Saudi Arabia in 1976, t o 
c r e a t e m i l i t a r y ba lance which had g o t d i s t u r b e d due t o 
Saudi A r a b i a ' s massive arms a c q u i s i t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , t he 
most r e c e n t m i s s i l e r a c e between I s r a e l and Sa^di Arab ia , and 
between I s r a e l and Jordon and I r a q , i s the a f t e r e f f e c t 
74. Alam, M. Sayeed : "Problem of Super^^owers' Dominance, 
Imam Khomeinie 's P o l i c y of N e i t h e r E a s t Nor West and i t s 
r e l e v a n c e " paper p r e s e n t e d in Seminar, Imam Khomeinie: 
P e r s o n a l i t y and Thought , New D e l h i , I n d i a , 6th June 1990, 
7 5 . MacNaugher Thomas L. : Arms and O i l ; Us M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y 
and the P e r s i a n Gulf, The Brooking I n s t i t u t i n , Washington 
D.C. , USA. 
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of purchase of CSS-2 miss i l e by Saudi Arabia from China 
and a c q u i s i t i o n of foreign ass i s tance by Syria, Jordan 
and I raq in t h e i r bid to enhance the c a p a b i l i t y of t h e i r 
m i s s i l e system able to cover the whole or half of I s r a e l , 
Arms in West Asia have not done the needful to abate 
i n t e r n a l / external and regional threats. 
Despite disarming the Pa l e s t i n i ans , defeat ing the 
Arabs in October war and Syria l a t e r in the Lebnon war as 
well as a l so enjoying m i l i t a r y supe r io r i t y over the Arabs, 
I s r e a l ' s in te rna l and ex te rna l secur i ty has not improved 
76 beyond low l e v e l . Mi l i t a ry might of I s r a e l i s s t i l l 
i n s u f f i c i e n t to ensure the secur i ty of I s r a e l without 
possess ing control over the West Bank and the Ghaza S t r i p . 
On Arab s ide , t h e i r borders are s t i l l not a t a l l free from 
I s r a e l i pene te ra t ion . 
Barring Iraq, each country of West Asia has f a i l e d 
to t r a n s l a t e i t s huge arms acquis i t ion in to a s t rong 
77 defence system, Kuwait 's unchallengable surrender to 
I r a q , a t t e s t s t h i s fac t .Saudi Arabia 's dependency on USA 
and o ther Western powers for help aga ins t the recent I r a q i 
t h r e a t a l s o s ing i f i e s the ineff iciency of the self -defence 
76, Middle East and North Aferica 1990, N, 11, p^ 126, 
77. c o t t r e l l , Alvin j . N,14, p , 62. 
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of West Asia ' s most heavi ly armed s t a t e . 
Artns acqu is i t ion has a lso proved ineffec t ive to 
cope with in te rna l r e su rgenc ies . Forceful suppression 
of i n t e r n a l d i scontents has resolved the problem tempo-
r a r i l y , bu t not permanently. In r e s u l t , the in te rna l 
problems have continued resurfacing a t frequent i n t e r v a l s / 
and are strengthening day by day. 
Armed supression a l so poin ts out the i n a b i l i t y of 
the government to solve the problem through p o l i t i c a l means. 
This f ac t , boosts the r e su rgan t s . Success of I ranian revo-
lu t i on in 1978 and the long iv i ty of In t i f adeh in face of 
naked s t a t e terror ism, confirm the impotency of forceful 
so lu t ion of the domestic problems. 
Arms acquis i t ion has l ega l i sed and strengthened the 
i n t e r n a l rebe l l ions in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and other 
s t ta tes . For arms i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e foreign presence which 
has been the basic weapon in the hands of r evo lu t i ona r i e s 
to win over publ ic and foreign sympathy. Needless to say, 
t h a t 'American arms'* bes ides ' c o r r u p t i o n ' , was the cen t r a l 
theme of the Islamic revolu t ion in I ran and i t s success in 
dethroning 2500 years old dynasty from the power, for ever . 
Arms have not enhanced the c a p a b i l i t y to West Asian 
s t a t e s to f ight war they are genera l ly engaged i n . I s r a e l 
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in the two wars of l a s t two decades v i r t u a l l y destroyed 
the most advanced weapons of Arab s t a t e s . I r an - I r aq war 
examplifled the mishandling of weapons. Arms were 
destroyed or/and remained unused due to the sheer ignorance 
of armed forces of the b e l l i g e r e n t s . Moreover, arms in 
many wars, l i k e the Lebnon war, turned out to be hurdle 
in smooth combat operation mainly because of the knowledge-
lessness of m i l i t a r y personnels to operate and maintain them, 
To sum up the preceeding discussion, the typical 
g e o - s t r a t e g i c , p o l i t i c a l and economic fea tures of West 
Asia determine the armament in the region. Armament, 
therefore , i s b a s i c a l l y regional in charac te r . Analysing 
the fac to rs of arms acqu is i t ion in west Asia, i t may also 
be concluded t h a t armament i s a necessi ty t h e r e . However, 
over rt l iance on mi l i t a ry s t rength and over capab i l i t y 
to buy the arms, have generated excessive armament, ensued 
arms races , and brewed tens ions and r i va l ry , each being 
the reason behind the growing de s t ab i l i z a t i on of west 
Asia. In shor t , though necess i ty in nature, arms are 
disadvantageous in consequences. 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
USA's POLICY OF ARMS SUPPLY IN WEST ASIA 
Except for a short period of Carter 's adminis trat ion 
only« arms have been the indispensable instrument of the us 
fore ign p o l i c y in West Asia frCMn Eisenho%*er t i l l date.American 
arms' are the a r t i c l e s which have been most c o n s i s t e n t l y 
and p e r s i s t e n t l y sold t o and bought by the West Asian s t a t e s . 
And t h i s e x p l a i n s the presence of Us arms i n large quant i ty 
i n the region. 
This chapter endeavours to analyse various a s p e c t s of 
us arms suppl i e s i n West Asia and a l so d e a l s wi th i t s ccnse -
quences t o US i n t e r e s t s . 
Maintenance of in ternal s e c u r i t y of a l l i e s has been an 
important fac tor guiding Us arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n p o l i c y in West 
2 As ia . This i s so because on contrary t o the contemporary 
governments* the f o r c e s of change are ant i -Us in nature . 
Hence« any revo lut ionary change in c l i e n t s t a t e s i s bound 
t o reduce US arms supply. Iranian example more than s u f f i c i e n t l y 
demonstrates t h i s f a c t . Thus,US arms p r i n c i p a l l y and pr imar i ly 
1 . General Brown quoted in "Pentagon Hears Army Chief Cal l* . 
Army of I s r a e l a Burden t o US", New York, Times, Oct. 18, 
1976. 
2 . The Nature of s o v i e t M,m and I n t e r e s t s in 
the Middle East , Published by The Middle Eas t , I n s t i t u t e 
Washington, D.C. , USA, 1972, P. 14. 
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aim at regime's Secur i ty and t h a t i s why the s t a t e s 
prone t o d i s turbances and terrorism from w i t h i n , l i k e , 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other GCC countr ie s and Jordan 
and £ 9 ^ t , h a v e been the l eading r e c i p i e n t s of u s arms. 
s e c u r i t y of a l l i e s from outs ide at tack reg iona l or 
ex tra -reg iona l i s an equa l ly important aspect of Us p o l i c y 
of arms ej^iort t o West Asia, from Nixon Doctrine and t h e r e -
after»arms have been given to enable r e c i p i e n t s wi th s e l f -
defence , t h e r e f o r e , t o avoid d i r e c t in t ervent ion on behalf 
3 
of a l l i e s for t h e i r s a f e t y . 
The ex terna l threat , l i k e the in terna l one, i n West Asia, 
i s l i a b l e to mark an end t o us hagemoney over the concerned 
s t a t e s ; therefore,USA i s hard bound t o t rans fer most sophis -
t i c a t e d weapons t o ensure i t s r e c i p i e n t s * s a f e t y from any 
danger, external i n nature, if-aqi threat throughout 1970® 
and Iranian threat in 1980* pre-occupied USA's p o l i c y of 
arms transfer aiming "deterrence to" and "defence from" 
* 
4 
"external" aggress ion . Cer ta in ly , the recent Iraqi threat 
t o Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other pro-Us s t a t e s of the 
Gulf, and I s r a e l , s h a l l force USA t o bear the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
3 . Chris ter , Johnson, t suerpoweri comparing American and 
s o v i e t Foreign P o l i c y , Frances Pr in ter s ( p u b l i s h e r s ) , 
London, UK, 1984, pp . 122-127. 
4. P i e r r e , A.J . : The Global P o l i t i c s of Arms S a l e s , 
Princeton Univers i ty P r e s s , New Jersy , USA, 1982, p . 6 3 . 
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for the security of its allies v;hich can be most effectively 
maintained by arms transfer as in the long run USA's 
military presence in face of world wide opposition and 
grave economic and political burden, may be a short-Jived 
phenomenon. 
"To counter Soviet influence and that of its 
surrogates" , has been the central theme of US arms 
transfer policy, right from the president Nixon down 
7 
to Reagan administration. President Carter who in the 
early years of his term gave little emphasis to this 
objective, in the later years, after the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, persued it with greater deal of 
determinism and activeness. Sale of arms to Saudi 
Arabia and Iran during last years of his presidency stemmed 
out from this gdaj. And even North Yenen, recipient of USSR's 
arms also, did not remain an exception with regard to the 
9 
policy of containment. President Reagan, through out his 
5. Rubin, Barry : "Reshaping the Middle East", Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 69, N. 3, Summer 1990, p. 142. 
6. Pierre, A.J.i The Global Politics of Arms Sales, 
Princeton, University Press, New Jersy, USA, 1982, 
p. 63 . 
7. Hildretch, Steven A. : "Perceptions of US, Security 
Assistance 1959-1983 : The Publication Record" in 
Graves Ernest and Hildretch Steven A. (eds.): US 
Security, the Political Process, Lexington Book, 
Toronto, Canada, 1985, p. 84. 
8. Reich, Bernard "United States', Middle East, Policy in 
the Carter and Reagan Administration" Middle East Review, 
vol. XVII, No. 2, Winter 1984/85. 
9. In 1979 Carter administration agreed to deliver arms 
wortn $ 390m to North Yemen to keep it away from USSR's 
clutches. 
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f i r s t term, fol lowed t h i s p o l i c y fu l l -b looded lyy ^ and in 
the second exempted West Asia as the region s u b j e c t t o 
superpowers p o l i c y of disarmament* Pres ident Bush« although 
not facing the danger of s o v i e t advancement i n West Asia, 
has shown apprehension about the USSR's arms in the are«» 
thereby, i n d i c a t i n g an i m p l i c i t w i l l i n g n e s s t o the c o n t i n t l t y 
of arms supply in the reg ion . 
us had suppl ied a subs tant ia l port ion of i t s arms to 
Iran, the f r o n t - l i n e s ta te bordering the s o v i e t - R u s s i a . 
In a s imi lar manner, USA has given aims t o Saudi Arabia to 
monitor s o v i e t naval power in Red sea - Indian Ocean.and 
other Gulf c o u n t r i e s , t o counter , USSR in the Pers ian Gulf 
Arabian Sea. Thus, arms have been b a s i c a l l y provided t o 
contain and deter USSR on both land and water in and around 
12 
west Asia . During the time of detante arms continued 
performing t h e i r funct ion t o conta in USSR. I n i t i a t i n g peace 
process in Arab-Israe l i s ec tor and pouring in arms i n the 
t o . P i e r r e , A.J. S- 4 , pp . 65 -67 . 
1 1 . s o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power,1990, Prospects for change u s , 
Goverwnent Pr in t ing Of f i ce , Washington, D .C. , USA, 1989. 
12 . Arun (Major) "Arms Transfer a& an Instrument of Foreign 
Pol icy" U . S . I . Journal, v o l . CXXIII, No. 491, January-
March 1990, p . 38. 
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Pers ian Gulf during the de tente per iod , UsA resorted to 
dual p o l i c y of containment of USSR on p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y 
13 f r o n t s . 
USA has used arms as an a l t e r n a t i v e and sa fer s u b s t i t u t e 
14 t o the d i r e c t confrontat ion with USSR . while at the same 
time# arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y has been used for the denia l of 
phys ica l presence to USSR i n USA's area of sphere , S t r a t e -
15 g i c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y important for UsA. 
Arms t r a n s f e r has been viewed by the d e c i s i o n makers of 
the United s t a t e s as the v i t a l instrument t o in f luence the 
l o c a l countr ies of the r e g i o n . The arms help i n t y i n g the 
r e c i p i e n t s t o c l o s e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s that too 
17 
at the expense of adversary po%*ers' s imi lar e f f o r t s . Arms 
t r a n s f e r i n f l u e n c e s foreign p o l i c y behaviour of the r e c i p i e n t 
country t o force i t to act as per the wishes and w i l l of 
USA in matters p e r t a i n i n g t o the co ld war p o l i t i c s and 
18 
other reg ional and g lobal i s s u e s . Arms a l s o congenialisse 
13 . Campbell, John C. "soviet P o l i c y in the Middle East" 
Defence Journal , v o l . I l l , Nos.4 & 5, April-May 1981, p . 1 0 . 
14. Harold H, "superpowers stake in the Middle East" 
in^The supeirpowers i n the Middle East ,publ ished by AEI 
Foriegn p o l i c y and Defence Review, 1986, p . 16. 
15 . Leiden, Carl "The United S t a t e s and the Pers ian Gulf" in 
J r . Michalak, Stanley J. and Gray Robert C. (eds . ) t 
American Foreign P o l i c y s i n c e Detente, Harper and Row 
Pub l i shers , New York, UsA, 1984, p . 109. 
16. N inc ic , Miros lav , The Arms Race t The P o l i t i c a l Economy 
of M i l i t a r y Growth, Praeger Publ i shers , New York, UsA, 
1982, p . 118. 
17,18 Contd . . . 
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c l o s e s t r a t e g i c cooperation between the suppl ier and the 
r e c i p i e n t . Sale of Awacs, F-15, F-16 a i r c r a f t s and Sidewinder 
- ! i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s to saudl Arabia, GCC s t a t e s and Egypt 
1 9 has been d i r e c t e d to t h i s aim. 
Instead of ideology USA's p o l i c y springs out of 
20 Real p o l l t i k . Geo. s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n of the area , domestic 
and economic compulsions, p a r t i c u l a r l y o i l f a c t o r , have 
determined United States p o l i c y of azms t r a n s f e r t o the 
r e g i o n . 
No country of the region t h a t happens to be the US 
21 
c l i e n t , i s the model democracy. Even I s r a e l s b l a t a n t v i o l a -
t i o n of bas i c norms of humanity and c i v i l r i g h t s and peace 
and order, has not prevented USA to stop or r e s t r i c t arms 
supply t o t h i s country. Nor did the brutal suppression of 
Iranian r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s by the shah with Us arms»f6rce Carter 
t o implement h i s arms r e s t r i c t i o n p o l i c y In name of'hianan 
r i g h t s * . I n f a c t , Carter's p o l i c y was not meant f o r West Asia, 
C o n t d . . . 
17 . shounlkhin, Andry U. "sov ie t Perception of US Middle 
East Po l i cy" , The Middle Eas t Journal, v o l . 43 , No, l 
Winter 1989, p7"T5I 
18. Rajgopalan, Rajesh, "Evolving Patterns of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Arms Trade wi th the Developing World", S t t a t e q l c Analys is , 
v o l . XI, No. 11, Feb. 1988, p . 1299. 
19. Singh, K.R, "The P o l i t i c s of Arms Bazaar, world Focus, 
v o l , 2, Nos. 11-12, Nov.-Dec. 1981, pp. 103-104 , 
20 . N inc ic , Miroslav, N. 16, pp . 119-120. 
2 1 . I b i d . , p . 119. 
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I t seems. Reagan scrapped a l l moral r e s t r a i n t s Carter had 
t h e o r l t i c a l l y Imposed, and based h i s p o l i c y on the a b i l i t y 
and i n t e r e s t s of the r e c i p i e n t and the supp l i er . 
In comparison t o USSR# domastic mileue appears t o 
be a s i g n i f i c a n t determinant of Us arm transfer p o l i c y in 
West Asia . Jewish lobby hai exer ted considerable inf luence 
on each of the organs of us government to induce t h e supply 
of arms t o I s r a e l , And s ince 1970 or so the "SaUdi lobby", 
and 
the 'Arab lobby'ythe "OAPEC lottoy" have been the a c t i v e 
pressure groups try ing t o i n f l u e n c e decis ion making process 
23 on arms supply t o Arab c o u n t r i e s and I s r a e l . E l e c t i o n 
manifesto , p u b l i c openion and arms industry are the other 
domestic actors shaping the Us arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n p o l i c y 
in West Asia. 
USA has provided arms to West Asian s t a t e s t o secure 
bases and s t r a t e g i c f a c i l i t i e s ^ c i r u c i a l for monitering USSR. 
having access t o o i l supply, for the working of CENTCCM, 
meeting p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n and n e t u r a l i z i n g USA-
24 
west Asia d i s t a n c e . There may not e x i s t d i r e c t deal of 
"arms for bases" l i k e the "arms for o i l " , but Us arms bear 
22 , shreedhar, "Impact on Reagan's Arms Transfer Po l i cy* 
S tra teg i c Ana lys i s , v o l . 5, Nos. 5 and 6, Aug,-Sept , 
1981, p . 88 . 
2 3 . Brzoska, Micheal* and Ohlson, Thomas. Arms Trade to the 
Third world, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press , New York, USA, 
1987, p . 54 . 
2 4. Martin, Lenare, G. The Unstable Gulf,Lexington Books, 
Toronto, Canada, 1984, pp. 128-129. 
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enough inf luence on the r e c i p i e n t to grant f a c i l i t i e s t o 
USA. Henceforth/USA, has acquired f a c i l i t i e s at the important 
bases of the c o u n t r i e s which r e c e i v e US arms. 
In an i n d i r e c t manner, UsA's arms have r e s u l t e d i n t o 
the modernization of bases which may be used at the time 
of c r i s i s by USA. Most of the bases in Saudi Arabia and 
other s t a t e s have been developed and modernized to s t a t i o n 
arms l i k e F-15 and F-16 a i r c r a f t s and AWACS which USA has 
25 transferred. 
Since 1973 war, USA has adopted the p o l i c y of "arms 
for peace". This p o l i c y came i n t o ex i s t ence when us arms 
paved the way for the negot ia t ion of senai I and I I agreements. 
Arms then were flowed to persuade Egypt and other Arab s t a t e s , 
and I s r a e l t o s ign peace t rea ty with each o ther . This 
ob jec t ive of USA u l t i m a t e l y mater ia l i zed in form of Camp 
26 
David Accord in 1978 and b i l a t e r a l peace t r e a t y between 
27 Egypt and I s r a e l in 1980. In the year 1978 a l o n e , USA 
gave arms aid worth $ 4.86bto I s r a e l and $ 1.8b t o Egypt. 
25. Krutskikh, Andrei > Us Mi l i tar i sm, Al l i ed P u b l i s h e r s 
Pvt . L t d . , New Delhi , Ind ia , 1987, pp. 137-138 . 
26. Arun (Major), N. 12, p . 35 . 
27. Krutskikh, Andrei, N. 25, p . 24. 
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After s igning the Carnp David agreement and peace treaty , 
28 both p a r t i e s had been given arms in reward. From 1973 t o 
1982 USA gave $ 4 .2b worth of arms t o Egypt and $ 11.46 to 
I s r a e l ; Egypt bought arms worth of $ l b and I s r a e l $ l , 8 b 
29 from USA. In the decade 1974-84, m i l i t a r y loan repayments 
30 
were waived off to Bg^t and Israel , -^ In the famous "Arms for 
Peace deals"*in 1983,with both p a r t i e s , I s r a e l was promised 
t o be given about 75 F-16 f i g h t e r a r i c r a f t s , 200 sidewinder 
a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s 105 AIM-7M sparrow m i s s i l e s , while the 
deal with Egypt included, among many i tems , E-2 Hawkeye 
31 e a r l y warning a i r c r a f t and 15 chinhook h e l i c o p t e r s . 
Nixon doctr ine was a response t o the f a i l u r e of d i rec t 
32 m i l i t a r y presence and m i l i t a r y a l l i e n c e s . s i n c e then arm 
transfer has become an appropriate a l t e r n a t i v e t o the 
m i l i t a r y (d irect ) presence . Arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n f o i l e d USSR's 
e f f o r t s t o f i l l the vaccum created by the B r i t i s h withdrawl 
in 1973, and f a c i l i t i f c a t e d the replacement of B r i t i s h e r s by 
the Americans in s u i t a b l e and easy manner in West As ia / 
Persian Gulf.^^ 
28. gahn, Anne, Messing: "United S t a t e s Arms t o the Middle 
East, 1967-76 »A C r i t i c a l Examination" in Lei tenberg, 
Miltan and Sheffer Gabriel , Great Power In tervent ion 
in the Middle East , Pergamon P r e s s , New York, USA,1979,p.115. 
29 . Edi tor ia l Research Report, "Us Foreign P o l i c y t Future 
Direct ion" Congressional Quarterly , Washington, D.C. 
1979, pp. 27 -28 . 
30. The SIPRI Year Book, 1990, p . 2 3 3 . 
3 1 . shreedhar "Arms Transfer t o Third world i n 1983" IPSA 
Journal, Oct. - Dec. 1983, p . 261. 
32. ": s7"Moosvi, "American Saudi Arabian Re la t ion" , v o l , 
N0.1-.4 Indian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, 1989 p . 145. 
33. Karle Micheal T. » The American Arms Supermarket, 
Austin, Texas, p . 2 20. 
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s u p p l y i n g arms t o each s t a t e of t h e r e g i o n * p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t o t h e Key s t a t e s - Saudi Arabia and Iran ( t i l l 1 9 8 0 ) , 
U n i t e d S ta te h a s m a i n t a i n e d a t o k e n p r e s e n c e and h a s a l s o 
tujmed the key s t a t e s capable o f o f f i c i a t i n g Vs p r e s e n c e 
and i n t e r e s t s i n the a r e a . 
Reagan and h i s s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e , Haig , r e d e v e l o p e d 
t h e concept of m i l i t a r y grouping o f l a t e 40^ and e a r l y 50® 
i n the name of " s t r a t e g i c c o n s e n s u s " , u n o f f i c i a l and non-
34 
s p e c i f i c arrangement , based on "common c a s e " "common t h r e a t " 
35 
and common o b j e c t i v e " . T h i s g r o u p i n g s t r e t c h e d "from 
P a k i s t a n i n E a s t , t o Egypt i n t h e W e s t ^ i n c l u d i n g Turkey 
I s r a e l and o t h e r s t a t e s " , USA s u p p l i e d i t s c l i e n t s of 
w e s t As ia the arms o f same c a t e g o r y s o t h a t t h e y c o u l d 
m i l i t a r i l y c o o r d i n a t e among t h e m s e l v e s and under the banner 
37 
o f Uni ted s t a t e s a g a i n s t s o v i e t orany_other common t h r e a t , 
USA s u p p l i e d weapons t o GCC members t o enab le them t o form 
common system of d e f e n c e . H e n c e f o r t h , USA v i r t u a l l y c r e a t e d 
a m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n around t h e Eastern M e d i t e r r s n i a n — 
38 I n d i a n Ocean area through arms s u p p l y . 
3 4 . Campbell, John C. N. 1 2 , p* 7 , 
3 5 . Krutskikh Andre i , N. 25 , p p . 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 . 
3 6 . New York Tiroes, March 2 0 , 1 9 8 1 . 
3 7 . Reich Bernard. N. 8^ p . 1 6 . 
3 8 . Krutskikh A n d r e i , N. 25 , p p . 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 . 
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Reagan's arms t rans fer p o l i c y became the paxrt and 
parce l of us o u t s i d e p r o j e c t i o n in West Asia . In fact* 
the growth of United S t a t e s ^ p p l y in the region and 
39 
deployment of RDF and CENTCGM go hand in hand* as a l s o 
speaks Reagan's Doctrine - PD -1300 , July 1981, t h a t , 
"arms t rans fer can enhance 45 f o r c e s operation and e f f e c t i v e -
40 
ness? Weapons i n the inventodesof Gulf s t a t e s and CENTCOM 
f o r c e s are of the same category . Arms transferred t o West 
Asian s t a t e s , are he lpfu l t o US naval presence f o r r e i n -
forcement, spare par t s and i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t y . In 
a d d i t i o n , F-15 and F-16 a i r c r a f t * Hawk m i s s i l e b a t t e r i e s 
and AWACS have been given e s p e c i a l l y t o Saudi Arabia, UAE 
and Oman which are the s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n s for Us naval 
41 f o r c e s operat ion , 
commitment t o the s e c u r i t y , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and 
p o l i t i c a l independence of I s r a e l ^ c o n s t i t u t e s the key of US 
42 armsprol i ferat ion p o l i c y in West Asia . Besides t h i s 
39, Brzoska, Micheal and Ohlson Thomas, N. 23, p . 58. 
40, world M i l i t a r y Expenditures and Arms Tranfers 1970-79. 
referred in Brown James and Synder William P t Defence 
Poicy in the Reagan Administrat ion, National Defence 
Univers i ty P r e s s , Washington, D.C. , USA, 1988, p . 146. 
41 , S tra teg ic Survey 1982-83, p . 136. Cited in Martin, Lenare GJ 
The Unstable Gulf, Lexington Books Toronto, Canada, 
1984. 
42 , S la t er , Jerotne, "The United S ta te s and the Middle East", 
in Jr . Michalak, s tane ly J, and Gray Robert C. {American 
Foreign P o l i c y s i n c e Detente , Harper and Row Publ i shers , 
New York, USA, 1984, p . 57, 
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h i s t o r i c a l , moral and i d e o l o g i c a l "coimnitinent., s t r a t e g i c 
s i g n i f i c a n c e * o f the c o u n t r y has a l s o been an i m p o r t a n t 
f a c t o r behind U n i t e d S t a t e s u n c o n t r o x l e d and u n l i m i t e d 
arms supply t o I s r a e l . U n i t e d s t a t e s by a b i l a t e r a l agreement, 
a r t i c l e 10 of Memorandum of Agreement* - i s bound t o p r o v i d e 
43 
mi l i taxry a s s i s t a n c e t o I s r a e l . I s r a e l was t h e o n l y non-
NATO and t h e t h i r d world c o u n t r y which was exempted from 
C a r t e r ' s arms r e s t r a i n t p o l i c y i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n i t s 
44 
"deterrence s t r e n g t h * . 
Ture ly s p e a k i n g , American arms i n I s r a e l have s t r e n g t h -
ened i t s d e f e n s i v e and o f f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t y . "The US arms" 
i n t h e words of H, K i s s i n g e r , "saved I s r a e l i n O c t . 1973 
45 
war from c o l l a p s e " , I s r a e l i i n v a s i o n of Lebnon i n 1982 
was encouraged by arms s u p p l i e d a f r e s h t o I s r a e l by USA 
46 i n the sameyear. The n a t u r e , volume and q u a l i t y of arms 
t r a n s f e r r e d t o Arab s t a t e s has a l s o been s u b j e c t t o I s r a e l ' s 
s e c u r i t y i ^ i c h has been g i v e n same amount of arms t o 
o f f s e t u n i t e d s t a t e s ' q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e arms 
47 t r a n s f e r t o t h e Arab s t a t e s of West A s i a . Even t h e C o n g r e s s , 
4 3 . Raj , C h r i s t o p h e r S. "West A s i a " i n subramanyam K. ( ed . ) i 
The Second Cold War ABC P u b l i s h i n g House, New D e l h i , 
I n d i a . 1 9 8 3 , p . 9 6 . 
4 4 . Us c o n g r e s s . S e n a t e , Committte of Fore ign R e l a t i o n s . 
4 5 . Campbell John C. No. 12, p . 2 . 
4 6 . H i l d r e t c h , s t e v a n . A, N . 7 , p . 8 2 . 
4 7 . R a j . C h r i s t o p h e r S. N. 4 3 , p . 9 3 . 
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known for i t s arms r e s t r a i n t p o l i c y , has not only been 
l i b e r a l * but bypassed US admin i s tra t ions ' ' l a i s s e z f a i r 
p o l i c y in grant ing approval of arms package t o I s r a e l . 
49 Arms are used as commodity whicJi brings economic b e n e f i t s . 
A number of f a c t o r s , the o i l boom accompanied by the p r i c e -
h ike , decreas ing importance and reduced share of c i v i l l i a n 
50 goods in US fore ign trade , R&D c o s t of weapons, contributed to 
us p o l i c y of fore ign m i l i t a r y s a l e s in West As ia . From 1970 
•Foreign M i l i t a r y S a l e s ' replaced 'Foreign M i l i t a r y Grants* 
and "the l e v e l s of these s a l e s have increased substantially** 
51 
as shown in f i gure 1.7 also."^^ 'Foreign Mi l i tary S a l e s ' * t o Gulf 
countr ies rose by 2500% between 1970 t o 1976.^^ According 
t o another source share of "Foreign Mi l i tary Sales* t o 
t o t a l arms supply went upto 91% i n 1988 from 14% during 
1950-1964.^-' 
However, due to the decrease in the o i l p r i c e s in 
second half of 1980*s,Us 'Foreign Mi l i tary s a l e s * in West 
Asia have wi tnessed a downward trend, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the 
48. I b i d . , N,43 , p . 97. 
49. Braoska, Micheal and Thomas Ohlson. K.23, p . 1 2 6 . 
50. Nincic Miros lav , N.16. , p . 127. 
51. Brewer Thomas L. ••American Foreign Pol icy x A 
contemporary Introduct ion , Prent ice -Hal l I n c . England, 
1986, p . 241 . 
52 . Brzoska, Micheal and Thomas Ohlson. N. 23, p . 35. 
53. Christer Johnson, N. 3, p . 127, 
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c a s e of n o n - o i l c o u n t r i e s l i k e » J o r d a n , Egypt and I s r a e l , 
According t o a r e p o r t by American e^qperts, p u b l i s h e d in 
New York Tiroes on 9 , 9 , 9 0 . , U S A s t i l l g i v e s n e a r l y $ 4500m 
54 i n form of a id t o Egypt , I s r a e l and (Pakis tan) e a c h y e a r . 
B u t , i n the c a s e o f o i l p r o d u c i n g s t a t e s * arms s t i l l s erve 
55 
a s an i n s t r u m e n t of Us economic i n t e r e s t s . 
Due t o t h e i n t e r - d e p e n d e n c e o f USA and West As ian 
c o u n t r i e s on o i l and arms r e s p e c t i v e l y , arms t r a n s f e r i n 
t h e r e g i o n has been d i r e c t e d t o t h e two way f low of o i l 
t a n k e r s and arms shippment . Moosvi c o r r e c t l y s t a t e s 
t h a t US arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y i n West A s i a r e v o l v e s around 
57 the t r i a n g l e of " S e c u r i t y , o i l and arms". Each f e a t u r e 
of Us arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y , a s a m a t t e r of f a c t , i s « i n 
one way o r o t h e r , r e l a t e d t o t h e a c c e s s t o w e s t Asian 
o i l , i t s smooth s t a b l e and s e c u r e d s u p p l y a t cheep p r i c e . 
During t h e l a s t two d e c a d e s , USA has f o l l o w e d an 
u n r e s t r i c t e d and u n c o n t r o l l e d p o l i c y o f arms t r a n s f e r i n 
w e s t A s i a , During the t i m e s of P r e s i d e n t Nixon and Ford 
58 
'arms s a l e s p o l i c y had gone o u t of c o n t r o l " . For the 
sake of some immediate p o l i t i c a l and economic g a i n s , 
5 4 . News R e p o r t , Nav Bharat T i m e s , S e p t , 9 , 1 9 9 0 . 
5 5 . S ingh, K .R . , N. 19 , p . 1 0 5 . 
5 6 . Moosvi , N. 3 1 , p . 1 5 2 . 
5 7 . I b i d . , p . 1 5 2 . 
5 8 . P e i r r e * N. 4 , p p . 4 5 r 4 8 . 
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USA provided West Asian s t a t e s t h e arms w i thou t any 
q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e checks which were cons ide red , 
i n then c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a s , t o quo te Henrey Ki s s inge r^ 
59 
"un rea l i s t i c** . 
L i m i t a t i o n s imposed by P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r were h a l f 
h e a r t e d . And P r e s i d e n t Reagan a b o l i s h e d whatever l i t t l e 
l i m i t a t i o n s were p r a c t i c e d by C a r t e r , He a s s o c i a t e d USA's 
arms t r a n f e r p o l i c y t o i t s s e c u r i t y and o t h e r n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t s than **human r igh t s '* e t c , w i t h i n one month of 
coming t o power, p r e s i d e n t Reagan promised , AWACS, a e r i a l 
t a n k e r and s i d e w i n d e r a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e t o Saudi Arabia , 
e x t r a F-15s t o I s r a e l , Cobra h e l i c o p t e r s equipped w i t h 
a n t i - t a n k m i s s l e t o Jordan , and E-2C Hawkeye e a r l y warning 
62 
a i r c r a f t to Egypt , Though us arms t r a n s f e r t o West Asia 
dec reased in t h e 2nd term of the P r e s i d e n t Reagan, bu t 
no r e s t r i c t i o n s on arms t r a n f e r were agreed upon by him 
and h i s coun t e r p a r t i n West Asia a s i n Europe. Bush and 
Gorbacheve a l s o . I t seems,are n o t w i l l i n g t o impose any 
n o t a b l e l i m i t a t i o n . Congress i n 1989 approved the weapons 
l i k e 42 FlA-18 Hornet a i r c r a f t t o Kuwait and 13-M-main b a t t l e 
59 . I b i d . , p , 50 , 
6 0 . I b i d . , p . 6 2 . 
6 1 . I b i d . , p . 6 6 . 
62 . Brzoska Micheal and Ohlsor Thomas. N. 23 , p . 58 . 
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6 3 tank t o Saudi Arabia , which i n d i c a t e that r e s t r i c t i o n 
on arms supply i s not l i k e l y in near future , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
when U s ' c l i e n t s have been again exposed t o e x t e r n a l 
danger since the Iraqi aggress ion of Kuwait and i t s subsequent 
annexation. 
West Asian s t a t e s have been g e t t i n g most s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
weapons,USA has i n i t s i n v e n t o r y , i n p l a c e of r u s t i n g and 
2nd hand weapons, transferred to^iem by USA before 1970. 
Tremendous buying capabity of r e c i p i e n t s , economic p r o f i t , 
and production of new and advanced weapons in USA, underlay 
i t s reasons. USA gave weapons t o the West Asian countr i e s 
which even NATO a l l i e s couid not get.AWACS, given to 
64 West Asia, i s one such recent example. The Shah of Iran 
65 could buy any weapon, other than nuc lear , he wished. 
He was given F-14, f i gh ter a i r c r a f t s and supruance c l a s s 
destroyers which were the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms US 
armed foces had by then. usA has made i t s l a r g e s t deal 
of soph i s t i ca ted arms t o West As ia . This deal of Note. 1981 
worth $ 8.5b included 5 AWACS, 1177 sidewinder a i r - t o - a i r 
63 . SIPRI Year Book 1990, p . 233. 
64 . Subraroanyam K. "Transfer of Arms and M i l i t a r y Technology 
as an Instrximent of Policy** S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s , v o l . XI, 
No. 2, May 1987, p . 133. 
6 5 . I b i d . , p . 135. 
66 . US Congress, s enate . Committee on Foreign R e l a t i o n s , 
sub conmittee on Foreign A s s i s t a n c e , s t a f f Report, 
"Us M i l i t a r y Sa le s t o Iran", 94th Congress, I I Sess ion, 
July 1976. 
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m i s s i l e s , 6 KC-107 a e r i a l r e f u e l l i n g t a n k e r s , 101 p a i r conformal 
67 F-15 fuel pods and 22 ground r a d a r I n t e r c e p t o r s t a t i o n s . 
a f f e c t s of US Arms Supply t 
The consequences of us arms supp ly have n e i t h e r been 
t o t a l l y f avourab le nor as grave a s ' I n v a l i d a t i n g the under -
l y i n g Usefulness of arms s a l e s a s an i m p o r t a n t i n s t r u m e n t of 
6fl 
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y " . Fo l lowing i s t he d e t a i l e d 
d i s c u s s i o n of t h e d i v i d e n d s arms t r a n s f e r has p a i d o r f a i l e d 
t o pay to t h e Uni ted S t a t e s . 
The success i 
To s t a r t w i t h , t h e arms supp ly h a s enab led the UsA 
t o e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e on r e c i p i e n t s t a t e s . Undoubtedly, t h e 
Shah, the most i m p o r t a n t r e c i p i e n t , wis the " r a r e s t and 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l " a l l y , America ever had in West Asia or any 
o t h e r r e g i o n . Us arms have g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d the fo re ign 
p o l i c y a t t i t u d e of i t s c l i e n t s . Arms and t h e p remise of 
s e c u r i t y led GCC members s t a t e s t o adhe re t o Us p o l i c y towards 
70 t h e I r a n - I r a q war . They welcomed Us naval p resence i n We$t 
67 . Raj C h r i s t o p h e r , s . "The Gulf and t h e RDF" i n subramanyam,K. 
(ed.) J The Second cold War, ABC P u b l i s h i n g House, New 
D e l h i , I n d i a , 1983, p . 77 . 
6 8 . Gupta, R.C. American Arms in west As ia , Puneet P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
D e l h i , I n d i a , 1985, p . 216. 
6 9 . K i s s i n g e r , H. White House Y e a r s , Boston, 1979 r e f e r r e d 
in Gupta R.C. »American Arms i n West As i a , punee t P u b l i -
c a t i o n s , D e l h i , I n d i a , 1985, p . 205. 
70 . subramanyam, K. N. 64, p . 133, 
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Asia and Kuwait went to an ex ten t of asking u s 
71 pro tec t ion for i t s o i l tankers . USA has a l s o attuned 
Saudi Arabia's and other o i l r i c h s ta tes 'approach towards 
the P a l e s t i n i a n problem to i t s p o l i c y . I s r a e l i massacre 
of P a l e s t i n i a n s at S h a t i l l a and Sabra, attack on Lebnon and 
unleashing of a t r o c i o u s terrorism on P a l e s t i n i a n s t i l l date , 
have not a c t i v a t e d Arab opposit ion t o the extent of r e sor t ing 
72 to o i l weapon,as in 1973 October war. To n o t e , i n add i t ion , 
that united s t a t e s by supplying arms greater in q u a n t i t y 
and of bet ter q u a n t i t y in comparison t o the West European 
s u p p l i e r s , h a s not shared i t s i n f l u e n c e with them — the 
73 e q u a l l y important arms suppl iers to west Asian s t a t e s . 
On economic s i d e , arms exports have paid o f f t o USA 
i n west Asia thoroughly. Arms e3Q)Orts in West Asia has 
boosted arms production and in return the over a l l economic 
74 product ion. Advanced a i r c r a f t s and m i s s i l e s — the most 
expensive weapons — are sold to West Asian c o u n t r i e s in 
number greater that any other weapons to fetch maximum 
75 p o s s i b l e gain out of arms export . Arms in West Asia have 
been sold at the p r i c e twice and t h r i c e of t h e i r o r i g i n a l 
7 1 . Rubin, Barry, N. 5, p , 133, 
72 . IDSA Journal, April-JUly 1983, 
7 3 . Chris ter , Johnson, N.3 , p , 132. 
7 4 . Nincic Miros lov , N. 16, p , 133. 
75 . 
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c o s t , l e a d i n g t o t h e mass ive a c q u i s i t i o n of s u r p l u s 
income t o s u p p l i e r s . A ^ B S s a l e s have reduced the c o s t of 
76 
m i l i t a r y p r o d u c t i o n f o r de fence p u r p o s e s . A c o n g r e s s i o n a l 
budget o f f i c e s t u d y h a s conc luded t h a t arms e x p o r t t o West 
77 A s i a save 8% of t o t a l R & D c o s t * In some c a s e s e n t i r e 
78 R&D c o s t of weapons h a s been met by t h e arms e x p o r t . 
Saudi Arabia has been r e l i e v i n g , a s d id the shah t i l l 
l a t e 1 9 7 0 ' s , USA of economic burden of produc ing h i g h l y 
e x p e n s i v e w e a p o n s , b y f i n a n c i n g t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n . o n e m i l l i o n 
Americans owe t h e i r employment t o e a c h $ 10b PFore ign 
79 M i l i t a r y S a l e s * . By t h i s y a r d s t i c k West Asian arms 
a t l e a s t p r o v i d e 3 0 , 0 0 0 . Jobs e a c h y e a r . The arms t r a n s f e r 
t o West As ia i s accompanied by t h e t r a n s f e r of m i l i t a r y 
p e r s o n n e l s and e x p e r t s , p r o v i d i n g , t h e r e b y , "employment of 
l a r g e number of s k i l l e d p e r s o n n e l s from the s u p p l i e r c o u n t r i e s 
80 i n t h e r e c i p i e n t c o u n t r y a t l a t t e r f e c o s t " . 
Arms e x p o r t h a s a l s o f u l f i l l e d the need of d o m e s t i c 
armed f o r c e s . Demand of export k e p t Us arm i n d u s t r y i n 
r e a d i n e s s t o p l a c e t o t a l out put p o t e n t i a l above p e a c e t ime 
7 6 , N i n c i c M i r o s l o v , N. 16, p p . 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 , 
7 7 , P i e r r e , N. 4 , p . 6 9 . 
7 8 , Subramanyam K. N , 6 4 , p . 1 3 1 . 
7 9 , P i e r r e , N, 4 , p . 6 7 . 
8 0 , subramanyam K. N. 6 4 , p . 1 3 1 . 
- 95 -
81 domestic r e q u i r e m e n t , . . . for emergency use". Arms export 
t o West Asia^has improved the q u a l i t y of Us weapons. I t i s 
sa id that the f i n e s t weapons US armed forces p o s s e s s i s the 
outcome of arms trade with fore ign nat ions , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
West Asia. 
Arms t r a n s f e r t o west Asia has proved a b e t t e r 
83 
subs t i tu te to p h y s i c a l presence of usA. Arms t r a n s f e r , 
on contrary t o m i l i t a r y presence, has cemented suppl i er -
c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s . S imi lar ly , arms t r a n s f e r , unl ike m i l i t a r y 
presence , which has been genera l l y found at var iance with 
diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e s , has been in harmoney with the same. 
And most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , arms t r a n s f e r has involved l e s s e r 
r isX than the d i r e c t presence, because , "Americans would 
no doubt prefer to r i s k the l o s s of American arms than 
85 l o s s of American l i v e s * . 
Us arms have f a c i l i t a t e d s t r a t e g i c access t o United 
s t a t e s in the region to a l imi t ed e x t e n t . Impressive array 
of F-14 f i g h t e r s , TOW anti-tank m i s s i l e s , supruance c l a s s 
war ships in Iran paved the way f o r us access t o cruc ia l 
8 1 . Nincic Miroslov, N. 16, p . 123 . 
82 . Edi tor ia l Research Report, N, 29, p . 39. 
8 3 . stephene G. Neuman. "Arms Aid and the Superpowers" 
Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 66, No. 5 summer 1988, reproduced 
in s t r a t e g i c D i g e s t , v o l . xlX, No, 3, March 198^, p . 2 5 2 , 
84 . ____________________^ "Aims and Superpowers Inf luence : 
Lesson from Recent wars", Orbis, v o l . 30 .N,4 , winter 1987, 
p . 729. 
85 . Editor ia l Research Report, N, 29, p , 38, 
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86 
communication and i n t e l l i g e n c e f a c i l i t i e s . In Oman^UsA 
has enjoyed t o t a l control over s t r a t e g i c a l l y important 
87 
naval and a i r b a s e s . However, performance of US arms in 
the case of the l a r g e s t r e c i p i e n t , Saudi Arabia/ i s not 
very in^ress ive o f f i c i a l l y , Saudi Arabia has not allowed 
permanent base r i g h t s , USA has been eager ly looking f o r . 
However, by con s t r u c t log bases at p o r t of Jeddah (Red Sea) , 
Jebula (Persian Gulf) and modernizing the milltaxry bases in 
Yanbu (Red Sea) and Dahran (Pers ian Gulf) over crowded by 
US personnels and arms, UsA has v i i r tua l ly c o n t r o l l e d these 
88 bases . And i t p r e c t l c a l l y demonstrated i t by g e t t i n g 
base r ight ( e x c l u s i v e l y ) from Saudi Arabia in the continuing 
Gulf c r i s i s . Over a l l , armstransfer has only earned dubious 
and temporary r i g h t s to us with regard to bases in West 
89 
Asia . Economic c o s t s of maintaining bases are e x t r a -
o r d i n a r i l y high and linreasonable, there fore , negate the 
in f luence of arms. There i s a l so ••not of course one t o one 
86 . I b i d . , p . 38. 
87. Moosvi, N. 32, p . 135. 
88 . Krutslcikh, Andrei, N. 25, pp. 136-138. 
8 9 . US congress . House committee on Appropriat ions, 
Hearing x Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies 
Appropriations, 91st Congress, 2nd Sess ion, 1970, 
p . 307, 
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correspondence between arms supply and the s t r a t e g i c 
90 
acces s" . Major r e c i p i e n t s have given l e a s t f a c i l i t i e s 
t o USA# while the smaller ones* l i k e Oman and UAE, provided 
USA the f a c i l i t i e s unappropriate t o arms they r e c e i v e from 
USA. 
The f a i l u r e s x 
Arms t r a n s f e r has n e g a t i v e l y af fected Us o b j e c t i v e s 
and i n t e r e s t in West Asia. The over a l l inf luence arms 
t ranfer has y i e l d e d i s half-hearted rather abso lute , a s there 
do e x i s t d i f ferences of i n t e r e s t s between the supp l i er and 
the r e c i p i e n t s . Egypts during the time of i t s t o t a l depend-
ency on us arms,refused to take part in Us sponsored RDF 
91 and re jec ted the idea of US-Egyptian s t r a t e g i c cooperat ion , 
u s p o l i c y of "arms for peace" a l s o f a i l e d t o i n f l u e n c e 
majority of us r e c i p i e n t s . Most of the us c l i e n t s denounced 
Camp David agreement and subsequent peace i n i t i a t i v e s * 
inc lud ing Reagan and Shultz p l a n s . Jordan fought 1973 war 
92 against I s r a e l wi th American arms. Even I s r a e l did not 
9 0 . Harkavy, Robert "s trateg ic Access* Bases* and Arms 
Transfers t The Major Powers Evolving G e o - p o l i t i c a l 
Competition in the Middle East* i n Leitenberg* Milton, 
and shut ter Gabriel t Great Power Intervent ion in the 
Middle East* Pergamon Press* New York* USA* 1979* p , l 7 9 . 
9 1 . Sharma* S.K, "Soviet Union and Middle East"* S t r a t e g i c 
Analysis* v o l . V* No. 2, Feb. 1982, p . 607, 
9 2 . Cahn* Anne* Hessing* N. 28* p . 111. 
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respond favourably t o America's P l a s t l n i a n p o l i c y for the 
sake of i t s s e c u r i t y which t o i t i s "before everything 
93 
e l s e , even before peace". Nor have Us arms s e t t l e d down 
94 US-I srae l i s t r a t e g i c d i f f e r e n c e s . Hence, arms transfer 
has proved i n e f f e c t i v e when Us i n t e r e s t s have c lashed 
with those of i t s c l i e n t s . They are , there fore , "at best 
95 of dubious u t i l i t y as sn instrument o f , . , , in f luence" . 
Paradoxica l ly , arms have i n f l i c t e d blow t o the very 
o b j e c t i v e s of arms t r a n s f e r . Us arms i n i t i a t e d "wrong wars 
a t l e a s t from American point of view". I s rae l fought 1973 
war which had near ly denied o i l to USA. UsA was duidjed as 
the i n s t i g a t o r of the Lebnon war which I srae l fought with 
us arms. S imi lar ly , the use of Us p lanes by I s r a e l in the 
bombardment of Baghdad nuclear r e a c t o r , made UsA the 
97 
co-conspirator". US arms strengthened Irans a b i l i t y t o 
f i g h t a prolonged war against a l l Us expecta t ions and 
98 i n t e r e s t s , 
9 3, Nan-xu-shan, "The Reagan's Adminis trat ion's Middle 
East Po l i cy" , survival v o l . XXVI, No.3 , May-June 1984, 
p . 110. 
94. Ibid., p. 111. 
95. Sinder, Lwis W. From Arms to Influence i A Reassessment 
of Effectiveness of Arms Transfer as Policy Instrument 
in Middle East, 1976, p. 35. 
96. Martin, Lenari, 3, N. 24, p. 238. 
97. Nincic, Miroslov, N. 16, p. 122. 
98. Editorial Research Report, N. 29, p. 29. 
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US arms have a l s o been counter productive in one 
r e s p e c t . Us s takes in West Asia , p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s geo-
99 
s t r a t e g y and o i l , have adorned the r e c i p i e n t s wi th 
bargaining power in the matters of anns supply. shah 
playing one superpower against the other*managed t o g*t 
whatever he l i k e d despi te us r e l u c t a n c e , ^ Saudi Arabia has 
a l s o resorted t o t h i s p o l i c y t o acquire arms. I t got 
60 F-15^ and addi t iona l AWACS by e x p l o i t i n g the i s s u e s l i k e , 
102 
" t e s t of American fr iendship" . 
Carter ' s arms r e s t r a i n t s p o l i c y damaged Us i n t e r e s t s 
in west Asia* I t gave s o v i e t Union a s o l i t a r y chance to 
101 
overtake USA as the l ead ing arm s u p p l i e r t o west As ia . 
I t a l s o enabled the former t o make inroads in Us b loc as 
Iran, Kuwait and Joraan diverted t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n s to the 
s o v i e t Union. 
Us arms f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h s t r a t e g i c a l l i e n c e among 
i t s c l i e n t s . Most of Arab r e c i p i e n t s do not have 
99, Cahn, Anne Hessing, N. 28, p . 122. 
100. I b i d , , p . 122. 
101. world M i l i t a r y Expenditures and Arms Transfers , 1975,ACDCA 
p . 74, Cited in Chris ter , Johnson j superpower comparing 
American and s o v i e t Foreign P o l i c y Frances, Pr in ter 
Publ i shers , London, U.K., 1984, p . 13 l . 
102. Gupta, R.C. , N. 68, pp. 212-213. 
103. P i e r r e , N. 4 , p . 67 . 
104. Nan-xu-shan, N. 93, pp, 107-113. 
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105 have diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with I s r a e l , and e x c e p t GCC 
countrie8« hav« not shown any i n t e r e s t in carry ing j o i n t 
m i l i t a r y operation or s ign ing j o i n m i l i t a r y communique. 
The long term consequences of arms t r a n s f e r have 
been detrimental t o US goa l s — maintenance of s tatus-quo 
of regima and strong suppl ier — c l i e n t r e l a t i o n . Arms 
were c a t a l y s t in the ouster of the shah — a l o s s of us 
world most important arms r e c i p i e n t and a l l y f o r e v e r . The 
h o s t i l e regime cance l l ed the arms deal worth of $ 12b* 
which included AWACS, des troyers , submarines, 100 F-16 
F ighters and 14000 mis&i les . Arms have widened i n d i r e c t l y , 
the danger of Is lamic flondamentalism in pro-US s t a t e s where 
an I r a n , l ike s i t u a t i o n sha l l a l t e r the e n t i r e balance of 
107 power and deprive USA from permanent and big sources of 
arms supply. 
10 5. Vayrynen, Raimo "Economic and P o l i t i c a l Consequences 
of Arms Transfer t o the Third World**, A l t e r n a t i v e s 
v o l . VI, N. 1, March 1980, p . 144. 
106. Edi tor ia l Research Report, N, 29, pp. 29-30 . 
107. IPSA Journal, Apri l -July 1983. 
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To conc lude . Us p o l i c y of arms t r a n s f e r cove r s the 
e n t i r e range of Us i n t e r e s t s and o b j e c t i v e s in the 
r eg ion , from i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y of the p r o -
regimes to the maintenance of g loba l ba lance of power, 
and from e x t r a c t i n g of p e t r o d o l l a r t o keep ing the arms 
i n d u s t r y in r e a d i n e s s . I t may a l s o be drawn from a f o r e -
mentioned d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t arms t r a n s f e r has a l s o been 
an i n s t r u m e n t s e rv ing oppos i t e i n t e r e s t s i . e . avoidance 
of c o n f r o n t a t i o n wi th USSR as w e l l as l a t t e r * s containnient , 
o r s u b s t i t u t i n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y p re sence d u r i n g the time 
of p r e s i d e n t Nixon as wel l a s h e l p i n g us nava l p resence 
around West Asia dur ing the time of p r e s i d a n t Reagan. 
Arms t r a n s f e r s have g e n e r a l l y y ie lded good r e s u l t s 
and the s e t b a c k s a re more e x c e p t i o n than r u l e . No heed, 
however, has been pa id t o the long term consequences of 
arms t r a n f e r which USA expe r i enced dur ing the time of 
I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n and a f t e r . C e r t a i n l y , the long- te rm 
i n t e r e s t s can no t be s a c r i f i c e d t o some immediate g a i n s . 
T h e r e f o r e , US must s u b j e c t i t s arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y , to 
quote H. K i s s i n g e r , " to the long term e f f e c t s of arms 
t r a n s f e r s so t h a t t hey may n o t become the v e r y reason of 
108 t h e i r s toppage" 
108. E d i t o r i a l Research Repor t , N. 29, p . 38. 
C H A P T E R - IV 
USSR's POT.lrry OF ARMS SUPPLY IN WEST ASIA 
S i n c e i t s breakthrough i n 1955 v i a t h e C2sech d e a l 
w i t h Egypt , USSR has c o n s i s t e n t l y persued a v i g o r o u s 
p o l i c y o f arms s u p p l i e s i n w e s t Asia* In f a c t , i n the 
absence o f i d e o l o g y , no t a d j u s t a b l e t o t h e I s l a m i c w o r l d , 
and c u l t u r a l and economic means, t h e US cup of t e a i n 
West Asia« a s t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o o l s , s o v i e t union h a s 
r e l i e d e x c l u s i v e l y on arms t r a n s f e r a s t h e most important 
2 i n s t r u m e n t of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n West As ia • 
T h i s c h a p t e r i s an a t tempt t o a n a l y s e t h e nature o f 
s o v i e t arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y i n West A s i a and i t s s u c c e s s 
and f a i l u r e v i s - a - v i s s o v i e t o b j e c t i v e s i n t h e r e g i o n . 
s t a r t e d a s e a r l y a s 1955 , s o v i e t p o l i c y of arms 
t r a n s f e r d u r i n g 1 9 7 0 - 8 5 , however, d e s e r v e s an s p e c i a l 
a n a l y s i s . During t h i s p e r i o d West Asia w h i l e r e p l a c i n g 
t h e Warsaw P a c t c o u n t r i e s became the l a r g e s t r e c i p i e n t 
o f s o v i e t arms. 
1 . Menon, Rajan ,» S o v i e t Power and t h e T h i r d wor ld . 
A f f i l i a t e d East -West P r i v a t e L i m i t e d , New D e l h i , 
I n d i a , 1986 , p p . 1 7 0 - 1 7 2 . 
2 . Hunt, Ben t "Port A c c e s s and Arms S a l e s t The Unspoken 
Quid Pro Quo** The Journa l o f c o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 
34 , No. 2 , June 1 9 9 0 , p . 335 . 
3 . Deger, s a d a a t , t **soviet Arms S a l e s t o D e v e l o p i n g Countr i e s 
i n C a s s e n Robert ( e d . ) s o v i e t I n t e r e s t s i n the Third 
world Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , London, UK, 1 9 8 5 , p . 1 5 9 . 
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s o v i e t Union superseded u s , as the p r i n c i p a l 
suppl ier of the region in 1912, and held t h i s p o s i t i o n 
4 
roost of the time during t h i s per iod , supply of ageing 
and second hand weapons was stopped and s o v i e t Union began 
p i l i n g up i t s roost advanced weapons i n West Asia from 
the Ijeginning of t h i s per iod . And neck t o neck competit ion 
for arms t r a n s f e r with UsA a l s o fol lowed in the saroe 
per iod. 
A nurober of f ac tors underlie USSR's Arms Export 
abroad, p a r t i c u l a r l y in west Asia . Arms export process 
in USSR i s r e l a t i v e l y f l e x i b l e than in USA as there does 
not e x i s t economic and p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s on defence 
industry and p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s , s o v i e t arms are d i s -
cernible as those of the West in terms of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , 
technica l q u a l i t y and pr i ce , e t c . In f a c t , weapons are the 
only type of machinery on which the East can claim a 
7 
rough t e c h n i c a l p a r i t y with the West. Terms and c o n d i t i o n s 
4. Bennett, Alexender, J. t "Arms Transfer as an I n s t a l -
ment Of s o v i e t Po l i cy i n the Middle East* in The Middle 
East Journal, v o l , 34, No. 4, Autmn 1985, pp. 763-764. 
5. Brazoska, Micheal and Ohlson Thomas i "Arms Transfer t o 
the Third world", Oxford Univers i ty P r e s s , New York, 
USA, 1987, p . 40. 
6. Degar Sadaat,N. 3, p . 161. 
7. portes, R. t "East West and south t The Role of Centrally 
Planned Economies in the International Economies" in 
Grovsman, Seven and Lundberg, Erik (eds.) The World 
Economic Order » Past and Projects, Macmillion, London, 
1981, pp. 319-357. 
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rABI.R I . .1 
O^ uetense Intelligencp Agency est.mat.es or the share of 
in hoviet arns production, bv item. lH/^-«c*. 
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t h e T1ffure f o r n r o a u c r v o n i n c t u d e s i m p o r t s 
rtrriilGry o v e r t u\j-ro«n ca i i p r e . 
6oTh c i v i l i a n and mi l i ta ry . 
Source : Brzoska. Micheal h. Ghlson, Thomas: Arms 
r r ans te r to the Th i rd World 1971-1965, Oxford 
U n i v e r s l t v Press New York, USA, 1967 
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g 
of sovie t arms supply are favourable to the c l i e n t s 
and the p r i c e s of the equipments* according to one source, 
9 
**are 40% lower than those comparable Viestern arms**. 
According to a CIA r e p o r t , the lag between deal and 
de l ivery of sovie t weapons i s half in comparison to USA. 
The USSR produces arms more than any other suppl ie r . 
High growth rate# excess production and l imi ted domestic 
absorptive capaci ty and major share of arms in t o t a l arms pro-
12 
product ia i see tab le 1.3 ) , have c o l l e c t i v e l y f a c i l i t a t e d 
arms esQjort, Improved a i r l i f t and naval c a p a b i l i t y t o 
de l ive r weapons in la rge q u a n t i t i e s with swiftness i s the 
13 added p lu s point in sovie t arms t rans fe r p o l i c y . In shor t . 
8. Krause, Joachim, i • 'soviet Arms Transfer to the Third 
world in 1980s*, Aussen p o l i t i k , vo l , 34, No. 4, 4th 
Quarter, 1983, p . 394, 
9, Major Arun, t ••Arm Transfer as an Instrument of Foreign 
po l i cy" , u . s a : Jou rna l , vo l , ex VIII , No. 491, Jan-March 
1988^ p . 36, 
10, ••Arms Flows to LDC's » Us-Soviet Ccmparisons^' CIA Report, 
Washington D.C., USA, 1977. 
11. Department of Defence, sovie t Mi l i t a ry Power, Washington, 
D . C , USA, 1981, 
12, Stephanie, Neuman G., ••Arms, Aid and the ijuperpowers". 
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 66, No, 5, Summer 1988, reproduced 
ifi' S t r a t e g i c Digest, vo l . XIX, No. 3, March 1989, 
p . 2571 
13. P i e r r e , A . J . , •'Global P o l i t i c a l of Arms Sales^*, Pr inceton, 
Univers i ty Press , New Jersy , UsA, 1982, p . 77. 
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JABLt- 1,4 
boviet deliveries or malor weaponds TO countries with 
t.reat.v OT rrendship and co-operation nas been signen. 
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Y o r k . USA. 1 9 8 7 
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USSR's c a p a b i l i t y and w i l l i n g n e s s t o s e l l arms have not 
only g iven i t an edge over USA as the arms suppl ier t o 
the reg ion , but provided on opportunity to a n t i - u s s t a t e s 
of the reg ion to turn u n h e s i t a n t l y and c o n f i d e n t l y t o 
the Sovie t Union for t h e i r defence needs. 
Unl ike USA# USSR has concentrated i t s arms 
t rans fer p o l i c y to a few c o u n t r i e s of the reg ion . Through-
out the per iod 1970-85 (except 1976-80) 50% of USSR's arms 
to the t h i r d world went to the three West Asian c o u n t r i e s , 
namely,Egypt, Syria and Iraq. This pattern shows that UsSR 
has given arms t o only ant i i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s of the 
14 
region and those having t r e a t y of f r i endsh ip and c o -
15 
operat ion with USSR as shown in t a b l e i , 4 , Occassional 
s u p p l i e s to n o n - s o c i a l i s t and pro-US s t a t e s l i k e Kuwait, 
Iran and Jordan, however, do not indicate a d e v i a t i o n . FOr 
the share of s o v i e t arms t o the t o t a l arms imports of t h e s e 
s t a t e s has been n e g l i g i b l e as wel l as nominal t o i t s 
t o t a l arms exports to the west Asia on contrary , the 
t r a d i t i o n a l rec ip ients have got the subs tnat ia l chunk of 
s o v i e t arms. Egypt, and Syria during 1971-76 rece ived 
28% and 26%,respect ively , of USSR'S t o t a l arms supply t o 
14. Brazoska, Micheal and Ohlson Thcmas, n . 5 , p . 4 3 . 
15. Kozyreve, A, j The Arms Trade » A New Level of Danger, 
Progress Publ i shers , Moscow, 1985, p . 25. 
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Table - 1.5 I Leading Arms RfC^lJjients of s o v i e t arms 






































































Total ot tun" 97 8 / 
source Brzoska , Micheal and Ohlson,Thomas i Arms T r a n s f e r 
to the Third world 1971-85, Oxford University Press, 
New York, USA, 1987. 
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the t h i r d world, as pointed out in the table 1 ,5 . The 
same table a l s o i n d i c a t e s that during 1981-85, Iraq 
and Syria acquired 25% and 22% of t o t a l s o v i e t supply to 
the thirtl world. Iraq has rece ived 97%, 85% and 55% of 
i t s t o t a l imports from s o v i e t Union in each f i v e year 
period from 1971. corresponding f igures of Syria have 
been 100%, 87% and 97% and that of south Yamen 100%, 98% 
and 100% (See appendixl.2) . 
However, s o v i e t Union's p o l i c y must not be 
considered as one e x c l u s i v e l y centered t o i t s t r a d i t i o n a l 
r e c i p i e n t s * I t has t r i e d t o penetrate i n t o Western camp 
whenever the opportuni t ies have arrived . So says Alb ieeht , 
"soviet p o l i c y in the th ird world has been and i s oppor-
tunds t i c" .^^ 
Arms have been g iven by USSR t o the c l i e n t s of US 
with an aim t o weaken US domination (as in case of supply 
t o the ShahJoyUSSR during 1970«s) ^^ and i t s e l f as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e source of supply in case of Us r e f u s a l to 
18 supply airms as per the needs o f i t s r e c i p i e n t , and to 
normalize r e l a t i o n s with the p o t e n t i a l r eg iona l 
16. Albrecht , U, t "soviet Arms Export" in SIPRI World 
Armament and Disarmament year Book, 1983, p . 12. 
17. s tremlau, John, J. i " s o v i e t Foreign P o l i c y in an 
uncertain world". The Annals, Sept. 1985, p . 10. 
18 . Kozverey, no. 15, p . 179. 
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a d v e r s a r i e s ; for exainple arms to Iran i n 1976 or to 
Egypt in 1988-89.^^ USSR suppl ied arms t o USA's- c l i e n t s 
when they were deprived of same by the UsA. In 1977-78 
deal with Kuwait, USSR promised to provide addi t iona l 
SA^IS shoulder launched s u r f a c e . t o ^ u r f a c e m i s s i l e s * 
"scud* medium range b a t t l e f i e l d support m i s s i l e s , FROG-7 
axrt i l lery rocke t s and SA-6 mobile low l e v e l s u r f a c e - t o - a i r 
20 
m i s s i l e s . In another deal of$27 m i l l i o n wi th Kuwait in 
1984, the arms USSR gave t o Kuwait were more s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
and much i n quant i ty than what USA had denied to the 
21 former. In 1982 when Washington showed unwi l l ingness 
t o modernize Jordanian army, the s o v i e t Union furnished 
SA-8 v e h i c l e movmted short range s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s 
and 16-zsU, 23-24 s e l f prope l l ed a i r c r a f t guns t o Jordan. 
One of the important f a c e t s of s o v i e t Union's 
p o l i c y of arms t rans fer to west Asia has been t o maintain 
the s ta tus -quo of "no war peace* s i t u a t i o n i n west Asia . 
19. H e l l e r , Mark, A. t "The s o v i e t Union in the Middle East* 
in Gaz i t , s . Eytah zeev and Gazit , sholomo (eds . ) % 
The Middle East M i l i t a r y Balance 1988-89, The Westview 
Press and the Jarusalem Port , Jarusalem, I s r a e l , 1988, 
p . 8 2 . 
20. Bennett , J, Al«xendeir# J. N'^ . 4, pp . 763-764, 
21 . New York Times, 13th July , 1985. 
22. Bennett , j . Alexender, N. 4, p . 768. 
22 
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That i s why S o v i e t p o l i c y i s a l l e g e d as one aimed a t 
23 
c r e a t i n g i n s t a b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n . A r a b - I s r a e l i war 
i s the gateway of s o v i e t U n i o n ' s arms s u p p l y t o a n t i 
24 I s r a e l i Arab s t a t e s . s o v i e t un ion has p r o v i d e d such arms 
t o the Arab s i d e which can not e ns ur e i t d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y 
over I s r a e l / but o n l y e n a b l e i t t o de fend i t s e l f from 
25 be ing overrun by I s r a e l . 
Due t o s o v i e t U n i o n ' s goa l of an "out of area" n a v a l 
and a i r p r o j e c t i o n t o c o n t a i n ar||i compete w i t h Uni ted S t a t e s ' 
g l o b a l advancement p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 
Read sea and the I n d i a n Ocean, i t s arms s u p p l y t o w e s t 
As ia h a s twinned w i t h the o b j e c t i v e t o g a i n s t r a t e g i c 
a c c e s s . so t h e volume end n a t u r e of arms e x p o r t s t o 
West As ian c l i e n t s h a s c o i n c i d e d w i t h growing i i o v i e t 
nava l b u i l d up i n Med-Red Sea and the I n d i a n Ocean a r e a . 
2 3 . P a j a k , R o g e r , P. » •The E f f e c t i v e n e s s o f S o v i e t Arms 
Aid Dil>loraacy i n the Third world* i n Donaldson , 
Robert , H. ( e d s . ) t The S o v i e t Union i n the Third 
w o r l d ' , s u c c e s s and F a i l u r e s Westview P r e s s , London, 
U.K., 1 9 8 1 , p . 395. 
2 4 . J a ' f a r , Kassem, M. » "The s o v i e t Union i n t h e Middle 
East t A Case s t u d y o f Syr ia" i n Cassen R o b e r t , ( e d s . ) j 
s o v i e t I n t e r e s t s i n the Third w o r l d . Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
London, U.K. , 1985 , p . 258 . 
2 5 . Krause , Joachim, N. 8 , P . 397, 
2 6 . For d e t a i l See,Hunt Ben, N . 2 , pp . 3 3 5 - 3 6 5 . 
- 112 -
USSR's p o t e n t i a l c l i e n t s , Egypt (1976) S y r i a south 
Yamen and Iraq have p o r t s and b a s e s , s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l 
f o r t h e USSR. Arms t r a n s f e r s t o Iraq and South Yamen^ , 
i n p a r t i c u l a r aim a t the a c q u i s i t i o n of s t r a t e g i c 
f a c i l i t i e s . I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t s t a t e s i m p o r t a n t f o r 
b a s e f a c i l i t i e s have been g i v e n arms on d i s c o u n t s , And 
d e n i a l of b a s e f a c i l i t i e s t o the s o v i e t Union by Iraq a t 
Uiran*i<-Qasar and Basra r e s u l t e d i n l i k e w i s e r e s p o n s e from 
30 USSR i n form of arms embargo on Iraq i n 1 9 8 0 . 
E s t a b l i s h i n g p o l i t i c a l f o o t - h o l d , i n f l u e n c i n g d o m e s t i c 
and f o r e i g n p o l i c y behav iour of the c l i e n t s , and, most 
i m p o r t a n t , e v o l v i n g an a n t i i m p e r i a l i s t p r o - s o v i e t a l l i a n c e 
are t h e b a s i c p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s of USSR's arms t r a n s f e r 
p o l i c y i n t h e a r e a . And t h i s i s what has been s o v i e t 
U n i o n ' s o f f i c i a l standm a l s o . To q u o t e , "the s o v i e t 
p o l i c y i s t o l e n d v i c t i m s of a g g r e s s i o n comprehens ive 
a s s i s t a n c e i f need be i n c l u d e s arms d e l i v e r i e s * . 
27 . "Iraq t Defence P r o t o c o l w i t h USSR" Defence and F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s D a i l y , Aug. 2 5 , 1976 . 
28 . "USSR } I n t e l l i g e n c e s h i p Deployment i Naval Deployment 
i n Mozembique", Defence and Fore ign A f f a i r s , D a i l y , 
Aug. 3 , 1 9 7 6 , 
29 . Hunt, Ben, N. 2 , p . 337 . 
30 . I b i d , p . 3 5 2 . 
3 1 . Krause , Joachim, N . 8 , p p . 3 9 2 - 3 9 3 . 
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Arms cement USSR's p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with the 
regional s t a t e s which otherwise* might have been l e s s 
32 
responsive t o s o v i e t approach • Arms have a l s o paved 
the way for the eaqport of ideo logy in t h i s Is lamic land. 
s o v i e t arms a l so Inf luence the m i l i t a r y es tabl i shment 
of reg ional s t a t e s which i s the s i g n i f i c a n t actor of 
the domestic p o l i t i c s of the s t a t e s of West Asia . 
For the sake of cold war p o l i t i c s , USSR has supplied 
arms t o maintain and strengthen c l i e n t ' s defence c a p a b i l i t y 
v i s - a - v i s that of I s r a e l , A comparison of m i l i t a r y balance 
of USSR's c l i e n t s with I s r a e l , shows that UsSR has always 
equipped them with arms t h a t at l e a s t ensure a q u a n t i t a t i v e 
and q u a l i t a t i v e p a r i t y . 
The USSR has a l s o viewed the A r a b - I s r a e l i war as 
the proxy war between i t s e l f and USA, and has , there fore , 
unl imitedly given arms t o i t s c l i e n t s during the war. 
USSR's s u p p l i e s t o Egypt i n l a t e 60 ' s and e a r l y 70 ' s 
i n i t i a t e d the A t t r i t i o n war and Ramdhan war of 1973. 
During t h i s period 43% of USSR's arms e x p o r t s went to 
33 Egypt. The l a s t such consignment of s o v i e t arms d e l i 
t o Egypt included advanced arms l i k e , MIG-2 3 Floggers , 
32. Pajak, Roger, F. i "West European and s o v i e t Arms 
Transfer P o l i c i e s in the Middle East* i n Leltenburg 
Milton and Sheffer , Gabriel (eds.) i Great Power ' 
Intervent ion in the Middle East, Pergomon Press , New 
York, USA, 1979, P. 156. 
33. Bennett, Alexender, J, N.4 , pp. 756-757. 
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ground a i r attack a ircraf t s# MIG-25 FOxbat, high 
a l t i t u d e i n t e r c e p t o r s , many SA-5 s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e 
34 
and T-72 main b a t t l e tanks . s i m i l a r l y , Syr ia , a f t er 
heavy l o s s in the Lebnon war, was replenished by the 
weapons l i k e SU-4 f i t t e r , MIG-27 Flogger ground a i r 
attack a i r c r a f t , MIG-25 Poxbat high a l t i t u d e i n t e r -
c e p t o r s , many SA-5 s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s and T-72 
35 
main b a t t l e tanks* Since the withdrawl of o i l embargo 
on Iraq, s o v i e t Unicwi has equipped Iraq with MIG-23*s 
MlG-25*s a i r c r a f t s and T-72, main b a t t l e tanks , which 
g r e a t l y contr ibuted t o Iraqi v i c tory over Iran during the 
l a s t phase of th« war. 
USSR's p o l i c y of arms Transfer to west Asia stems 
out of !*Realpolotik" i . e . the containment of and compe-
37 t i t i o n with USA. To quote in t h i s regard, the statement 
of US Congress CX)ninittee, " p o l i t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n , the 
securing of s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n and the impairment of 
34. H e l l e r , Mark, A. N. 19, p . 80. 
35. Bennett , Alexender, J . N.4, p . 754. 
36. Dixon, Micheal, J. and Whelan Joseph, G. » The 
s o v i e t Union in the Third world; Threat to world 
Peace, Pergamon Publ i shers , Washington, D . C U S A , 
1986. p . 153. 
37. Krause, Joachim, N. 8, pp. 397-389. 
- 115 -
•J Q 
Western I n f l u e n c e , are the major goa ls (o£ s o v i e t Union)«" 
USSR h '^s diminished the p o s s i b i l i t y of u s penetrat ion to 
minimum in the both Yaroens# Syria and Iraq« and reduced 
i f not contained* USA's in f luence in i t own camp. A number 
39 
of arms d e a l s with Kuwait ( including l a t e s t one in 1988 
40 
of $ lOOO m), North Yaroen and Jordan g i v e evidence of 
the independence of these s t a t e s from USA in the matter 
of choice of arm s u p p l i e r s . 
Maintaining the balance of power of i t s c l i e n t s as 
against I s r a e l at both q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e 
s c a l e s , USSR has kept a pace with Us arm t r a n s f e r in the 
areas . West Asia i s a l so l e a s t a f fected by new detente 
between the USA and the USSR, as says , Freedman, "in the 
Middle East , however, the USSR under Gorbacheve has not 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d i t s e l f by any new breakthrough* .. Indeed 
so far there has been more cont inu i ty than change in 
38. U . S . , congress . House, committee on I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
R e l a t i o n s "The s o v i e t Union and the Third World t 
A Watershed in Great Power po l icy* report by the 
Senior S p e c i a l i s t D i v i s i o n , congress ional Research 
Serv ice , Library of congress , 95th Congress ,1s t 
Se s s ion , May 8, 1977, p . 69, 
39. Heftier Mark A. » "Soviet Pol icy in the Gulf* in 
Gazit s . Eytan zeev and Gazit Sholomo (eds . ) t The 
Middle East Mi l i t ary Balance, 1988-89, The Westview 
Press and The Jarusalem Post , Jerusalem I s r a e l , 
1988, pp. 123-124. 
40. Dixon, Macheal J . and Whelan Joseph, G, N.36, p.170,-
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s o v i e t fore ign p o l i c y towards Middle East"* . Arms race 
between USA and USSR i s s t i l l a l i v e very much in the 
West Asia i n comparison t o Europe and other regions 
of the world. 
In a t o t a l deviat ion from the p o l i c y p r i o r t o 1970, 
USSR's p o s t 1970 arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y in West Asia has 
been l a r g e l y guided by econc^ic motive. Dire needs of hard 
currency earning to continue trade with USA, the West and 
Japan, compelled USSR to boost up i t s arms expor t to West 
42 Asia, For arms in comparison to other export i tems 
inc luding natural gas and o i l , had maximum di f ference 
between rea l and market c o s t and were most badly required 
b^ ' the r i c h West Asian s t a t e s , 
s o v i e t Union increased the pr ice of arms dest ined 
43 to be sold to West Asia, lowered d iscounts and asked 
i t s r e c i p i e n t s to pay in hard currency and that too imme-
d i a t e l y , * * 
41, Freedman, Robert, 0 i " s o v i e t Po l i cy Towards Middle East" 
in Laired, Robert F, (ed , ) t Soviet Foreign P o l i c y , 
Proceedings of Academy of P o l i t i c a l Sc i ence , v o l , 3 6 , 
N.4 . c a p i t a l c i t y Pres s , Montgplies, Vermont, p .176 . 
42, i - ierre , N, 13, p . 149. 
43, Brazorka, Micheal and Ohlson Thomas, N,5, p. 41, 
44, Beyme, Kalus Von, j The soviet Union in world Politics, 
Gowr Publishing Co, Ltd., Aldershot, Hants, England, 
1987, p. 137, 
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Dwindling o i l revenues, and I r a q ' s , USSR's major 
45 
c l i e n t , war-ravaged economy forced USSR t o cut the 
economic mot ives short from i t s arms t rans fer p o l i c y at 
the beginning of 1980s, However, USSR again resorted to 
same p o l i c y s ince 1986 when trade d e f i c i t of $ 2 b shot 
46 
up the demand of hard currency. Also, USSR's p o l i c y has 
not been s o l e l y guided by hard currency f a c t o r . During 
1970-85 USSR gave arms t o i t s c l i e n t s on d i s c o u n t s and 
c r e d i t s . For example, worth $ 1.5 b arms to south Yamen 
^'^ 48 
in 1979 and arms t o Syria i n 1983 were provided on easy 
cred i t terms. In other words, economic b e n e f i t although 
important has never been given preference over the p o l i t i c a l 
motives of arms t r a n s f e r . 
To match the Us weapons or to have an edge over them, 
and to demonstrate the a b i l i t y t o f u l f i l c l i e n t ' s demand, 
USSR has transferred the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons t o 
the West Asian c o u n t r i e s , i t pos se s sed , such as mG-23 
Flogger, MIG-25 Foxbat MIG-28 a i r c r a f t , T-72 and T-82 tanks , 
BMD APC's and SA-8 Gammon and SA-8 Greeko s u r f a c e - t o - a i r 
49 
m i s s i l e s . Moreover USSR has followed the c y c l i c a l 
45. Stephanie G, Nexoman, t "Arms, Aid and the superpowers" 
Foreign A f f a i r s , Summer 1988, v o l . 66, No .5 , pp.1044-1066, 
46. P a t t r i c k , Lock, Brown i "Gorbacheve Tried t o Find a Way 
Out of the Siberian Oil Cr i s i s" Baston, Globle , Sept . 
15, 1985, Cited in Orb*s, v o l , 30, No.4, Winter, 1987, 
p . 715, 
47. Chris t ian Science Monitor, Jan. 12, 1983, p . 13. 
48 . New York Times, March 21 , 1983. 
49. The M i l i t a r y Balance, 1978-79, p . 1 5 . The M i l i t a r y Balance 
1983-84, pp, 52, 55-56, 59-60 ,62-63 , 9trr91, IISS,London. 
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Table - 1.6 
Cyclical P a t t e r n of soviet Arms exports to West Asia. 
A i rc ra f t s Mig-15 ^MiG-21 —>MiG-23 —: MiG-27 
Fighter a i r c r a f t bombers T4-16 >^ T4-32 
Tanks T-34 ^ T-54A-55 ^ T-72 ^T-80 
source I Calculated from slPRl"Anns Trade Register*'197lT85. 
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of arms t rans fer as shown in the t iable - - 1,6 
SA-5 s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s and SS-21 s u r f a c e - t o -
surface m i s s i l e s the l a t t e r having the dual c p p a b i l i t y 
to de l i ver e i t h e r nuclear or conventional weapons 
were not so ld to WTO c o u n t r i e s before t h e i r despatch t o 
West Asia. Iraq was the f i r s t s o v i e t c l i e n t in the world 
to obtain T-22 "Blinder* medium range bombers# T-64 main 
51 b a t t l e tanks and MIG-27 f l o g g e r . * SA-5, SA-6, SA-9, SA-22 
52 
suppl ies to Syria i n 1982 were acquired by the Sov ie t 
army in 1982 only and not de l ivered to wTO s t a t e s t i l l 
53 then . To sum up in the words of Krause, Jachim, "West 
Asian countr ies p o s s e s s which Moscow's European a l l i e s 
e i t h e r do not have or do not have in comparable q u a n t i t i e s " . 
Transfer of m i l i t a r y personnels* t e c h n i c i a n s and 
advisers i s the par t and parce l of USSR's arms trans fer 
54 
p o l i c y . "Rarely are weapons sent without a d v i s e r s and in 
nximber greater than would appear warranted". Moscow 
provides a l l l e v e l of f r a i n i n g from motors v e h i c l e repair 
50. Airforce Magazine, Dec. 1983, p . 164. Cited in The 
Middle East JourrTal, v o l . 39, N.4, Autmn 1985, p7754, 
51. Ibid., p. 759. 
52. New York Times, March 21, 1983, p. 4, 
53. Menon, Raja, N. 1, pp. 205-206. 
54. Krause, Joachim, N, 8, p . 394. 
55. P ierre , N. 13, p . 76, 
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to 3 years course of m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s at Moscow 
Mi l i tary Academy f The Sov ie t personnels in West Asia 
perform e s s e n t i a l l y three f u n c t i o n s . The d e l i v e r y and main-
tenance of m i l i t a r y equipments* the t ra in ing of l o c a l 
personnels and the i n s t r u c t i n g of indigenous m i l i t a r y 
operat ion .^ T i l l date there are around 6000 t o 7000 
e g 
s o v i e t m i l i t a r y personnels i n Middle East, more than 
in any other region of the world. In 1979 there were 
2480, 1100, 1065 s o v i e t personne l s in Syria, south Yamen 
59 and Iraq, r e s p e c t i v e l y . The ir strength doubled in mid 
1980's and has been c o n s t a n t l y increas ing s ince than. 
s o v i e t Union has a l s o channelled arms t o some c o u n t r i e s 
of West Asia through p r o x i e s . In fac t , USSR while sending 
arms to Egypt in 1955 through Czechoslavakia, had begun 
i t s arms supply to West Asia through t h i s method, supply 
56. Pajak, Roger, F. N. 23, p . 390. 
57. Ja*far, Kass«n, M. N. 24, p . 390. 
58. Department of Defence, s o v i e t Mi l i tary Power,1990, 
Washington, USA, 1989, p . 2b. 
59. Demechenko, p , } "Khushenie absolutism Kommunist" 
1979, p . 83 , Cited in say Sawyer Herbert L i s o v i e t 
percept ion of Oil Factor in US. Foreign P o l i c y . The 
Middle East Gulf Region, Westview Press , Boulder 
Clorodo, USA, 1983, p . 32. 
60 . Dixon, Micheal, J and Whelan Joseph, G. N. 36, p , 160, 
6 1 . Department of Defence, N.58 . 
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t o Iran during the Iran-Iraq war i s the recent example. 
In order to be neutral in the Gulf war and t o normalize 
and enhance r e l a t i o n s with Iran as we l l a s r e s p e c t i t s 
t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s with Iraq, Sov ie t Union, persuaded 
North Korea, Syria and Libya t o supply S o v i e t arms t o Iran. 
USSR's p o l i c y of arms supply in West Asia has not 
been wayward and unl imited. Arms r e s t r a i n t s of d i f f e r e n t 
types have been appl ied, s o c i e t Union approved CAT with USA 
which mainly aimed at r e s t r i c t i n g arms supply to West Asia. 
Pres ident Gorbacheve in var ious meetings with pres ident 
Reagan and l a t e r Bush has shown w i l l i n g n e s s t o c u r t a i l 
arms supply t o the region, 
USSR has a l s o assumed a s e l f imposed r e s t r a i n t on 
arms supply beyond which d i r e c t confrontat ion wi th the 
64 
other superpower becomes i n e v i t a b l e . Many t imes request 
of arms have been turned down or USSR has agreed t o supply 
while imposing l i m i t a t i o n s . TU-22 bombers and MIG-23^,sent 
t o Iraq, remained umder the control of s o v i e t personne l s . 
62 , Gazit , S. Eytan Zeev and Gazit , Sholomo, N.39, p . 153« 
63 , Brazaska, Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas, N .5 , p . 45. 
64 , Menon Raja, N, 1, p ,194 , 
6 5. Cyntheia,Roberts , A. t ••soviet Arms Transfer P o l i c y and 
the Dec is ion to Upgrade Syrian Air Defences", Survival , 
v o l . 15, No, 4, JUly-August 1983, p , 115. 
62 
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S i m i l a r l y , s o v i e t t e c h n i c i a n s c o n t r o l l e d SA-5 a i r defence 
m i s s i l e s e n t t o Syr ia a s i t covered I s r a e l a i r space and 
US c a r r i e r based a i r c r a f t s t a t i o n e d i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n 
66 
s e a . 
Since 1985 USSR's s h a r e i n t h e supp ly of West Asia 
has d e c l i n e d remarkably . I t ha s been r e p l a c e d by UsA and 
France i n the r e g i o n , A worldwide r e d u c t i o n in Sov i e t 
supply, p e r i o r i t y t o t h e I n d i a n sub c o n t i n e n t and the 
c e n t r a l Asia (Afghanistan) , Gorbacheve ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
o v e r t o n e s , and h i s d i p l o m a t i c approach t o West Asian c r i ses^® 
owe t o t h i s t r e n d . 
Cqpsequences of s o v i e t Arms T r a n s f e r P o l i c y i 
Pros & Cons of s o v i e t arm t r a n s f e r p o l i c y are 
d i f f i c u l t t o a s sess ,vo lumes of l i t e r a t u r e a v a i l a b l e ex-
aggera te e i t h e r success or f a i l u r e of t h e p o l i c y . However, 
an a n a l y t i c a l and o b j e c t i v e i n s i g h t i n t o t h e s e very 
m a t e r i a l s s u g g e s t s t h a t arms t r a n s f e r has b rough t mixed 
r e s u l t t o USSR in West A s i a . T h i s i s the p remise of d e t a i l e d 
a n a l y s i s , a t t empted as under s 
66 . I b i d . , p . 115, 
67 . The SIPRI Year Book, 1990. 
68 . H e l l e r Mark, A, N. 19, p , 80, 
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The Setbacks » 
As regards the setbacks/ to begin wi th , USSR has 
not reta ined contro l over the weapons once i t supplied the 
same to the c l i e n t s . In r e s u l t , many t imes use of the 
69 
s o v i e t weapons hurt s o v i e t i n t e r e s t s in West As ia . Syria 
used Soviet weapons against the l e f t i s t f o r c e s in Lebnon 
and Pales t in ianswhich undermined Soviet-PLO r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
The Iran-Iraq war the l a t t e r fought with s o v i e t weapons 
which had i t s bearing upon the Sovie t - pos t Shah Iran 
r e l a t i o n s . Bes ides , these i n c i d e n t s a l s o s tra ined r e l a t i o n s 
between s o v i e t Union and i t s c l i e n t s , 
USSR's arms have proved counterproductive to s o v i e t 
o b j e c t i v e s . The arms t rans fer was the centra l cause of 
soviet -Egypt ian schisms, s o v i e t Union's dishonour of 
agreement with Egypt on arms supply and presence of 
71 20,000 s o v i e t personnels u l t i m a t e l y l ed t o the l o s s of 
Egypt to USSR. Nature volume and de l ivery of arms as wel l 
as presence of m i l i t a r y personnels have n e g a t i v e l y a f fec ted 
r e l a t i o n s between Syria and USSR as wel l as Iraq and USSR. 
USSR's l i m i t e d arms supply to both b e l l i g e r e n t s of Iran-Iraq 
war, de ter iorated s o v i e t - I r a q already s tra ined r e l a t i o n s 
69 . Degar, Saddat, N. 3, p . 170. 
70 . Sa ive tz , Carol, R, and woodby Sy lv ia , » sov ie t -Th ird 
world R e l a t i o n s , Westview Pres s , Boulder, colorodo, 
USA, 1985, p . 155. 
7 1 . Micheal, MccGwire, t M i l i t a r y Object ives i n s o v i e t 
P o l i c y . The Booking I n s t i t u t i o n , Washington, D . C , 
USA, 1987, p . 221. 
- 124 -
and a l s o did not improve Sovie t - Iranian t i e s beyond 
72 low s c a l e . 
7 "i Arms t r a n s f e r has r e s u l t e d i n t o reverse i n f l u e n c e . 
s o v i e t c l i e n t s taking f u l l advantage of s o v i e t Union's 
s takes and superpowers r i v a l r y in West As ia , have very 
often d i c t a t e d USSR in matters of i t s arms transfer p o l i c y . 
Egypt in 197 3 when detente was in f u l l swing, and Syria 
on the eve of Labnon war, succeeded to acquire arms desipite 
USSR's r e l u c t a n c e . 
Thus, s o v i e t Union-West Asia P a t r o n - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s 
have been, as a matter of f a c t , that of " c l i e n t , d i c t a t i n g 
to Patron",^^ 
Inf luence ,presence and leverage acquired by the 
s o v i e t Union are not permanent. This i s what at l e a s t 
the exarrple of Egypt t e s t i f i e s . Massive supply of arms of 
high q u a l i t y has not prevented the trend of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n 
of sources among i t s r e c i p i e n t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y Iraq, And 
the net r e s u l t of s o v i e t arms transfer in West Asia as 
sumired up by Kassem has been, Arabs have viewed s o v i e t 
m i l i t a r y aid inadequate, adv i sers as conce i t ed , arrogant 
and v i r t u a l l y ignorant of rea l needs of Arabs fac ing I s r a e l " , 
72 . Dixon, Micheal, J. and Whelan, Joseph, G. N ,36 ,p ,154 , 
73 . Menon, Raja. N . l , p . 236. 
74 . Dixon, Micheal, J. and whelan, Joseph G. N.36, p , 1 7 6 . 
75 . J 'a far , Kassem, M. N.24, p . 258. 
75 
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The succes s i 
soveit arms t r a n s f e r h a s p rov ided s h o r t - t e r m b e n e f i t s 
t o USSR fo r i n s t a n c e , arms t o t h e Shah i n mid 1970 ' s 
t e rmina ted s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s on i t s Southern b o r d e r s as t h e 
Shah ensured UsSRtonot a l low I r a n a s the base to the 
76 f o r c e s h o s t i l e t o UsSR . S i m i l a r l y , arms supp ly to North 
Yamen weaned i t away from the Western camp, supp ly to the 
Arab s t a t e s a t the end of each Arab I s r a e l i war rega ined 
USSR's p r e s t i g e which had d e c l i n e d dvie t o t h e bad performance 
77 
of i t s arms du r ing the wars , i n the eyes of c l i e n t 
Through arms supply s o v i e t Union has been ab le to make 
78 i t s p r e sence f e l t in West Asia by denying US the hege-
money in the a rea and p u r s u i n g p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n 
wi th i t s c l i e n t s t i e d t o i t by ' t r e a t i e s of f r i e n d s h i p 
7Q 
and c o o p e r a t i o n ^ with the s o v i e t debt mounting on i t s 
c l i e n t s , i t a l s o seems t h a t t h e r e i s n o t l i k e l y t o be 
any r e t r e a t from e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g s o v i e t l e v e r a g e over 
i t s c l i e n t s . 
USSR has s u c c e s s f u l l y compe ted wi th USA i n the 
area and e n j o y e s presence a s formidable a s t h a t of USA. 
7 6 . Brazaska, Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas N. 5, p . 46. 
77 . The Nature of sov ie t Aim and Trans fe r i n t h e Middle 
East I The Middle East I n s t i t u c e , 26 J a n . 1972, p . 5, 
7 8 . See Cassen, Robert (ed . ) t Sov i e t I n t e r e s t s i n the 
Thi rd wor ld . Sage P u b l i c a t i o n , London, U.K, , 1985, 
79 . See fo r d e t a i l . Raja, Menon, N, 1. 
80. Stephine G, Neuman, N, 4 5. 
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F i r s t , USSR h a s p r even t ed s t r a t e g i c a l l y impor t an t c o u n t r i e s , 
l i k e Sy r i a , and Yainens t o f a l l in the Western c l u t c h e s . 
On p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l level,USSR has been ab l e t o 
develop an a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t group of c o u n t r i e s . (Sy r i a , 
I r a q and South Ymane) which ( the group) c o n s t i t u t e s a 
p a r t of a b r o a d e r group t h a t i n c l u d e s Kabul, Addis Ababa 
and T r i p o l i , ® ^ 
USSR's arms supply has harmed USA's i n t e r e s t v i s - a - v i s 
i t s c l i e n t s . Arms supply t o North Yamen p reven ted i t t o 
move t o the Us b loc du r ing the border war w i th South 
Yameni The l a t t e r got a l l a s s i s t a n c e from USSR in t h e 
83 
same war. 
supp ly ing arms t o Kuwait and Jordan USSR has 
c e r t a i n l y c o n t r i b u t e d in enhancement of Kuwa i t ' s non-
a l igned s t a t u s . And King Hussain of Jordan throwing h i s 
support beh ind Saddam Hussain i n the l a t e s t Gulf t d r i s i s , 
had demons t ra ted the l i t t l e i n f luence USA bearsupon 
, ^ 84 Jo rdan . 
8 1 . Menon, Ra ja . N. 1/ p . 223. 
82 . Brig , Abdul Rahman S i d d i q u i , "U.S. and t h e Middle East:* 
Defence J o u r n a l , v o l s . V I I , V I I I , Nos». 4 - 5 , April-May 
1981. 
8 3 . U.S. Arms Cont ro l and Disarmament Agency, world M i l i t a r y 
Expend i tu r e s and Arms T r a n s f e r s 1972-1982, Table I I , 
p . 97 , 
84. " S h i f t i n g S t a n d s " , The Times of I n d i a , 2 S e p t . , 1990, 
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USSR Owes fo r t h e s t r a t e g i c f a c i l i t i e s i t p o s s e s s e s 
i n West Asia t o i t s arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y . Arms s u p p l i e s 
t o Syr ia compel led i t t o p r o v i d e l i m i t e d and a f t e rwards 
85 
r e g u l a r f a c i l i t i e s a t L a t a k i a and T a r t u s p o r t s , and 
86 T i y a s a i r f i e l d s . In south Yamen USSR has got access 
t o p o r t of Aden and a l l i s l a n d s of Perim and S c o r t a , 
Massive arms supply t o Egypt extended t o the pe rmiss ion 
87 88 
t o use p o r t Said« Alexender ia , and Martuh , R igh t t o 
Use the a i r f i e l d s of Cairo-West Aswan and some o t h e r p l a c e s 
fo r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e f l i g h t were a l s o gran ted t o USSR in 
exchange of arms supply. Arms gave access t o t h e bases a t 
Khorram Shaher and Umm-i-Qasr i n I r a q , A n a l y s t s are of 
t h e view t h a t success of arms t r a n s f e r depends no t only 
upon a c q u i s i t i o n of s t r a t e g i c f a c i l i t y , but t h e degree 
of a cce s s and l o c a t i o n of the b a s e s . In t h i s connec t ion , 
USSR has e x c l u s i v e l y used b a s e s of Umm-i-Qasr, Alexendr ia 
8 5 . C la rk , I a n , i " s o v i e t Arms s u p p l i e s and Ind i an Ocean 
Diplomacy" i n Bowman, L a r r y W. and C l a r k , I a n , ( e d s . ) t 
The I n d i a n Ocean i n Golobal P o l i t i c s , Young I n d i a 
P u b l i c a t i o n s , New D e l h i , I n d i a , 1981, p . 173 . 
86 . Benne t t , Alexender J . N. 5, p . 757. 
8 7 . Harkavy, Rober t , t " S t r a t e g i c Access, B a s i s , and Arms 
T r a n s f e r s i The major Powers Evolving G e o - P o l i t i c a l 
c o m p e t i t i o n in t h e Middle Eas t " i n L e i t e n b e r g , Mil ton 
and Shef fe r Gabr ie l ( e d s . ) i The Great Powers I n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n the Middle Eas t , Pergamon P r e s s , New York, USA,1979, 
p . 22 . 
8 8 . CIA "communist Aid t o Less Developing c o u n t r i e s ? 
Washington, D,C. , 1977, p . 19 . 
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69 
and Mersa, Martuh , while as regards the s t r a t e g i c 
Importance of the bases* USSR has got f a c i l i t i e s around 
the bases which help I t s p r o j e c t i o n In the sea waters 
90 
around West Asia. 
Economic bene f i t I s the net a s se t of USSR's arms. 
91 t rans fer p o l i c y . In words of Ian Clark, "before p o l i t i c a l 
returns compensated economic cost of arms t r a n s f e r and 
now economic gains n e u t r a l i z e the diminishing p o l i t i c a l 
92 
returns of arms supply" , Arms transfer has flowed 
much needed hard currency t o USSR. By 1901 USSR had 
rece ived 85% of i t s Incttne from arms s a l e s in hard 
93 currency. Arms s a l e s y i e l d e d Soviet Union $21b in 
94 
hard currency. At the end of the 70s arms s a l e s accou-
nted for 15% of t o t a l s o v i e t hard currency earning 
which at the beginning of the decade was as l e s s as 3% 
only^^ (see a l s o Tables 1. 7& 1 . 8) . 
89. Hunt, Ben. N. 2, pp. 340-341 . 
90 . Menon, Raja. N. 1, p . 231. 
91 . Bennett , Alexender J, N. 5. p . 774. 
92 . Clark, Ian, N. 85, p . 169. 
93 . s o v i e t Economy in If980^ t Problems and Prospects , 
v o l . 2 , Joint Economic Committee, 97th congress , 
2nd Sess ion , D e c 31, 1982, Washington, D.C. 
pp. 502-504. 
94. Deger, Saddat, N. 3, p . 150. 
95 . Krause JOachim, N. 8, p . 396. 
- 129 -
IMBLE - 1 . 7 
Cit« esntares ot Soviet sris oeliveriet and hard currencv eanints 
US l u l l ion 
lai''o 13/5 1»76 1»7T 1976 l»7d IsjoO l»6i 
ZoeTer's esti iaies dsioj) 
f»f«s o«iiverie« l.tioO 1.660 1.^70 o.olO *.l3v ».i70 4.671} <».i6u 
naro correncv 
recieo's ror 
3v»% s»»«S l.5iA,i (.5w l.oSv) i.i.t.vi j.'i«b5 S.oSS *.i.\}0 'i.i.v'v) 
' iirrent acconnT 
o»i9nce Dtiis 
joio S9i«s 1.000 o.ool I.3i7 l.uoy i.^j«4 o,666 3.46* i..6w 
' aoi'ai 5~count 
Diiance 4oo 5.'"97 2.5ia l . i l i 766 l.lSi. »o o.w4ij 
lie' erroes ano 
o«tisions 5.154 l.s(5 o7_ i.liic i . l5u t.5lo 3.5oc 6.34ii 
Edoson ano rtuler's esnta^e vl»T:ji 
nsro-ciirfencv 
recieo' tor 
arts saies l.wu 7:^ 3 l.luo l.5w 1.044 
net errors ano 
otissions -i.*w -96y il -l.dla -04u 
iraoe lesiouais 
i&c resioiiai t.ulS l.os'^ i . j lo o.oau 4.>.u7 4.J44 n.hn 4.a3» 
Lm. Dnis H.I- fc.04a i.oyl <..745 4.00! 5.5u5 5.6uu 5.aw D.Oil 
HO inTr»-cci)ntr\ toiioanv 
Source : Cassen Rober t (. ed. > Soviet interests in the 
Third Worid, Sage Publications, London, U.K. 1985 
- 130 -
1 n D l . t - l , 8 
ibafi nafo-oiirrencv oaiance-or-rraoe accoonf iu5» •niion.efceot rows io»-ioii 
IsTO laTl ii'il laTj iiU laiS IsTo isTT l»7d l»is lioy l»6l 
iliExDorts Z.iOl i..6o0 i.dOl 4.790 7.470 7.656 7.7^1 11.345 lo.l57 19.54a Z3.4»6 23.600 
(Without 
artsii.o.D 
u/ i ioor ts i.hii i.a43 4. l57u 6.54? 6.446 l4.i57 15.316 14.045 lo.aSl il.565 i6.yt7 i7.60u 
i3thon-deren- 500 313 1.356 1.757 976 6.419 5.595 3.300 3.794 i.036 Z.519 4.000 
ce trace oer-
ic i t 
t4»«ris saies 0^ 7u I w 55y l.uou 1.*AW l . i5u i . j w 2..5w i . 75u o.Suu 3.7w 
»5t£«Dorts 1 i . i o l i.700 i.901 5.3*0 6.470 6.636 10.791 13.6*5 15.657 Z1.199 i6.996 i7.5uO 
with arisi 
lOfaris/totai .>n5 .026 .034 .103 .116 .113 .lU .166 .16 .123 .129 .134 
exDortf ratio 
wi(»ri$'non- .uoo .u^o .uo5 .lUo .133 .127 .126 ,ivi .l:*o . Uu . u ^ .155 
•lutarv e«D-
oris ratio 
<6iaf«si(\oiv- .10 ,it.3 .0(3 .aU l.u22 .155 .223 .ow .o5o l.oSu l.Jo9 .»i.5 
oerence traoe 
oenc i t i ratio 
la/retfoieui 4ou oyo 6w l.JU4 2.741 j .os l 4.74o 5.5oo 5.7lu a.5o5 il.aas u.i.o7 
»lu)Natijrai U 21 24 oi 95 2iu o56 56o l.ii72 I.4D4 2.7u4 3.956 
fas 
Source : Cassen Robert(ed.> Soviet Interests in the 
Third World. Sage Publications, London. U.K. 1965 
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Arms have t rans la ted i n t o inf luence though to a 
l imi ted s c a l e . Massive arms export improved USSR's image 
as a power benign to ant i c o l o n i a l i s t , ant i i m p e r i a l i s t 
s t a t e s of the region t i l l Sadaat 's be traya l , Soviet 
Union exerc i sed considerable inf luence on Egypt's 
p o l i c y and a c t i o n s . Though often termed as the "mischievous 
a l l y * . Syria has followed i t s fore ign p o l i c y in s o v i e t 
on i n t e r e s t s . I t refused to condemn Soviet invas ion of 
Afghanistan. Instead, i t came c l o s e r t o USSR by s ign ing 
97 the t r e a t y , o f fr iendship and cooperation* with t h e l a t t e r 
The governments of Aden and Moscow have mirrored each 
other . Changes in p o l i t i c a l fortunes of t h i s country 
have not a f f e c t e d Soviet in f luence but strengthend i t , 
98 
otherwise^ PDRY has served as the bridge head for 
sov i e t involvement in the North West Africa and Arabian 
99 
Peninsula. and acted as Soviet ambassadors in world 
fortune. 
However, USSR has not enjoyed absolute inf luence 
in West Asia . I t i s i n t e r e s t s have been hampered by the 
96. Dixon, Micheal J. and Whelan Joseph G. N. 36, p . 176. 
97 . I b i d . , p . 177. 
98 . Rubinste in, Alvin z . » ''The Soviet Union's imperial 
Po l i cy in the Middle East", Mddiel East Review, 
v o l . XV, No. 1, Vol. XV, No.";?, F a l l / w i n t e r 1982/ 
1983, pp. 19-24, 
99^ Dixon, Micheal J. and Whelan Joseph. G. N.36, P. 167. 
100. Menon, Raja. N. 1, p . 225. 
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the c l i e n t s ' foreign p o l i c y behaviour. Syria fought 
the Lebnon war and Iraq attacked Iran despute Sov ie t 
Union's o p p o s i t i o n . The wars i t s Arab c l i e n t s fought 
with I s r a e l a l s o to ld upon USSR i s world wide p r e s t i g e 
PLO-USSR d i f f e r e n c e s are a lso not unknown. PLO paid no 
heed t o UssR*s advice to re fra in from dec lar ing statehood 
in e x i l e * PLC's s h i f t towards USA has a l s o s idetracked 
USSR from West Asian peace plans and p r o s p e c t s . 
USSR's c l i e n t s have often embarked upon anti-UsSR 
p o l i c y a l s o Syria helped ant i Arafat fac t ion despi te 
102 s o v i e t support to YasslrArafat . In Ogadon war, Iraq 
103 
supported Somalia mater ia l ly and the Er i tar ian 
s e p a r a t i s t movement against the s o v i e t support to the 
Ethopian government, Iraq a l s o condemned Soviet i n t e r -
vention i n Afghanistan. 
s o v i e t in f luence on the domestic p o l i t i c s of West 
Asian s t a t e s has been l e s s e r than i t s in f luence upon 
t h e i r fore ign p o l i c y , ccwnmunist p a r t i e s d e s p i t e s o v i e t 
101. H e l l e r , Mark A. N. 19, p . 80 , 
102. Menon, Raja, N. 1 . , p . 227^ 
103. Iran Clark. N. 85, p . 160, 
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b l e s s i n g have f a i l e d t o g r a b power in t h e i r c o u n t r i e s 
and have been t r e a t e d inhumanely by t h e p r e s e n t governments. 
USSR has a l s o f a i l e d t o I n f l u e n c e the domes t ic p o l i c i e s 
of t h e s e s t a t e s through t h e i r m i l i t a r y , P r c - s o v i e t 
e l ements i n m i l i t a r y have been e i t h e r crushed or do not 
e x i s t . I r a q i n p a r t i c u l a r # h a s been ex t remely severe 
a g a i n s t p r o - S o v i e t e l e m e n t s . 
In 1978-79 Saddam Hussain's government execu ted 
104 48 members of armed fo rce s f o r t h e i r being p ro -SOv ie t . 
s o v i e t p r e s t i g e as arms s u p p l i e r has from time to 
time been s u b j e c t t o severe q u e s t i o n s . Heav- l o s s of 
s o v i e t weapons and t h e i r e x t r e m e l y bad performance in 
the A r a b - I s r a e l i wars , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Lebnon war 
in which I s r a e l a t the c o s t of i t s one a i r c r a f t , d e s -
t royed , some 90 MiG-21® 13® and 29^, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 
SA-8, SA-9 s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s and 400 t a n k s of 
S y r i a , have p laced s o v i e t arms i n f e r i o r t o t h a t of 
the West w i t h which I s r a e l has fough t . 
104, Menon, Raja . N, 1, p . 226-227, 
105. Rubens t i en , Alvin, Z. N. 96, p p . 19-24 . 
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After a f u l l analysis of the success and setbacks 
of soviet arm transfer pol icy In West Asia, i t can be 
accurately summed up in these words; ""the over a l l 
impact, of arms aid programme appears to be on posit ive 
side scale of soviet foreign pol icy ledger". 
The conclusion of the afore-mentioned study of 
sovie t arms t ransfer po l i cy br ings back t c in t roductory 
remark t h a t arros are the sole instrument of USSR's 
p o l i t i c a l , s t r a t e g i c and economic i n t e r e s t s . What can 
be inferred in addit ion i s t h a t Soviet arms t ransfer 
ind ica tes the p o l i t i c a l expansion than m i l i t a r y as very 
often a l leged in Western sources . In disagreement to 
the Western sources i t may also be said t h a t Soviet 
pol icy of arms t ransfer i s compromising object ive instead 
of conf ron ta t ion i s t to the us i n t e r e s t s in the region. 
106. Cassen, Robert, Soviet I n t e r e s t s in the Third world. 
Sage Publ ica t ions , London, UK, 1985. 
C H A P T E R - V 
ARMS AND OIL 
Arms and o i l , t h e two m o s t I m p o r t a n t i t e m s of b i l a t e r a l 
t r a d e be tween West A s i a a n j t h e W e s t , a r e , i n f a c t , t h e 
b a s i c d e t e r m i n a n t s of p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s be tween 
t h e two r e g i o n s . The s m a l l p h r a s e — 'Arms and O i l * • c o v e r s 
a wide v a r i e t y of s u b j e c t m a t t e r and i s s u e s r e l e v a n t t o 
West As ia and West r e l a t i o n s . 
T h i s c h a p t e r i s an a n a l y t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n of t h e c o n c e p t 
u n d e r f o l l o w i n g m a j o r h e a d i n g s i The c o n c e p t . Arms and O i l 
P o l i c i e s o f t h e West A s i a , t h e USA and t h e West E u r o p e ; and 
e f f e c t s of Arms and O i l L i n k a g e . 
The Concep t t 
Though l a d e n w i t h i n d e p t h and s u f f i c i e n t s t u d y , t h e 
t o p i c l a c k s a t h e o r e t i c a l f ramework and h a s , t h e r e f o r e , 
been m i s u n d e r s t o o d . The term a rms and o i l i s i n t e r c h a n g e d 
w i t h "arms f o r o i l * , w h e r e a s , b r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , a rms and 
o i l d o e s n o t o n l y r e f e r t o t h e t r a n s f e r of two c o m m o d i t i e s ; 
r a t h e r i t c o v e r s a l l a s p e c t s d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d 
t o t h e s u p p l y of b o t h i t e m s . A n o t h e r p r e v a l e n t m i s c o n c e p t i o n 
i s t h a t a rms and o i l s t r a t e g y i s Wes t e rn i n n a t u r e w h i l e 
i t , i n r e a l i t y , i s no l e s s a West As ian s t r a t e g y a l s o . In 
t h i s b a c k g r o u n d t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n c e p t of a rms and o i l 
i s b e i n g d e l i n e a t e d a s u n d e r . 
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To S t a r t with, arms and o i l l inkage, from the Western 
p o i n t of view i s the continuous, smooth and su f f i c i en t supply 
of o i l from West Asia in r e tu rn for the t r ans f e r of arms. 
Secur i ty of the o i l supply i s the most important 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of arms and o i l r e l a t ionsh ip , I r r e spec t i ve 
of supply- demand-price p a t t e r n , the secur i ty of o i l has 
been an a l l time obsession of the usA and the Western 
powers. For example, more than any other f a c to r , the secu-
r i t y of o i l got USA and i t s a l l i e s involved in the I ran- I raq 
war and guided t h e i r arms t r a n s f e r pol icy to I r aq , Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and other smaller Gulf s t a t e s . Arms provided 
to the o i l producing s t a t e s have meant for t ack l ing sub-
versive and t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s around o i l t r ade rou t e s . 
Amidst vehement opposition of the congress, Reagan administ-
r a t ion could ge t approved the t r ans fe r of a package of 
mi s s i l e system to Saudi Arabia in 1985-86 only on the b a i l s 
of i t s u t i l i t y of the secur i ty of o i l route from espionage 
2 
and t e r r o r i s m . Besides i n t e r n a l danger, armsare t rans fe r red 
to the region t o strengthen the secur i ty of o i l r i ch s t a t e s 
in view of ex te rna l t h r e a t . For USSR's or any of the 
1. Al-sowayegh, Abdul Aziz » "The Security of Oil suppl ies , 
p reva len t views Among Oil Consumers and Producers" in 
Sharif, Walid (ed.) : The Arab Gulf s t a t e s and JaPan; 
Prospects for co-operat ion. Groom Helm, Dover, New 
Hanqpshire, USA, 1986, p . 33. 
2, Cordsman, Anthony H. i western St ra tegic I n t e r e s t s in 
Saudi Arabia, Groom Helm, Sydney, Aus t ra l i a , 1987. 
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•regional powers* control over arms and o i l t rade shal l 
e i t h e r end or induce ext ra ordinary changes in o i l t r ans f e r 
process ; both being dev s t a t i n g to the West, 
Arms t r a n s f e r i s used as an instrument to secure 
su f f i c i en t quan t i t y of o i l a t reasonable p r i c e . At a 
number of t imes the West Asian countrico have reduced the 
p r ice of o i l and increased production to obtain the West 's 
offer of advanced weaponry. P a r t i c u l a r l y , Saudi Arabia -
the swing producer has yielded to such offers by bringing 
down pr i ce and f lar ing up productioii of i t s as well as 
OPEC's oil.-^ 
Arms t r a n s f e r for o i l a l so means and aims at complete 
iOl i t ica l -economic i n t eg ra t i on of o i l producing s t a t e s t o 
oil-consuming ones, so t o dissuade the former from d iver -
sifying the source of supply, and prevent them to be 
influenced by the power adversary t o o i l consumers. Thcanas 
Macnaughtr r i g h t l y sums up the danger of any such development 
by saying tha t "Soviet Union's p o l i t i c a l leverage over 
o i l producers can d i s tu rb the o i l t rade as much as "the sovie t 
4 purchase of same amount of o i l " . On i t s economic s ide , 
3. Economist, Feb. 8, 1986, p . 61 and April 26, 1996, p . 70. 
4. Mcnaugher, Thomas L, , Arms and Oil » us Mi l i t a ry 
Strategy and the Persian Gulf, Brooking I n s t i t u t i o n , 
Washington D.C., USA, 1985, p . 9. 
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arms and o i l r e l a t i onsh ip means backward flow of do l l a r 
spent in purchase of o i l , through the sale of sophis t ica ted 
and ejqaensive arms in l a rge quan t i t y . Oil import cos ts 
USA dear ly . To quote , in t h i s regard, Hans Landsberg, ••looked 
in a more graphic w a y . . . , one day petroleum imports cost 
the same as importing two years supply of Tungsten and 
5 
s ix month's supply of cobal t or Platinum. 'Jl'herefore, 
enormous import requirement and sky-rocketing of pr ice led 
USA to r e so r t to massive export of arms to channel back 
the p e t r o d o l l a r , and red.ress i t s decl ining balance of payment. 
That i s why with the quadrupling of o i l p r i c e s arm sale to 
West Asia a l so increased fourfold. 
Arms and o i l i s a two way t r a f f i c . From West Asian 
po in t of view i t means acquir ing of arms of high q u a l i t y 
and in appropriate quan t i ty . The o i l revenue gave these na t ions 
freedom of choice with regard to category*nature and source 
of supply. In te rna l and ex te rna l insecur i ty and need of 
the modernization of defence forces - an outcome of o i l 
factor - compelled West Asia s t a t e s to s e l l o i l for arms. 
5, Landsberg, Hans L, i Minerals in the E igh t i e s i s sues 
and P o l i t i c s , Oak Ridge, Tenn, Oak Ridge National Lab 
Programme Planning Analysis , 1982, pp. 19-20, 
6, Statement of Richard, R. V io l e t t e , Director of s t a t e s 
Negot ia t ions , Defence secur i ty Assistance Agency, 
Before the House sub-committee on Near East and South 
Asia, 30 July , 1984, pp . 5-14, 
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Limited absorptive capac i ty and slow pace of modernization 
of 
a l so d i rec ted a subs tan t i a l p o r t i o n / o i l income towards the 
purchase of arms* 
Thus, on the basis of afore-mentioned discuss ion 
the 'arms and o i l ' r e l a t i o n s h i p can be defined as shipment 
of arms for o i l and o i l for arms as per the requirement, 
r espec t ive ly , by the West and West Asia, Inter locked in 
close p o l i t i c a l and economic t i e s in the r e s u l t of the 
b i l a t e r a l t rade of the two commodities. 
Arms and Oil P o l i c i e s of the West Asia, the USA and the West 
a) West As ia ' s Pol icy and s t r a t egy of Arms and Oil > 
Unhindered supply of o i l t o the West i s the v i t a l 
object ive of West As ia ' s arms and o i l po l icy as i t expor ts 
7 
most of i t s o i l and imports a l l i t s needs, through the 
c ruc ia l Gulf waterways. Arms have been imported by the 
Gulf monarchies for the s ecu r i t y of the country as well 
as tha t of o i l route from the Pa le s t in i an Guer i l l a s (in 
Kuwait) , Doffar insurgency and rad ica l and fundamental 
l i s t forces wi th in . Arms acqu i s i t i on for the secu r i ty 
increased since the success I ranian revolut ion and I ran-
Iraq warx I t stepped up when I ran threatened t o a t tack 
7, Nakhaleh Emile A. t Arab-American Rela t ions in the 
Per i ian Gulf, Foreign Affairs Study s e r i e s . No, 17, 
March, Washington, D,C., UsA, 1975, p . 4. 
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Q 
the Gulf s t a t e s and close down or mine S t r a i t of Harmuz 
g 
through which 60% of world 's crude o i l drained . 
west Asian o i l producing s t a t e s have acquired arms 
in exchange of o i l from the West, p a r t i c u l a r l y USA. to 
e s t a b l i s h and maintain close m i l i t a r y cooperation with 
the l a t t e r in order to avoid d i r e c t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t , 
from USSR, the r ad ica l s t a t e s of the area_and from any 
other credible anemy. 
Arms acqu i s i t ion stands for twin purposes; the 
supply of spare p a r t s , ammunition and personnel from the 
West to meet ex t e rna l or regional challenge and the invi» 
t a t i on to suppl ie r to fight on t h e i r behalf in case they 
f a i l t o , or^are unable to f igh t agains t the t h r e a t s ing le -
handedly. 
Gulf s t a t e s of West Asia import p r a c t i c a l l y a l i t h e i r 
needs, from m i l i t a r y e^Q^orts and arm t o managerial s taff 
and from c a p i t a l goods and technology to food i tems from 
8. Indian Express, "Iran Threatens t o mine Gulf, Harmuz" 
16 Oct, 1980. ^ 
9. Muttam, Jofain, Arms and I n s e c u r i t y in the Persian Gulf, 
Radiant Publ i shers , New Delhi , Ind ia , 1984, pp. 161-162. 
10, cordsman Anthony H, N. 2, p . 28, 
11 . Nakhaleh, Emile A, i The U.S. and Saudi Arabia, Foreign 
Affairs study s e r i e s , N. 26, Washington, D.C. USA, p . 50, 
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USA and i t s a l l i e s . At l e a s t 40,6% of Arab c o u n t r i e s ' 
12 t o t a l imports cx>mesfrom i n d u s t r i a l market economies. 
Oil supply in t h i s context a c t s as a means to car ry on 
and s t ab l i ze the in tensive t r a d e re la t ion with USA and 
other Western coun t r i e s . 
West Asia*s o i l for arm" po l icy springs out massive 
o i l income coupled with l imi ted absorptive capac i ty and 
13 l imi ted investment on development and modernization. 
Hence, a subs tan t ia l amount of o i l revenue i s spen<t on 
defence expenditure, p a r t i c u l a r l y the purchase of expensive 
weapons in unknown q u a n t i t i e s from USA and i t s Western 
a l l i e s . 
Downfall of revenue in 19 80*s did not de-esca la te 
West Asia ' s arms and o i l t r a d e . In the wake of ex t e rna l -
and in te rna l t h r e a t ; Iran - I raq war and r i s i n g Islamic 
resurgencies» the Gulf s t a t e s have reduced d r a s t i c a l l y the 
resources on development p r o j e c t s to d i r e c t the same to 
12. Bhaghat, KOrany. "Unwelcome Guests" The P o l i t i c a l Economy 
of Arab Relat ions with superpowers in Shrabi Hussain (ed.) t The Next Arab Decade, Al ternat ive Futures , 
Westview Press , Boulder, Colorodo, USA, 1988, p . 82. 
13. Muttiin, Joha, N. 9. p . 72. 
14. Ernest , D. Albreht, Lock P. and VJulf H. " M i l i t a r i z a t i o n 
Arms Transfer and Arms Production in Per iphera l 
count r ies" . Journal of Peace Research, v o l . 12, No. 3, 
1935, p . 197. 
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the 
meet and ma in t a in / r i s ing demand of arms purchase . Iran 
and I raq are the notable examples in t h i s regard ,^^ Iran, 
for example, with the decrease in i t s revenue by 58% in 
1986, made severe cut backs in c i v i l i a n imports to $ 8000m, 
while m i l i t a r y imports reduction amounted t o around $ 200m, 
only, Iraq a l so l imited i t s spending on c i v i l l i a n imports 
around $ 0,5000m and d i rec ted major por t ion of i t towards 
17 
m i l i t a r y imports . I r an ' s* I r a q ' s and Saudi Arabia ' s 
defence expenditures were r e spec t ive ly $ 4.4b, $ 2.986 
and $ 2.44b in l98i,^®—-the year of highest o i l income — 
these ins tead of s lashing down, went upward t o $ 9.90b, 
$ 12.87b and $ 13.57b in same order in 1988 - the year of 
19 the lowest income. 
Oil producing s t a t e s have adopted the p o l i c y of over 
production and reduced p r i ce to win over the arms suppl ie r . 
This trend s t a r t e d as e a r l y as the days of o i l embargo. 
In response to b i l a t e r a l dea ls of arms and o i l between 
15. Brissand Albert , D i s t l e r Catherine and Salame Ghassane, 
"Oil Exporting Countries" in Joans, Pear ie (ed.) iThe 
Third Oil shock, Bostor and Henley, London,England, 
1983, p . 44. 
16. The Middle East and North Africa, 1990, p . 125. 
17. I b id . , p . 125. 
18. The Mi l i t a ry Balance 198::-83, IISS, London, 
19. The Mi l i t a ry Balance 1989-90, pp. 99, lOl , 111, I I sS , 
London, 
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F r a n c e and B r i t a i n w i t h L i b y a , I r a q , and S a u d i A r a b i a 
r e s p e c t i v e l y i n 1 9 7 3 - 7 4 , t h e l a t t e r o n e s i n s u b s e q u e n t , OPEC 
sununit announced t h a t "5% c u t f o r Dec . would n o t be a p p l i e d . 
20 t o European arms s u p p l i e s " . R i g h t from t h e Doha c o n f e r e n c e 
i n 1976 t o t h a t of 1 9 8 8 , S a u d i A r a b i a h a s a l w a y s t r i e d t o 
21 
r e d u c e t h e o i l p r i c e . In r e t u r n , i t h a s been r e w a r d e d 
w i t h mos t a d v a n c e d , weaponry by t h e Wes te rn o i l c o n s u m e r s . 
The b e l l i g e r e n t s of I r a n - I r a q war a l s o f o l l o w e d Saud i 
e x a m p l e . Fo r i n s t a n c e , I r a n i n 198 i a t t h e moment of d i r e 
n e e d s of arms s e t t h e p r i c e of i t s o i l $ 4 be low t h e OPSC's 
o f f i c i a l p r i c e and $ 7 below t h e p r i c e i t had been s e l l i n g 
22 two y e a r s a g o . I r a n ' o i l * p r o d u c t i o n a l s o c l i m b e d t o 
2 MBD (above t h e c e i l i n g s e t u n d e r March 198 2 ag reemen t ) 
23 d u r i n g t h e second q u a r t e r of 1 9 8 2 . 
I n t e r n a l , e x t e r n a l , and r e g i o n a l t h r e a t s t o e a c h of 
t h e o i l p r o d u c i n g s t a t e s , n e c e s s i t a t e d arms and o i l l i n k a g e s 
i n West A s i a . I r a n , I r a q and S a u d i A r a b i a d u r i n g 70® wen t 
f o r arms p r o c u r e m e n t f e a r i n g one a n o t h e r , I r a n - I r a q war 
2 0 . Hanks, R o b e r t J , "Oi l and S e c u r i t y i n U . S . P o l i c y 
Towards t h e A r b i a n Gulf ; I n d i a n Ocean a r e a " i n M a j i d , 
F a r i d , Abdel ( e d . ) t O i l and S e c u r i t y i n t h e A r b i a n Gul f , 
Groom Helm, London, E n g l a n d , 1 9 8 1 , p . 5 5 . 
2 1 . Chhabra , H a r i Sha ran i " O i l P r i c e War : On Way t h e 
S e l f s u f f i c i e n c y w o r l d F o c u s , v o l , 1 0 , N o . 5 , May 1 9 8 9 , 
p . 1 8 . 
2 2 . B r i s s a n d A l b e r t , D i s t l e n C a t h e r i n e and Salame G h a s s a n e , 
N. 15 , P . 4 5 . 
2 3 . I b i d . , p . 4 5 . 
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during 80 ' s channelled more and more p e t r o d o l l a r s towards 
24 arms purchase. smaller Gulf s t a t e s g r e a t l y increased 
t h e i r defence expenditure during t h i s pe r iod . In 1985 
defence ejqpendituresof Kuwait, Bahrin and Qatar were 
25 $ 1.1b, $1.35b and $ 59.5m re spec t ive ly . These went up 
by $l ,55b and $184.574m and $1.542b (1987) r e spec t ive ly 
in 1989.^^ 
Oil income created a l o t of d i scontent , r e fue l l ing 
i n t e r n a l r e b e l l i o n s from r a d i c a l , fundamentalist and 
s e p a r a t i s t f o r c e s . Pe t rodo l l a r s have been spent a t a l a r g e ' 
scale t o deal with these problems for twin purpose of keeping 
the army loya l t o the ex i s t i ng governments and increas ing 
i t s capaci ty to counter armed r ebe l l i ons as w e l l . 
Threat frcsn soviet Union i . e . "acquir ing p o l i t i c a l -
97 
m i l i t a r y control of the o i l d i r e c t l y or through proxies" , 
shapes West A s i a ' s arms and o i l policy*Saudi Arab ia ' s arms 
purchase po l i cy cen t e r s . round t h i s t h r e a t . 
24. Arabia Sept. 1984, P. 16 Cited in Sharabi Hisham (ed.) 
The Next Arab Decade, Al te rna t ive Futures Westvlew 
Press , Boulder, Colorodo, USA, 1988, p . 73 , 
25. The Mi l i t a ry Balance, 1981-82, pp. 49,53,56. 
26. The Mi l i t a ry Balance 1987-88, pp. 96-97, 104, 111. 
27. New York Times, April 1984, p . 39. 
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I t b o u g h t weapons l i k e F - 1 5 , F-16 and T r o n o d o a i r -
c r a f t s m a i n l y t o r e n d e r unmatched 54-27 and M l 4 - 2 9 , g i v e n 
2S by USSR t o I t s c l i e n t s i n t h e r e g i o n , 
US P o l i c y and S t r a t e g y of Arms and O i l t 
Arms i n e x c h a n g e of o i l have been t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
p u r s u e a p r o - I s r a e l i p o l i c y w i t h o u t Arab o p p o s i t i o n , USA's 
a rms t r a n s f e r s t o t h e Arabs have f u l f i l l e d t h e i r d e s i r e t o 
m a t c h I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p l a n d had a s a r e s u l t , 
p a c i f i e d Arab -Amer i can c l a s h of I n t e r e s t s on t h e i s s u e of 
l a t t e r ' s u n e i j u i v o c a l s u p p o r t of and commitment t o t h e 
e x i s t e n c e and e x p a n s i o n of I s r a e l . I s r a e l i s a l s o an 
i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f UsA ' s arms and o i l p o l i c y . F o r i t i s t h e 
mos t r e l i a b l e f r i e n d of t h e Us i n t h e r e g i o n t o cop>e w i t h 
any a n t i - U S s i t u a t i o n i n West A s i a . 
O i l embargo was t h e r e s u l t of g r o w i n g p o l i t i c a l 
d i s e n c h a n t m e n t of Arab Gulf s t a t e s w i t h USA, a s s a y s , 
Rl-Hon Tory Benn, ••the o i l embargo o f 1 9 7 3 . . , . was a p o l i t i c a l 
a c t , , . , n o t much t o do w i t h demand and s u p p l y " . T h e r e f o r e , 
artr.s t r a n s f e r p o l i c y of UsA h a s aimed a t m a i n t a i n i n g and 
t r e n g t h e n i n g p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n w i t h o i l p r o d u c i n g s t a t e s . s 
2 8 . cordsman, Antony H, N. 2 , p . 9 0 . 
2 9 . Macnaugher , Thomas L . N, 4 . 
3 0 . Al-Sowayegh Abdul A z i z . Arab P e t r o - p o l i t i c s # C r o o m Helm, 
Ken t , E n g l a n d , 1984, p . 1 6 2 . 
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USA h a s t r i e d t o r e t a i n t h e s t a t u s quo of p r e s e n t p o x e r 
s t r u c t u r e of c o n t e m p o r a r y g o v e r n m e n t s i n t h e r e g i o n and 
t o cement i t s r e l a t i o n w i t h them i n o r d e r t o k e e p 
West A s i a fic«e from "Khomein ies o r Q a d d a f i e s " . "^ ^ T h i s 
p o l i c y h a s p a i d o f f t o USA. Gulf s t a t e s h a v e c o n t i n u e d 
s u p p l y i n g o i l t o USA. and i t s a l l i e s w i t h due c a r e t o W e s t ' s 
32 
e c o n o m i c h e a l t h . For e x a m p l e , I r a n ' s o i l embargo on USA 
a f t e r t h e r e v o l u t i o n ^ w a s compensa t ed by t h e o t h e r Gulf 
33 
s t a t e s t h r o u g h e x t r a - s u p p l i e s t o USA. 
USA and t h e West have l i n k e d t h e i r a rms p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
p o l i c y t o i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n and low p r i c e . The West 
European c o u n t r i e s h a v e u s e d t h i s p o l i c y t o t h e g r e a t e r 
a d v a n t a g e . T h e y s u c c e s s f u l l y r e v e r t e d t h e o i l e m b a r g o of 
1 9 7 3 , u s i n g t h i s method and d i d i t a g a i n d u r i n g t h e t i m e of 
2nd, o i l shock by p e r s u a d i n g Sa^d l A r a b i a t o i n c r e a s e i t s 
34 p r o d u c t i o n by 10 mbd. The p e r i o d be tween 1980 t o 198 5 
i s t h e one i n w h i c h Saudi A r a b i a i m p o r t e d most of i t s 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d a rms and a l s o f o l l o w e d i t s o v e r - p r o d u c t i o n 
minimum p r i c e mos t l i b e r a l l y . 
3 1 . F i e l d , M i c h e a l x • • B r i t a i n , t h e EEC and t h e Midd le East^* 
i n Maj id F a r i d Abdel ( e d . ) t O i l and S e c u r i t y i n t h e 
Arb ian Gu l f , Groom,Helm,London, l 9 8 i , p . 1 0 3 . 
3 2 . I b i d . , 1 0 3 . 
3 3 . A n d r e a r y a n N. Ruben IfOil and S o v i e t P o l i c y i n t h e A r a b i a n 
Gulf J I n d i a n Ocean a r e a " i n M a j i d , F a r i d A b d e l ( e d . ) : 
O i l and S e c u r i t y i n t h e A r a b i a n Gulf , Croom Helm, London , 
E n g l a n d , 1 9 8 1 , p . 6 0 . 
3 4 . Cordsman, Anthony H. »N.2 , p . 30 . 
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Soviet t h r e a t i s the key of Us* arms and o i l po l icy . 
The arms t r ans fe r red to the loca l a l l i e s of the region, 
strengthened t h e i r capab i l i ty to meet Soviet challenge so 
long as US forces do not a r r i v e for ass i s tance or to f ight a 
d i r e c t war. They also serve as a deterrent to Soviet 
m i l i t a ry th inking and future p l a n s . Us arm supply to the 
Shah during the 70•s was pr imar i ly directed towards t h i s 
s t ra tegy .35 
Since most of the arms (as sophis t ica ted as possessed 
by the USSR> procured by West Asian countr ies can not be 
handled by the loca l forces, they , in fac t , have been 
i n s t a l l e d a t the West Asian bases to be used by the US 
m i l i t a r y personnels in case of a soviet a t t ack . Transfer 
of a large nvimber of personnels and ejQserts in t h i s region 
i s , therefore , an added advantage. And arms t r a n s f e r and 
i t s deployment at s t r a t e g i c a l l y important bases , ensure 
the base f a c i l i t y , v i t a l to us s t r a t egy in r e l a t i o n t o 
the reg ion ' s proximity with sovie t Union, 
An important objective of USA's arms and o i l pol icy 
i s to make " f r iends" and w i n " f a c i l i t i e s " , p a r t i c u l a r l y to 
p ro tec t the supply of oi l e s p e c i a l l y from sovie t a t t ack . 
35. Asopa, Sheel K. t Oil Arms and Islam in the Gulf, 
Pr intwel l Publ ishers , J a ipur , Ind ia , 1986, p . 102. 
36. Muttam J o h n , N. 9 , p p . 16 2-16 3 . 
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Arm t r a n s f e r s h e l p e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n g e t t i n g t h e 
a p p r o v a l of t h e p r e s e n c e of Us f l e e t i n t h e a r e a and 
p r o v i s i o n o f m i l i t a r y b a s e s from the l o c a l p o w e r s . Arms 
s u p p l y h a s a l s o meant " c o n c e n t r a t i o n of m i l i t a r y equ ipmen t 
1.37 
a t b a s e s f o r t h e i r s u b s e q u e n t u t i l i z a t i o n . . . " For e x a m p l e , 
a f t e r I r a q ' s t h r e a t t o c a p t u r e S a u d i A r a b i a t h e l a t t e r 
h a s g r a n t e d USA r i g h t t o u s e Dahran a i r b a s e and o t h e r 
b a s e s wh ich a r e equipped w i t h weapons more a p p r o p r i a t e f o r 
38 US f o r c e s t h a n t h o s e of Saud i A r a b i a . V a r i o u s a i r c r a f t s 
i n Saudi A r a b i a ' s inventoary# l i k e F-15 and F-15E a r e common. 
39 
t o USCENTCOM a l s o . S i m i l a r l y , t h e whole u s m i l i t a r y 
p r e s e n c e i n West As i a i s i n t e g r a t e d t o AWACS and r a d a r 
40 
equ ipped a i r c r a f t s , s e n t t o S a u d i A r a b i a by t h e USA. 
41 I m p o r t a n c e of o i l — " t h e s t r a t e g i c m i n e r a l " - ^ and Us 
42 
" v u l n e r a b i l i t y * t o i t ^ i s t h e R a i s o n *d' e t r e of Us arms 
and o i l p o l i c y . The r e q u i r e m e n t of c o n t i n u o u s s u p p l y of o i l 
from t h e Gulf h i g h t e n e d t h e n e e d of an i n t e n s i v e and 
u n v i o l a b l e i n t e r - d e p e n d a n t t r a d e r e l a t i o n s . Arms t o which 
3 7 . Macnaughe r , Thomas L . N.4 p p . 1 6 2 - 1 6 3 . 
3 8 . A n d r e a r y a n N. Ruben, N. 3 3 , p . 6 3 . 
3 9 . Macnaughe r , Thomas L. N. 4 p . 6 4 . 
4 0 . Mttttam, J o h n . N . 9 , p . j 6 2 . 
4 1 . T h i s t e rm ' was f i r s t of a l l u s e d by D a v i d , G. H a g l i u n d 
i n " S t r a t e g i c M i n e r a l s ^ A C o n c e p t u a l A n a l y s i s " . R e s o u r c e 
P o l i c y , S e p t . 1 9 8 1 , p p . 1 4 6 - 1 5 2 . 
4 2 . Hag lund , Dav id G. : "O i l a s a F a c t o r i n u n i t e d S t a t e s 
P o l i c y t o w a r d s the Midd le E a s t " , i n , M a r a n t z , P a u l and 
S t e i n b e r g , Belma ( e d s . ) i s u p e r p o w e r i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e 
Midd le E a s t , Westview P r e s s , B o u l d e r , G o l o r o d o , USA, 
1985 , p . 180 
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West As i a was a s v u l n e r a b l e a s t h e West on o i l , w e r e t h e 
m o s t e f f e c t i v e means i n the hand of usA t o m a t e r i a l i z e 
t h i s o b j e c t i v e . Even c a r t - ^ r ' s p o l i c y of "arms r e s t r a i n t * * 
c o u l d n o t weaken a rms and o i l r e l a t i o n s h i p . E v e r - i n c r e a s i n g 
d e p e n d e n c e on o i l d u r i n g C a r t e r ' s t e n u r e c o n t i n u e d t h e 
f low of a r m s . 
43 in 1977 US a c q u i r e d a s much a s 36% of I t s i m p o r t s 
of o i l from t h e Midd le E a s t wh ich r o s e t o 47% i n 1980'^^ 
t h e l a s t y e a r of C a r t e r ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . However , d e c r e a s e 
in u s d e p e n d e n c e on o i l h a s n o t harmed arms and o i l l i n k a g e . 
US a v a i l e d o n l y 8% of i t s t o t a l i m p o r t r e q u i r e m e n t from 
45 M i d d l e E a s t i n 1983 and i n t h e same y e a r Reagan gave arms 
t o Saud i A r a b i a and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s l l m i t l e s s l y , m a i n l y 
b e c a u s e of o i l ; t h e s e c u r i t y of o i l i n t a k e . 
SO more t h a n t h e d e p e n d e n c y upon t h e M i d d l e E a s t o i l , 
i t s s e c u r i t y c o n s t i t u t e s . the K e r n e l of Us arms and o i l 
p o l i c y . Us i m p o r t s N i c k l e from Canada more t h a n i t i m p o r t s 
o i l from West A s i a , b u t c o n s i d e r s t h e f o r m e r " e q u i v a l e n t 
46 47 
t o d o m e s t i c r e s o u r c e s " due t o t he s e c u r i t y of i t s s u p p l y . 
4 3 . Monthly E n e r g y Review, D e c . 1 9 8 3 , p p . 3 6 - 3 7 . 
4 4 . Al-Sowayegh Abdul A z i z . N. 3 0 , p . 1 7 1 . 
4 5 . Month E n e r g y Review, Dec . 1 9 8 3 , p p . 3 2 - 3 5 , 3 8 - 3 9 . 
4 6 . B e i g i e C a r l E . and ( J r . ) Hero A l f r e d o ( e d s . ) i P a t t e r n 
and T r e n d s i n Resou rce s u p p l i e s and P o l i c i e s , Wes tv iew 
P r e s s , B o u l d e r , C o l o r o d o , USA, 1980 , p p . 4 5 - 9 2 . 
4 7 . Hag lund , D a v i d , G. , N. 42 , p . 1 8 2 . 
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Arms a r e t h e means t o p r o t e c t t h e o i l p r o d u c i n g s t a t e s 
from i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l d a n g e r s t o e n a b l e them t o 
t r a n s f e r t h e o i l u n d i s r u p t e d l y and p e a c e f u l l y . P r o t e c t i o n 
of o i l s u p p l y by t h e r e g i o n a l p o w e r s t h e m s e l v e s , w a s t h e 
48 
r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d N i x o n ' s *two p i l l a r s p o l i c y " . I r a n and 
Saud i A r a b i a r e c e i v e d most of t h e i r a rms from USA n o t 
m e r e l y a s t h e m a j o r s u p p l i e r s of o i l b u t a s t h e " p o l i c e m e n " , 
p r o t e c t i n g t h e o i l s u p p l y of t h e whole a r e a . S i n c e t h e 
b e g i n n i n g of I r a n - I r a q war , USA h a s p r o v i d e d a d v a n c e d arms 
t o t h e s m a l l e r o i l - r i c h s t a t e s of t h e Gulf , f o r t h e s e c u r i t y 
49 
of t h e i r o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s and t a n k e r s from I r a n i a n a t t a c k . 
D e s p i t e t h e d e c l i n i n g of Midd le E a s t o i l i m p o r t s i n 1 9 8 0 ' s 
USA f o r t h e s a k e of t h e S e c u r i r y of i t s s u p p l y h a s been 
c o n t i n u o u s l y p u r s u i n g arms and o i l p o l i c y a s v i g o r o u s l y 
a s e v e r . H e r e i n l i e s the c e n t e r a l i t y of t h e s e c u r i t y 
f a c t o r i n Us o i l and arms s t r a t e g y . 
Avo idance of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of any f u r t h e r o i l 
embargo h a s been the p r i m a r y g o a l of US arms and o i l 
p o l i c y . For i t i s s t i l l h e l d t h a t t h e n e x t o i l embargo 
w i l l be a s d e v a s t a t i n g a s was t h a t of 1973 , ( w h e r e a s many 
4 8 . H u s s a i n , S i r r e ^ e h i U . S . P o l i c y in t h e Gulf 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 7 j 
A f t e r m a t h of B r i t i s h W i t h d r a w l i I t c h a P r e s s , London, 
E n g l a n d , 1984 , p p . 1 4 4 - 1 4 5 , 
4 9 . Macnaughe r , Thomas L, N , 4 , p p . 1 6 6 - 1 7 0 , 1 7 1 . 
5 0 . Asopa S h e e l K. N. 35 , p p . 1 4 1 - 1 4 5 . 
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ana lys ts do not agree with t h i s contention) , These (arms) 
have turned Saudi Arabia — the most p o t e n t i a l power 
to impose o i l embargo — and other s t a t e s t o t a l l y 
dependant upon USA for regular arms inflow, thereby^ 
making themselves the vict im of embargo as I t w i l l Cer ta in ly 
blockade the supply of arms and food from the o i l 
importing coun t r i e s . 
Arms t r a n s f e r has been the source of o f f s e t t i n g 
the p r i c e - h i k e , since 1973 t i l l the " o i l - g l u t " , arms 
t r a n s f e r s bes ides bringing down the p r i ce s a l so aimed at 
redress ing the balance of payment and recyc l ing ^>etro--
d o l l a r . Sale of sophis t ica ted weapons in l a r g e quan t i ty 
increased monetcary value of arms sa l e s deals in the 
region which due to t h i s reason had come to acquire the 
currency of "arms s e l l e r ' s market". I t was mainly due 
to the p r i ce -h ike , t he r e began tough competitions between 
West European suppl iers and USA, 
US-Iran and Us-Saudi Arabia suppl ier c l i e n t r e l a t i o n -
ship , which had s ta r ted in 1970-71 at low l e v e l , increased 
52 abruptly as the p r i ces quadrupled , and went on r i s i n g 
afterwards, 
5 1 . Muttam, J o h n . N, 9 , p , 5 5 . 
52. The M i l i t a r y Balance 1974-75, pp. 31-40. 
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The value of major weapons exported by the United 
s t a t e s t o Saudi Ar^ibia were $154 m In 1973. I t reached 
$244 m in 1974, went by $1053 m 1978 and f i n a l l y turned 
out to be $ 1997 m in 1982. The corresponding f igures 
of Iran were $659 in (1973) $ 744m (l974) , $ 1218 m 
(1978) and $ 1837 in ( i982) .^^ 
Inef fedt iveness of m i l i t a r y presence in comparison 
t o arms supply and imprac t i cab i l i t y of the d i r e c t control 
over o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s (the theory was propogated by 
Henery Kis s ine r , R.W, Tucker and l a t e r P res iden t Carter 
54 himself) compelled USA to prefer arm and o i l pol icy 
t o secure smooth and subs tan t ia l flow of cheap o i l from 
West Asia. 
Mi l i t a ry presence though useful in many r e spec t s 
i s very often detr imental to what i t aims to achieve i . e . 
the s ecu r i t y of the supply/ as the presence of US forces 
in west Asia has created domestic and i n t r a - r e g i o n a l 
i n s e c u r i t y . Moreover, US m i l i t a r y presence ins tead of 
de te r r ing USSR has invi ted i t in the region, inc reas ing , 
5 3. Brazoska, Micheal and Ohlson, Thomas : Arms Transfer 
t o the Third world 1971-85, Oxford Univers i ty Press , 
New York, USA, 1987, pp. 234-235. 
5 4 . Hag lund , David G. N. 42 , p p . 1 7 8 - 1 8 1 . 
55. Jabber, Paul , "US I n t e r e s t s and Regional s e c u r i t y 
in the Middle East", Daedalus, vo l . 109, P a l l 1980, 
p . 80. 
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e g 
t h e r e b y , USSR's c a p a b i l i t y t o s t r a n g u l a t e o i l supp ly . 
Most i m p o r t a n t l y , m e r e the m i l i t a r y p resence does no t 
se rve zs many o b j e c t i v e s a t a time as arm and o i l p o l i c y 
can . 
Se izure of o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s has been condemned 
as i m p r a c t i c a l . In nature ahd f u t i l e i n t h i n k i n g . An 
occupat ion of o i l i n s t a l l a t i o n s i s l i a b l e t o d i s r u p t 
the o i l supply t o the West much longer than taken-up by 
t h e o i l embargo of 1973 which had caused much s u f f e r i n g 
57 t o USA on economic and p o l i t i c a l f r o n t s . 
Oi l f i e l d s of West Asia a r e a l s o v u l n e r a b l e t o 
d e s t r u c t i o n , r e s u l t i n g i n t o t o t a l stoppage of o i l 
58 
supply t o USA and NATO a l l i e s f o r many months •. NATO 
59 
a l l i e s , would have no t coope ra t ed with UsA due t o 
t h e i r a l l - o u t dependence upon the West Asian o i l and 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o even s h o r t term i n t e r r u p t i o n . Us 
56 . K l i n g h o f f a r , Arthur J . t ••soviet Oi l P o l i c i e s and the 
Suez Canal*^, world Today, Oct . 1975, p . 404. 
57. Knorr, Ka lus , : "The L i m i t s of Economic and M i l i t a r y 
powers, Daedalus , Fa l l 1985, p . 234. 
58. Record, J e f f e r r e y , ••The RDF and Us M i l i t a r y I n t e r -
ven t ion in the Pers ian Gulf, Publ i shed by Cambridge 
Mass I n s t i t u t e for Fore ign A n a l y s i s , 1981 , p p . 2 9 - 3 2 , 
59. Hagluna, David, G. N. 42, p . 187. 
60 . Whig Standard (Kingston) c i t e d in , Maran tz , Paul 
and S t e i n b e r g , Belma ( e d s . , ) : superpower involvement 
in the Middle Eas t , Westview, P r e s s , Boulder , 
Colorodo, USA, 1984, p . 180. 
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m i l i t a r y ac t ion wi l l undoubtedly exacerbate wide scale 
ter ror ism before , during, and a f t e r the c o n t r o l , making 
te r ror i sm "as much a problem for occupying count r ies 
as i t i s . , . , for GCC rulers '* . The m i l i t a r y attempt 
t o occupy the Arab o i l f i e l d s may also r e s u l t in the 
6 ? 
capture of US c i v i l i a n s and personnels as hos tages . 
Both fa i lu re and success w i l l lead to USA*s complete 
d i s soc ia t ion from and loss of p o l i t i c a l influence over 
West Asian coun t r i es , the most s t r a t e g i c a l l y important 
na t ions . . 
Had the s t ra tegy of s e i z ing o i l f i e l d s been given 
a p r a c t i c a l shape, there would have begun a d i r e c t war 
between the superpowers. The repurcussions of t h i s war 
could be the shortage of supply, and p r ice -h ike imme-
d i a t e l y . And the r e s u l t in case of USSR's success in 
the war could have been the t o t a l stoppage of o i l drain 
to the USA. 
6 1 . Macnaagher, Thomas L. N.4, P i . 187-188. 
62. I b i d . , p . 195, 
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West Europe's Pol icy and St ra tegy of Arms and Oil t 
Much more than UsA* West European count r ies happen 
to be dependant upon supply and pr ice of West Asian 
o i l as the following statement of Fried Edward succinct ly 
r e f l e c t s , 
"Since 1973 OECD economic growth averaged 
half as much as during the proceeding 
decades* inf la t ion doubled and unemployment 
. . . . a l so doubled, "6 3 
Thus, desp i t e opposition from USA and the t o t a l 
64 disregard of Us decision to boycott Arab o i l — when 
the o i l embargo was underway, — the West European 
countr ies switched ovarr to "arms for o i l " dea l s to end 
the o i l embargo. At the end of Jan. 1974,France signed 
the deal t o buy 800 mil l ion tonnes of Saudi Arabian o i l 
over a period of twenty years in exchange of t r ans fe r 
of Mirage f i gh t e r planes , SAM armoured veh ic les » 
and other heavy weapons. France signed trade and arms 
deals with I ran and Iraq a l s o . Great Br i ta in in the same 
63. Fried, Edward ; Preparing for the Next Oil Shock, 
p . 9. 
64. Robert, Lieber , J , » Oil and the Middle East War j 
Europe in the Energy C r i s i s , published by Center for 
In t e rna t i ona l Affairs, Havard Univers i ty , USA, pp.32-36. 
65. The Guardian (London) Jan. 12, 1974. 
66. In t e rna t iona l defence Review, Feb. 1974. p . 19, and 
SIPRI Year Book, 1975, p . 200 
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year a l s o e n t e r e d in arms f o r o i l d e a l s w i th many 
67 Gulf c o u n t r i e s . 
Since 1980^West European c o u n t r i e s began r educ ing 
t h e i r impor t from Middle E a s t , but , y e t , r e m a i n e d h i g h l y 
dependent , almost 50% t o 40% of t h e i r t o t a l import needs , 
upon Middle E a s t , T h t t s ^ i r r e s p e c t i v e of the amount of 
o i l ( imported by t h e West European s t a t e s , arms and o i l 
p o l i c y has n o t been s u b j e c t to d e c l i n e . 
West European p o l i c y of arms and o i l has been 
g e n e r a l l y ' s tuck t o t h e b a r t e r dea l of "arms for o i l " . 
However, t h i s p o l i c y has a l s o been concerned wi th t h e 
s e c u r i t y of o i l supply and o i l p roducing s t a t e s , t o 
a l i m i t e d e x t e n t . For example , F r a n c e ' s and B r i t a i n ' s 
arms t r a n s f e r t o I raq du r ing the war meant f o r i t s 
s e c u r i t y and proved c a t a l y s t in enhancing i t s defence 
c a p a b i l i t y and l a t e r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the v i c t o r y over 
I r a n . 
B r i t a i n has a l s o used arm fo r p o l i t i c a l l e v e r a g e 
in small Gulf s t a t e s which were i t s c o l o n i e s and where 
a l a r g e number of i t s m i l i t a r y e x p o r t s and p e r s o n n e l s 
a r e s t i l l s t a t i o n e d . 
67. Robert L i ebe r , J , N. 64 , p p . 32-34. 
6 8 . Newsom, David D. x"America Engulfed" Fore ign P o l i c y , 
No. 43 , summer 198l, p . 25 . 
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Recycling of p e t r o d o l l a r s , appropria t ing the 
balance of payment and c lose economic t i e s with 
west Asian countries^are a l so the features of West 
European arms and o i l p o l i c y . 
Effects of Arms and Ojl Linkage : 
Effects of arms and o i l linkage have been both 
advantageous andr harmful t o the t r a d e r s . However, a 
dd ta i led ana lys i s brings t o knowledge tha t the l inkage 
had served the i n t e r e s t s of the suppl ie r 
of arms more than that of o i l . The benef i ts achieved by 
the l a t t e r are a few and far in between. 
Effects of Arms and Oil Linkage i The West Asia 
The West Asian countr ies have mis-spent t h e i r o i l 
wealth on over-armaments a t the cost of development. 
Huge a l loca t ion of GDP and GNP on defence expendi ture , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y on arms purchase, c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s the 
deviat ion from the development in west Asia. Oil revenue 
has been squandered to buy i r r e l e v a n t weapons which could, 
otherwise, be a l located to f ru i t fu l econom.ic development. 
The cost of s t a t ion ing and maintenance of foreign per -
sonnels i s t h e ex t ra and heavy burden on VJest Asian 
69, Saiygh yusif A. : "Oil in Arab Development and P o l i t i c a l 
Stra tegy i An Arab view in John Duke Anthoney (ed.) x 
The Middle EastjOil , P o l i t i c s and Development, 
publ ished by American Enterpr i se for Publ ic Policy 
Research, Washington, D . c , 1975, p . 40, 
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coun t r i e s . Likewise, spendings on arms have more often 
than not re ta rded , slowed down and in t e r rup ted the 
developmental process in west Asia. This phenomenon 
i s r i g h t l y summed up by-Edith Penrose j 
"Very large flows of o i l revenue i^hich 
smoottens-the road towards development 
in some respec ts but make i t much, 
rougher in o the r s ; in p a r t i c u l a r , the 
revenues w i l l themselves create p i t f a l l s 
and potholes which may setiotJsly r e t a r d 
genuine development'=,/0 
The c a p a b i l i t y o i l revenue has given to buy western arms 
and other i t ems , has led to over re l iance on oil-economy 
in t o t a l negligence to the p o s t - o i l economy. If o i l 
consuming s t a t e s succeed to achieve t h e i r goal to meet 
the energy requirements from domestic sources then West 
Asian economy in the absence of non o i l economy ahal l 
71 c e r t a i n l y co l l apse . 
West Asian count r ies , acaustomed to high expenditure 
72 on arms purchase , have desp i te the d4windling resources 
continued buying arms by i n i t i a t i n g d r a s t i c cu t , in the 
70, Penrose, Edith ;"After ward t Oil Revenues - Hopes 
and Caveats in John Duke Antbon;^ (eds.) tThe Middle 
East } O i l , Poji i t ics and Development, publ ished by 
American Enterpr ise for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, D.C. 1975, p . 99, 
71 , Al-sowayegh, Abdul Aziz, N,l p . 32, 
72, Jaidah, A l i . j^Oi l Production Po l i c i e s in the 
Gulf S ta tes* Energy Forum, vo l . 1, 1983,p •, 54, 
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developmenta l p r o j e c t s . While o i l revenue i n d i c a t i n g 
a descending curve f o r f u t u r e ^ i t i s l i k e l y t h a t s o c i a l 
development w i l l cont inue t o su f f e r in t h e y e a r s t o come. 
Arms and o i l l i n k a g e has not only n e u t r a l i z e d 
the o i l power of West Asian c o u n t r i e s bu t a l s o turrjed 
them as power dependent upon and i n t e g r a t e d t o the West, 
Emite A, Nakhaleh r i g h t l y conc ludes t h i s phenomenon as^ 
"a l though t h e y have sovere ign dependent s t a t e s * a l though 
they have t h e i r g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s , a l though In o i l 
they p o s s e s s a formidable w e a p o n , . , , the Gulf s t a t e s 
73 
remain s u b j e c t t o the p o l i c i e s of the superpowers" . 
F i r s t l y , t h e i r dependence upon Western arm s u p p l i e r s has 
curbed t h e i r p o l i c i e s t o p l a y one superpower a g a i n s t 
74 the o t h e r . Secondly, dependence upon r e g u l a r arms 
in f low has dragged them in the cold war p o l i t i c s a s t h e 
v i r t u a l a l l i e s of USA, so f a r t hey have been o n l y able 
t o save t h e i r freedom wi th r ega rd t o t h e c h o i c e of 
75 sources of supply t o a l i m i t e d extent . , and d e c i s i o n 
7 3 , Nakhaleh, Emile A, N,7 , p . 29. 
74, Macnaugher Thomas L. N . 4 , p . 184. 
75 , J a b b e r , Paul : " P e t r o d o l l a r s Arms Trade and the 
P a t t e r n of Major C o n f l i c t " i n Hurewitz , J .C .Ced . ) 
O i l , t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i Dispute and the I n d u s t r i a l 
wor ld , Westview P r e s s , Boulder, Colorodo, Washington, 
D.C. 1976, p . 163. 
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76 
of granting bases and f a c i l i t i e s . F ina l ly , USA'fe-
"favourable to Israel**, Arab- I s rae l i pol icy exemplif ies 
more than anything the dependence of o i l - r i c h s t a t e s 
"7 
upon the United S t a t e s . USA has enjoyed" spec ia l 
r e l a t i onsh ip" with I s r ae l and has regarded i t as i t s 
7 8 No, 1 commitment in the Middle E a s t . ; , , , ? , . Even the 
peace i n i t i a t i v e s in response to Arab o i l p ressures 
also smack of p r o - I s r a e l i bias* 
Arms and o i l r e l a t i o n s h i p has dulled the edge of 
o i l weapon. Over production and low-price of o i l and 
dependence upon the Us for secu r i ty weakened economic 
79 force of o i l weapon. On p o l i t i c a l s ide , arms inflow 
in the region has separated Arabs p o l i t i c s from o i l . The 
i.ebnon war and the In t i f adeh , the i ssues as grave as the 
October war, fa i led t o persuadethe Arab s t a t e s t o reimpose 
80 
o i l embargo, USA's veto t o send UN member to review 
^^» Defeifce Science Monitor. Cited in Nakhaleh, Emile A, 
Arab-American Relat ions in the Persian Gulf; Foreign 
Affairs Study Se r i e s , No. 17, Washington, D.C. USA, 
1975, p . 108. 
77. Ali , Sheikh R. j Oil and Power ; P o l i t i c a l Dynamics 
in the Middle East , P r i n t e r Pub l i shers , London, 
England, 1987, p . 131. 
78, "The Middle East » Us Pol icy , I s r a e l , 
Oil and the Arabs'* Congressional Quar ter ly , p , 35. 
79. "The US H i l i t a r y in Saudi Arabia", 
Defence Science Monitor, reproduced in S t r a t eg i c 
Biqest , Oct, 1981, p , 828. 
80. Itayim, Paud, "Strength and Weakness of the OH Weapon 
in the Middle East and the In t e rna t iona l System", p , l . 
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the s i tua t ion in occupied t e r r i t o r i e s in the Secur i ty 
Council desp i te Arab opposit ion to recent I s r a e l i 
s ta te terror ism in P a l e s t i n e , c l e a r l y s t a t e s US 
negligence t o Arab alJtitude towards the Pa l e s t i n i an 
p roblem. 
Arms inflow in west Asia t i ed i t s r e c i p i e n t s to the 
West t o an extent t ha t now o i l embargo can not be even 
81 
re imposed. Famoufts Arab j o u r n a l i s t Haikal a f t e r one 
year of 1973 war expressed the views that o i l embargo 
would not be used in case of renewed round of Arab-
82 I s r a e l i f i gh t i ngs . Dominating Saudi Arab p o l i t i c a l l y 
and economically, USA has d i ssoc ia ted i t from any future 
o i l embargo which without saudi Arabia can not be imposed 
or w i l l prove ineffect ive i f applied. Fa i lu re of I ranian 
o i l embargo in 1980 bears testimoney t o t h i s f a c t . 
Assurance of o i l supply has t ransfer red the power of o i l 
embargo to o i l consuming s t a t e s / as France, UsA and Japan 
exhibited t h i s power by e x e r t i n g the o i l embargo on Iran 
8 "i during Iran»Iraq war. Recently, Iraq i s the victim of 
o i l and arms embairgo by the West, Thus supplying arms 
81 . chhabra Hari Sharan, N.23, p . 19. 
82. Haikal quoted in News Week 27 January and 10 March,1975. 
83. The Middle East and Noith Africa 1990, Curopa Pub l i -
cation Ltd, 36th add i t ion , 1989, London, England, 
p . 125. 
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to the major i ty of the members of OAEEC/ U SA has 
mul t i f led the j o i n t a b i l i t y of OAPEC to impose the 
embargo. 
Oil and arms deal has not t r ans la t ed i n to secur i ty 
as far as o i l producing s t a t e s are concerned. Saudi 
Arabia/ the b igges t producer and the s t ronges t power 
can not deal even with the low leve l or medium level 
85 t h r e a t . Needless to c i t e Saudi Arabia 's inef f icacy 
to meet the I r a q i th rea t , on i t s own. In fac t , none of 
the o i l producing s t a t e s have the meaningful capab i l i t y 
to cope with an I s r a e l i , I r a q i or sovie t t h r e a t . During 
the 70 's a l l Gulf s t a t e s including Iraq were subject to 
in secur i ty a r i s i n g out of I r a n ' s m i l i t a r y might. Nowadays 
Iraq pOses same th rea t on them. Arms,on con t ra ry , as a 
matter of f ac t , have been the important fac to r of i n t e r n a l , 
external and regional i n secu r i t y , US arms and personnels in 
the Shah's I ran underlay h i s ous te r . Existence of foreign 
personnels in Saudi Arabia and presence of Us MEDEASTFOR in 
Bahrain are the causes of domestic dissension in these countroes. 
8 4 , Macnaugher , Thomas L. N, 4, p , 184 , 
8 5 , Cordsman, Anthony, H , , N. 2 , P , 1 9 , 
8 6 , M a c n a u g h t e r , Thomas L . , N. 4 , p . 1 0 1 , 
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Arms dur ing 1970*s s t i r r e d r e g i o n a l t h r e a t and u l t i m a t l y 
wi th the b e g i n n i n g of 1980 ' s I r a n - I r a q war s t a r t e d which 
could c o n t i n u e t o ' t h e next n ine y e a r s because t h e both 
b e l l i g e r e n t s were always adequa t e ly armed t o s u s t a i n 
t h e war. The end of the Gulf war d id n o t l e s s e n the 
v o l a t i l i t y of t h e r eg iona l s i t u a t i o n i n West Asia as old 
r i v a l r i e s r e s u r f a c e d . I r a q i aggress ion of Kuwait being 
t h e f i r s t such c a s e . 
S f f e c t s of Arms and Oil : The West 
USA and t h e West have followed arms and o i l p o l i c y 
wi th success but no t witJiout s e tbacks a l s o . The I r a n i a n 
r e v o l u t i o n b rough t i n t o focus the coun te r p r o d u c t i v i t y 
of arms supply v i s - a - v i s o i l supp ly . Likewise i n t e r n a l 
upheave l s in SaUdi Arabia and o the r Gulf s t a t e s , s h a l l 
l e a v e no doubt r e g a r d i n g the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of arms 
87 t r a n s f e r t o secure the o i l . 
On s u c c e s s s i d e , however arms and o i l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
has m a t e r i a l i z e d i n the achievement of b a s i c o b j e c t i v e 
t o import o i l "as much as p o s s i b l e , as cheap ly as 
88 • 
p o s s i b l e and f o r a s long as p o s s i b l e " . u s and t h e W e s t ' s 
87 , "The US M i l i t a r y i n Saudi Arabia* I n v e s t i n g I n s t a b i l i t y 
o r D i s a s t e r " i n Defence Science Moni to r , reporduced 
in s t r a t e g i c Diges t , Octoboer 1981, p , 817 , 
8 8 . Nakhaleh,Emite A. N,7 , p . 66, 
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Laissez Fair po l i cy of arms t r a n s f e r has ensured the 
s imilar response from the side of o i l suppl ies a l s o . 
The t r ans f e r of arms reduced the p r i ce of o i l during 
80 's while i t s s tab le and regu la r flow paved the way for 
s table and regu la r supply of o i l from the other s i de . 
Arms t r a n s f e r , the most important foreign poljcy 
too l ,has s t ab l i zed Us-Gulf r e l a t i o n s for a long fu ture , 
ensuring the o i l drain from west- Asia so long as the 
present monarchical setup continues to th r ive t h e r e . 
Arms have been successful ly used as "a device t o 
recycle the p e t r o d o l l a r s . . . , back t o the economy of the 
89 West in form of payment of arms and s e r v i c e s " . By 1984 
a l l West European s t a t e s and USA had favourable balance 
90 
o± trade with West Asia. Reduced import of o i l on 
low p r i ce since 1982 and export of arms in grea te r 
quant i ty and a t higher p r i c e , swelled USA's and West's 
balance of payment, immensely, while on reverse side 
some o i l producing s t a t e s , l i k e Iran and I raq , suf fe red 
91 trade d e f i c i t s . In other words arms have shi f ted 
89. Asopa, Sheel K. N, 35, p . l i i . 
90. Economist, Jan, 18, 1986. p . 59. 
91 . The Middle East and North Africa 1990, p .123 . 
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the ba lance of t r a d e in . favour of the West from 
92 t h e West A s i a . Oi l income of VJest Asian c o u n t r i e s has 
become l e s s of "income* and more of a • • l i q u i d a t i n g 
93 
capi tal**. 
To reap economic b e n e f i t s , France l i f t e d i t s seven 
year old arms embargo on f r o n t - l i n e c o u n t r i e s of the 
A r a b - I s r a e l i zone , The Us government adopted s p e c i a l 
measures t o promote arms s a l e s in West As i a . West A s i a ' s 
obsess ion w i t h s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons, much c o s t l i e r 
than those second-hand weapons, t r a n s f e r r e d before 1970 , 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o the balance of payment. For i n s t a n c e , the 
cos t of F-4 phantom a i r c r a f t s was $4 m in 1974 while the 
p r i c e of F-14 a i r c r a f t s which I r an and Saudi Arabia v 
94 bought a f t e r the o i l boon, was $20-25 m. Us so ld i t s 
arms wi th i n c r e a s e d p r i c e - t a g . The shah p a i d , "50% more 
95 for each of h i s F-14 p lanes than USA's navy d i d " . 
Oi l boom i n West Asia a l so gave new i e e s e of l i f e t o t h e 
ammunition i n d u s t r y of USA which had been l a y i n g 
96 s t a g n a n t s i n c e Vietnam war . Income from arms supply 
9 3 . Al-Sowayegh, Abdul Aziz , N . l , p . 32. 
94. J a b b e r , P u a l , N. 75. 
9 5 . The New York Times, 22 F e b . , 1973. 
96 . I b i d . 
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p u t in the hands of developed c o u n t r i e s l a r g e f i n a n c i a l 
sums which were used t o lend the c o u n t r i e s of t h i r d 
wor ld . According t o one e x p e r t , " r e c y c l i n g of p e t r o -
d o l l a r s . . . . i s the g e n e s i s of world d e b t c r i s i s and i t s 
97 i m p l i c a t i o n s — socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l " . 
The comprehensive d i s c u s s i o n t e s t i f i e s the 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t arms and o i l l i n k a g e can be n e i t h e r 
confined to b i l a t e r a l t rade of the two i t ems nor sub jec ted 
the demand and supply p a t t e r n of e i t h e r of the two 
commodit ies . Mutual f r i e n d l i n e s s , cc«nmon s e c u r i t y and 
s t a b l e supply a r e the b a s i c f e a t u r e s of arms and o i l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . And f l u c t u a t i n g demand-supp ly -p r i ce t r end 
in o i l and arms t r a d e has no t a f f e c t e d i t s s t a t i c 
c o n t i n u i t y . 
The r e s u l t of the arms and o i l l i n k a g e has 
been the s u f f i c i e n t flow of the each item t o i t s r e s p e c t i v e 
r e c i p i e n t , whereas i t s consequence has been p o s i t i v e 
t o the s u p p l i e r of arms and d e t e r i m e n t a l t o the s u p p l i e r 
of o i l . 
97 , Mehta B a l r a j , "Economics and P o l i t i c s » A Complicated 
i s s u e " , world Focus, v o l , 10, NO. 5, May 1989, p . 8 , 
CONCLUSION t AN ASSESSMENT 
In conclusion, i t may be said that t 
1) Arms prol i ferat ion in west Asia/ comprises of certain 
dist inguishing character is t ics , by-product of and inherent 
in the regional and international p o l i t i c s of the region, 
2) The U s e f u l n e s s of arms v i s - a - v i s the r e c i p i e n t ' s and 
t h e s u p p l i e r ' s i n t e r e s t s , i s l i m i t e d , temporary and 
d o u b t f u l . 
3) In f u t u r e , arms t r a n s f e r t o the r e g i o n p r o m i s e s an 
upward g r o w t h . 
As regards t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of arms p r o l i -
f e r a t i o n i n West A s i a , arms are the e x c l u s i v e i n s t r u m e n t of 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y of s u p p l i e r and c l i e n t towards e a c h o t h e r . 
A comparison of West As ia w i t h o t h e r r e g i o n s , i n t h i s c o n n e c -
t i o n , bears t e s t i m o n y t o t h i s f a c t . In Europe, t h e second 
l a r g e s t buyer of arms a f t e r West A s i a , arms are n e i t h e r 
e x c l u s i v e nor p r e - d o m i n « n t i n s t r u m e n t of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
I d e o l o g y i s the b a s i c in s t rument of USSR and E a s t Europian 
r e l a t i o n s a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r a c q u i r e s 7.5% of w o r l d ' s t o t a l 
arms i m p o r t s . No l e s s important i s i d e o l o g y i n West Europe — 
USA r e l a t i o n s . Trade and economic a i d , i n p r a c t i c e , have been 
more important i n s t r u m e n t s than the arms i n West A s i a . 
The nominal s h a r e o f A f r i c a , North America, L a t i n America , 
O c e a n i a ' s o u t h A s i a and E a s t A s i a , i n w o r l d ' s t o t a l arms 
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suppl ies / Ind ica tes non-exis tent ro le of Arms in the 
foreign p o l i c y of suppl ier and c l i e n t of each of these 
regions . Indeed* economic a id«ad i r ec t m i l i t a r y presence 
perform the function in these regions what arms do in West 
Asia. On the contrary, the r o l e of instruments ,other than 
arms#in West Asia and the superpowers r e l a t i o n s , has been 
neg l i g ib l e . Commercial t rade of west Asia with the West 
as well as the Eas t , i s more economic than p o l i t i c a l in 
na tu re . Trade s t a t i s t i c s a l so show t h a t b i l a t e r a l t rade 
i s not a bas ic instmment of foreign p o l i c y . The t o t a l 
shaire of commercial t rade of West Asia with West or East 
i s much low in comparison t o t h a t of arms t r a d e . 
Economic aid as an instrument of foreign po l icy i s 
only confined t o a few countr ies of the region, namely, 
I s r a e l , Egypt, Syria , Jordan, south Yamen and North Yemen, 
To add, in these countr ies economic aid i s the p a r t of arms 
t r a n s f e r . Some economically poor countr ies of the ar«a# 
l i k e Egypt, have received aid mainly t o buy arms and 
ammunition. 
Ideology, p a r t i c u l a r l y the communist ideology, hardly 
plays a major ro l e in r e l a t i on to the i n t e r e s t s of i t s 
ejqporter. In West Asia communism because of i t s non-Islamic 
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nature has not been welcomed. And those countries which 
have adopted s o c i a l i s t i c pattern^ gave i t an Arab and 
Islamic framework and rejected the Russian brand of socialism 
in their bid to be dissociated ideologica l ly from soviet 
Union, Therefore, pro-soviet nature of some of West Asian 
s tates , except souty Yemen, i s the result of arms trade 
with USSR and common ant i - imperia l i s t ic cnaracter rather 
than ideological af f in i ty . 
Pro-US s ta tes of the region have also been l e s s 
receptive to the Western ideology. Po l i t i ca l system of 
most of these s ta te s , does not bear resemblance at al l to 
the Western democraciesilSrael may be saved as a doubtful 
exception) , Despite growing Westanization in a l l f i e lds 
and fashioning a c a p i t a l i s t i c system of economy, Islam, 
than any other al ien ideology, prevai ls as the basic 
soc io -po l i t i ca l and economic force in West Asia, 
Oil , though a v i ta l factor of international p o l i t i c s 
in the region, as an instrument of foreign pol icy i s 
relevant to a particular group of suppliers and c l i e n t s , 
consisting of the Persian Gulf s ta tes and the Western 
countries only. 
Arms transfer's linkage to the geo-strategy of the 
region, i s also an interim feature of West Asian armament:. 
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Geogr^h ica l proximity with the Soviet Union, and 
con t igu i ty with NATO's southern Flank and c loseness with 
r e s t of the a l l i e s and US naval presence augment much of 
sov ie t and American supply r e spec t i ve ly . Access t o base 
and other s t r a t e g i c f a c i l i t i e s i s the common motive behind 
the suerpowers po l icy of arms t r a n s f e r . 
Change in weapons-technology, sh i f t ing g e o - s t r a t e g i e s 
and changing nature of cold war p o l i t i c s , have not delinked 
arms t r a n s f e r with the geo - s t r a t eg i e s of West Asia, as 
in the Europe. Development of long-ranged m i s s i l e s and 
a i r c r a f t s and AWACS only increased the importance of West 
Asia as the avenue of deep pene t ra t ion in to the wide 
landmass of USSR. Growing geo - s t r a t eg i c importance of the 
Indian Ocean compounded the v i a b i l i t y of West Asia because 
of i t s v i t a l loca t ion in the Ocean, when the disarmament 
of Europe i s much in a i r in the wake of new de ten te between 
the superpowers, nothing concrete has been decided by 
the superpowers, even in the l a t e s t summit on West Asian 
C r i s i s , with regard to the reduct ion of arms t r a n s f e r in 
bhe region . 
Although a general war i s ne i the r p re fe r red by 
nor poss ib le between the superpowers, but owing to the 
i n s t a b i l i t y of the region and superpower's, c o n f l i c t i n g 
s takes t h e r e . West Asia has always been regarded as a 
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batt le ground If, unfortunately, the war breaks out 
between the superpowers. Aims transfer, hence, in West 
Asia i s connected to the "general war** strategy a lso . I t 
i s undeniable that the p o s s i b i l i t y of general war, emanating 
out of the downfall of the shah, soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan and i t s threat to o i l supply, had caused the 
abrupt increase in the arms transfer to Saudi Arabia and 
other Persian Gulf states in l a t e 70^ and the early 80^. 
However, arms transfer has been more concerned with the 
avoidance of war than i t s incitement. USSR curtailed i t s 
arms supply to Egypt after 1973 war, for i t threatened to 
endanger the then developing detente. Similarly, American 
arms in Iran and thereafter Saudi Arabia only aimed at 
the balance of power rather i t s disturbance. The pol icy of 
"balance of deterrence", an important objective of arms 
supply, i s based on threat to the opposite power to prevent 
to start a d irec t war. 
TO be more specif ic , arms prol i feration in West Asia 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y a cold war character is t ic . I t measures the 
degree of cold war p o l i t i c s . For the fluctuations in 
weapons s t a t i s t i c s correspond with the sifcmilar trend in 
the intens i ty of cold war. During the period of f i r s t 
detente, arms transfers though coijtinued, l o s t the ir 
competitive character, superpowers began Arms control 
talk and President Cari:er was helped by the absence of 
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of soviet r iva l ry in formulating an arms res t ra in t policy. 
These features subdued with the emergence of second 
cold war,and«in consequence* arms exports and race 
restar ted. 
Arms prol i ferat ion i s a cold war phenomenon in the 
sense that i t s i s more po l i t i ca l than mil i tary in nature. 
Arms transfers have been entrusted with the goals like 
establishment of power bloc# containment of adversary 
power and achieving pol i t i ca l leaverage the basic 
features of cold war .pol i t ics . 
Arms and oil relationship, as described in detai l 
in the l a s t chapter, const i tutes the most unique charac-
t e r i s t i c of arms prol i fera t ion. In no other region of the 
world, there ex is t s a politico-economic and s t ra teg ic 
relationship between arms and any other commodity. 
The relationship has a great significance in economic 
context, pa r t i cu la r ly to the supplier of arms. I t also, 
simultaneously, reflects and shapes the po l i t i ca l aspects 
of rec ip ient -c l ien t re la t ions . In s trategic sphere, i t i s 
connected with the security of i t s traders; i t s denial 
may be catastrophic for the s t a b i l i t y of s tatus quo and 
ultimately the survival of the concerned s t a t e s . 
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The r e l a t i o n s h i p holds special s ignif icance f^ from 
the view po in t of the th i rd world and the West r e l a t i o n s . 
Oil i s the s ingle commodity, the West has been vulnerable 
t o . I t a lso h i g h l i g h t s the interdependency and mutual 
re l iance of two regions — inequal in s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l and 
economic spheres . 
Besides, p o l i t i c s , economics of arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
i s a lso a d i s t i n c t feature of the arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
in West Asia. I f not superior , economic i n t e r e s t s have 
played no l e s s s ign i f i can t ro le than p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c 
in s t imulat ing arms t rans fe r to and the acqu i s i t i on in 
West Asia. 
Economic benef i t i s the reason in the emergence of 
West Asia as the most l u rca t ive arms s u p p l i e r ' s bazar . 
A steep, increase in arms supply, o i l boom, t r a n s f e r of most 
advanced and highly expensive arms, general ly i r r e l e v a n t 
to the needs, and secur i ty of the r e c i p i e n t s the o i l r ich 
s t a t e s and sale of arms in huge quant i ty with 25 to 50% 
increase in market p r i c e , p l aus ib ly indica te the primary 
of economic motives in arms t r ans fe r po l i cy . During 70^ 
and 80® arms had been used as the most e f f ec t ive means to 
drain the foreign exchange. USA's supply during these ,. 
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two decades, remained pre-occupied with the re trans ferr ing 
of p e t r o d o l l a r , and that of USSR with earning of hard-
currency* 
On the s ide of the r e c i p i e n t s , amassing of large and 
surplus Income could only make the a c q u i s i t i o n of arms 
of high quant i ty and In huge quant i ty p o s s i b l e . 
Over expenditure on arms procurement, obsess ion with 
most advanced weapons and arms race among the s t a t e s 
mainly and merely for p r e s t i g e , can a l so be re la ted t o the 
econwnic c a p a b i l i t y of West Asian s t a t e s more than p o l i t i c a l 
expediency or s e c u r i t y concerns* 
A look a t the pat tern and trend of azmament in West 
Asia s i g n i f i e s that arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s a s t a t i c 
phenomenon in west Asia* The Middle E a s t ' s share in the 
world's t o t a l imports has dec l ined t o 1,4% (from 39,6 to 
37,7) in the decade 1977-1987 in comparison t o marked 
dec l ine in the share of other reg ions . The out-break of 
one c r i s i s a f t e r the other, invo lv ing both the superpowers 
and the l o c a l a l l i e s , has always maintained the s ta tus 
quo of arms t rans fer and a c q u i s i t i o n in West Asia . 
P r i c e - r i s e in the f i r s t ha l f and Sovie t threat in the 
second, maintained the c o n t i n u i t y of arms supply in the 
region through out the 70^, so d id , Iranian threat and -
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Iran-Iraq war in the 80° . And the current c r i s i s including 
growing Arab-Israe l i t e n s i o n s , may cause and, probably^ 
increase the arms inflow u n t i l and unless an other inpasse 
takes over i t . The s igning of world's l a r g e s t deal worth 
$ 21 b between Saudi Arabia and USA has s e t the precedent 
t o the future course of armament in West As ia . 
Preceeding d i s c u s s i o n s help to arrive a t conclusion 
that consequence of arms trade has not been inaccordance 
with the r e l i a n c e made upon i t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y , in the case 
of the r e c i p i e n t s . ^ 
As for as the r e c i p i e n t s are concerned, arms have 
turned West Asia from the d e s t a b l e region t o a v o l a t i l e 
area, as ,an Arab-Israe l i war, the long Gulf war and numerous 
border c l a s h e s have erupted in the l a s t , two decades which are-
marked by high and intensed armament. 
Arms, c e r t a i n l y , have been one of the bas i c fac tors 
promoting the outbreak and the ^scaiatlon of wars and making 
the p o l i t i c a l and the d iplomat ic means t o so lve the 
d i f f erences as unpreferable . 
At the beginning of 1970^ (l973) Arab and I s r a e l i 
enemies, armed with most s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons,once again 
decided to r e s o r t to war to s e t t l e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . 
Iran throughout 70® used armed aggression to s e t t l e i t s 
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scores with other s t a t e s . At the end of the decade growing 
m i l i t a r y might of Iraq, i n s t i g a t e d i t t o atcack Iran t o 
so lve the Shatt-al-Arab d i spute and o thers . In 1980's the 
Gulf war, i t s cont inu i ty — fought with world's most 
advanced weapons, p r e c i p i t a t e d i n s t a b i l i t y in the region, 
so has done the Iraqi occupation and annexation of Kuwait 
a t the beginning of 1990®.The present Iraqi might i s an 
outcome of I r a q ' s huge acquis t ion of an array of s c^h i s t i ca t ed 
weapons from as many suppl i ers as p o s s i b l e . 
Discr iminat ive pattern arms a c q u i s i t i o n in West Asia 
has made the region hetrogeneous leading t o b ig power -
small power dichotmy, and, more inportant ly , a weak and 
inequi table regional p o l i t i c a l order. 
Emergence and aggravation of internal discontentment, 
as noted in chapter 1 s t in d e t a i l , i s the r e s u l t of 
arms t r a n s f e r . To svunir.arize, arms transfers i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e 
foreign presence , undermine the economic progres s , create 
r 
corruption and help the m i l i t a n t approach of the governments 
towards the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ; a l l these are the important 
causes of the internal d i s s e n s i o n . Armed suppression of 
resurgents wins them popular support one one hand, and 
exposes the i n e f f i c i e n c y of the government to so lve the 
problem p o l i t i c a l l y * on the o ther . 
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Loss of po l i t i ca l power,control of o i l and s ta te 
revenue i s the gravest of the effects of arms aoqusltion. 
Acquistion of arms — the source of i n s t ab i l i t y — by' t r ans -
ferring the control over the crucial base fac i l i t ies^ has 
been doubl^/ harmful to West Asian s t a t e s , which have 
not only lost the power to exploit superpowers' in te res t s 
in the area, but have also become subject to the domination 
by the l a t t e r . For arms transfers have materialized the 
superpowers' objective to drag world's most s t rategic 
important area into cold war camps and, in resul t , turn 
the West Asian states as mere the proxies of the superpowers' 
regional and global s t ra tegy. This i s what, most exactly, 
Saudi Arabia has done by giving bases to US forces, which 
tiie l a t t e r was trying t o have eagerly and from as early 
as the s ta r t of 1980. 
Transfer of o i l — a source of the West's po l i t i ca l — 
economic survival-for the arms in unknown quantity and at 
highly exorbitant ra tes , a t t e s t s West Asia's squandermania 
and that too for nothing worthwhile. By continuously supplying 
o i l in large quantity and at reasonable pr ice, the West 
Asian s ta tes are themselves responsible for the fastening 
of the exhaustion of t h i s non-renewable source, and down-
grading of economic value of o i l which i s l ikely to s t i r r up 
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as the o i l reserves of other o i l producing regions exhuast 
in near future. 
Assurity and continuity of o i l t ransfer for arms 
has turned the o i l weapon ineffective. Because i t i s the threat 
of interruption only enhances the value of the o i l producing 
s ta tes in the eyes of the consumers. 
Oil for arms relationshiop as pr«cticed by the West 
Asian countries, clearly points out towards the t ransfer of 
o i l along with petrodollar to buy the arms. This trend can 
be referred as the most notable example of misspending of 
national income which/ otherwise, could be allocated to 
civi l ian economy to prepare the state for the post o i l 
economy• 
Truely spealcing, there does not exist any advantage 
of arms acquisition except that i t s has led to modernization 
of the defence system and maintenance of the status quo of 
West Asian st^ites,^ 
But, doubtful i s the usefulness of up-to-date 
defence of West Asian countries in the context of West Asian 
po l i t i c s and goe-strategy. Modernization of defence has not 
t ranslated into i t s prime objective, the national securi ty. 
Strategically dislocated smaller Gulf s ta tes of the area 
despite possessing new and advanced weapons'do not have the 
capabili ty to deter the bigpowers surrounding them. 
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The continuat ion of t he unpopular regimes i s the 
cause of growing i n t e r n a l resurgencies and a host of soc io -
economic and p o l i t i c a l problems, A change than s t a t u s quo 
i s good for West Asia. Such a change may pave the way for 
the establishment of a democratic power s t r u c t u r e , equ i tab le 
socio-economic system, and peaceful regional order , hopeful ly . 
The biggest advantage of arms t r a d e t o the .supplier 
i s t ha t i t accomplishes a number of ob jec t ives vrtiich o ther 
instruments of foreign pol icy have f a i l ed t o do. In p o l i t i c a l 
context , arms t r a n s f e r wins f r iends and br ings p o l i t i c a l 
leverage and inf luence . S t r a t e g i c a l l y , arms t r a n s f e r d i r e c t l y 
and i n d i r e c t l y prepares the way for base ' r i g h t s and s t r a t e g i c 
f a c i l i t i e s . On econcxnic s ide , i t improvises t he balance of 
payment, fetches maximum poss ib le p e t r o d o l l a r and also br ings 
surplus income. As a t r ade item, arms ensure smooth and 
suf f ic ien t supply of o i l . On domestic f ront , i t increases 
the production of arms for the defence forces , meets the R & D 
cost of weapons production, c rea tes employment and cont r ibu tes 
s i gn i f i can t ly t o the overa l l economic growth of the s u p p l i e r 
country. 
Arms happen t o be t he best ava i l ab le a l t e r n a t i v e to 
m i l i t a r y presence, and coordinate extremely well with the 
m i l i t a r y presence as w e l l . Arms go hand in hand with ideology 
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export in West Asia. USA used arms t o export Western values 
in I ran during the 70 and Saudi Arabia in 80®. Right from 
the Chezk dea l , Soviet arms t r a n s f e r , as i t s o f f i c i a l po l i cy 
also claims, has a s o c i a l i s t i c o r i en t a t ion since i t i s given 
la rge ly t o the countr ies having s«ni s o c i a l i s t i c o rde r . 
Arms i s t h e most e f fec t ive item t o b a r t e r o i l . Export 
of c i v i l l l a n goods and technology can not ensure t he s e c u r i t y 
of o i l supply, as these items are not as badly needed and 
t h a t too only from the West ' as the arms a r e . Demand 
of c i v i l l i a n items in West Asia also shows a descending 
curve. On the o ther hand, regular supply of arms secures 
simultaneous supply of o i l from the West Asian s i d e . 
Against the afore-mentioned advantages, arras t r a n s f e r 
i s a lso counter productive in many r e s p e c t s . Arms t r a n s f e r 
which c rea tes i n t e r n a l and external u n s t a b i l i t y , can be 
of great consequence to the suppl ier in t e r n s of i t s 
reduction or stoppage . Exploi ta t ion of the unstable s i t u a t i o n 
by an opposite power, regional or ex t r a - r eg iona l , may 
ha l t arms supply and a lso damage the p r e s t i g e and pos i t ion 
of t h e concerned superpower. I r aq i aggression against Kuwait 
i s the current example which demonstrates t h i s f a c t . 
This act of I raq would not only deprive USA from one of the 
important r e c i p i e n t s , but has already brought t o the l i g h t 
t h e inef f ic iency of US government to compell I r aq , e i t h e r 
- 181 -
by force or negot ia t ion , to withdraw from the occupied land. 
In s i m i l a r manner, fore ign arms and presence,which have 
aggravated t he i n t e rna l resurgences, are a l so^ the cause of 
t h e i r own stoppage or reduc t ion . For i f the i n t e rna l 
resurgencies succeed t o grab power they w i l l most l i k e l y 
abandon the supply from t h e previous supp l i e r . 
Superpowers' pol icy to c rea te regional powers by 
increas ing mi l i t a ry prowess of c l i e n t s with highly soph is t i -
cated has very often boomeranged. Having developed i t s e l f 
in to a regional power with the help of Soviet arms, Egypt 
withdrew from the Soviet camp, an unexpected loss to USSR's 
pos i t ion and presence in t he r eg ion . Had the Shah of I ran 
succeeded in h i s grand des igns , he would have tujmed i n t o « 
v i r t u a l superpower by hagemonizing the o i l r ich West Asia. 
I r aq , owing i t s present s t a t e of m i l i t a r y s t rength t o the 
Western suppl ie rs and US b le s s ings , as the reg ional power 
of West Asia, i}as shown capab i l i ty t o th rea ten US forces 
and t h a t of i t s a l l i e s , s c u t t l i n g the o i l supply t o i t s 
Western consumers and destroying the o i l i n s t a l l s t i o n s of 
USA's biggest source of o i l supply, Saudi Arabia^ I raq has 
remained undeterred by _ economic and arms embargo and 
p o l i t i c a l p ressures , and sha l l force the Western powers to 
negot ia te on I r aq i terms as the time passes by and p r i c e 
of o i l touches an unprecedented l i m i t s . 
- 182 -
Moreover, if US, western powers and Soviet economic 
and military efforts fail to deliver the good, the myth of 
bipolarity of international system will come to an erosion 
at the hands of Iraq. And in a multi-polar system,regional 
powers will determine the international politics. It is 
noteworthy in this context that a regional power in WeJst 
Asia,tQduegeo-strategic and oil factors, will be the most 
powerful , of all the regional powers including the present 
superpowers. 
During 1985-89, oil glut, dwindling prices of oil, 
decreased share of West Asian oil in total supply and some 
other related factors led to the relative downfall in arms 
supply from the West. Whereas, in 1990 the oil producing 
states by regaining their place in world oil market have 
decided to decrease the production and reverse the process 
of oil glut. Prices of oil have been increased to $ 18pb 
in recent OPEC summit. These shot up after the Gulf crisis and 
do. not seeip to go blow $ 20pb even if Gulf crisis comes to 
an early end. With the declining of import from non Middle 
Eastern sources, the share of Middle East oil shall grow. 
An increased share of oil in energy consumption in 1990^ 
in comparison to 1980^, has also been predicted. Since rising 
prices, increased import and major role of oil in economic 
production were the basic reasons beHiind arms inflow in West 
- 183 -
Asia, i t may be forcasted t h a t s imi la r t r end in economics 
of o i l in I979f sha l l c e r t a in ly speed up the arms supply. 
The present Gulf imbroglio sha l l immediately hasten 
arms acqu i s i t ion by the West Asian s t a t e s -co strengthen 
t h e i r na t iona l s ecu r i t y . The Gulf c r i s i s sha l l increase t he 
arms acqu is i t ion for a longer period even i f i t comes t o 
an end. The count r ies , l i k e Saudi Arabia, I s r a e l and Egypt, 
sha l l r e so r t t o heavy armament t o n e u t r a l i z e growing 
m i l i t a r y s t rength of I r a q . To view from the s u p p l i e r ' s 
pe r spec t ive , m i l i t a r y presence may be a temporary phase^ 
due t o var ious economic and p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s and 
compulsions. Arms t r a n s f e r , w i l l be prefer red as e f fec t ive 
means t o develop the m i l i t a r y capab i l i ty of local a l l i e s 
t o cope with fur ther s i t ua t i on once US army departs from 
V e^st Asia. Arms embargo on Iraq wi l l have only an i n s i g -
n i f i can t bearing on the t o t a l supply of arms to West Asia. 
Reduction of cold war t ens ions ' w i l l not, poss ib ly , lead 
t o the curtai lment of arms supply, because in West Asia,arms 
suRply;doejg not stem merely out of cold war r i v a l r y or arms 
race, as in Europe. I t i s the by-product of a number of 
regional f a c t o r s . 
The regions o ther than West Asia,^  are loosing t h e i r 
importance as arms r e c i p i e n t s . Central Asia and Indian 
- 184 -
sub-continent which were t he focal po in t s of arms 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n during 1980® have ceased t o be the c ruc ia l arma 
r ec ip i en t s with the end of Afghanistan c r i s i s . Therefore, 
in absence of arms s e l l e r s market e l se where in the world. 
West Asia w i l l again acquire a cen t re -s tage in wor ld ' s 
supply of arms. 
To conclude f i n a l l y , arms, though detr imental in 
many r e spec t s , have remained t o be t he predominant and 
most e f fec t ive instrument in the shaping and continuance 
of West As ia ' s r e l a t i o n s with both superpowers and other 
major powers a l s o . Added t o i t , i s t he fact t h a t in forseeable 
future arms seem to gain some ex t ra - s ign i f i cance as i t s 
supply i s supposed t o increase in West Asia a f t e r t he pause 
of l a s t f ive years on so . 
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APPENDIX - 1*7 
Values of impor t s of major weapons by West Asia , 1971-85, 
by r e g i o n . 
F igu res a r e i n Us $m, a t c o n s t a n t (1985) p r i c e s . 
B = f ive y e a r moving a v e r a g e s . 
R e c i p i e n t I97 l 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
reg ion 
Middle E a s t A 5601 5339 10,269 6760 7248 7398 9833 
B 5868 6572 7,043 7403 8302 7769 7619 
contd, 
C o n t d . . . . 
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1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
7605 6010 8665 9557 11^996 11,408 12*881 10,670 
7902 8334 8766 9527 10,901 11,302 
O^ietU Uhivirii<j Press >/ei^ y^v^ ^ usifj^a^ 
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APPENDIX - 1.8 
Values of imports of major weapons by West Asia, 1971-85, 
by country 
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Items do not add up to t o t a l s due t o orrission of r e c i p i e n t s 
with low import values , see a, 
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